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SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. 2. Religion in Law. 3. Is there a difference between religion 
and other kinds of faith? 4. Preliminary pieces of advice on this research. 
 
 
1 - Introduction 
 
From June 18th to June 22nd 2017 the first preparatory meeting of the newly-
born European Academy of Religion: the so called Ex Nihilo Zero 
Conference was held in Bologna. The Adec - that is the Association of Italian 
University professors of Law and Religion - decided to take the opportunity 
to discuss about one of the two terms of its denomination, which indeed - 
and probably in a contradictory way - has never been examined in depth 
within the legal framework itself. The research question was really very 
simple - and at the same time quite explosive: what is the meaning of the 
word “Religion” when we find it written in the Eu Courts jurisprudence? 
We read “Religion”, but are we sure that this word has a unique meaning? 
Are we able to give a unanimous definition of “Religion”? 
To give an answer, we launched a call for papers receiving twenty-
two applications focusing on likewise case studies that we discussed in 
Bologna on June 22nd in front of other scholars and interested persons that 
joined our session. Then we gave the speakers the opportunity to write a 
paper to disseminate our conclusions and hopefully to continue our 
discussion in the scientific arena. All papers were submitted to a peer-
review process - directed by Professor Maria Luisa Lo Giacco and me - and 
finally, we now publish thirteen papers in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo 
confessionale thanking Prof. Giuseppe Casuscelli for his kind hospitality. I 
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hope that these contributions will be able to offer an effective insight into 
our issue as well as the possibility to foster our research. 
 
 
2 - Religion in Law 
 
Our approach has been pragmatic. We analyzed formal judgements 
expressed by some different Courts well knowing that the frame is for sure 
wider and that this research question is not new at all. In the twentieth 
century, Rudolf Otto steered European scholars towards a new “religious 
centralization” defining “Heilig as an a priori”1 whereas Mircea Eliade 
stated that “the beginnings of culture are rooted in religion experiences and 
beliefs”2. Nevertheless, both scholars studied religion as a social issue 
without pointing out what religion is. Thus, we lack this definition. To find 
the best grounded meaning of religion in law one could examine several, 
different, historical, philosophical, anthropological, sociological and - why 
not? –psychoanalytical perspectives. Nevertheless, I have decided not 
to analyze all these different options in this paper, since for sure the 
meaning of religion originates out of the law, we, as jurists, must find the 
epistemic meaning of religion looking in other areas extra law. Robert 
Crawford made this effort collecting different definitions of religion and 
finally, he argued that each of them reflected different perspectives 
according to where their authors moved from, and definitively stated that 
religion cannot be defined3. In his opinion, all efforts to define religion seem 
to be doomed to failure.  
However, as we are involved in Law and Religion studies, we need 
to define as well as possible what religion is without necessarily claiming it 
to the law. In other words, it is important to state that politicians, judges 
and lawyers cannot think that the States - as Law makers - should give a 
legal definition of religion. That is not possible because of the State 
neutrality - or separateness - principle4, which, despite having different 
denominations all over the world5, in a few words impedes that the State 
                                                          
1 R. OTTO, Das Heilige: über das Irrationale in der Idee des Göttlichen und sein Verhältnis 
zum Rationalen, Beck, München, 1917. 
2 M. ELIADE, The Quest. History and Meaning of Religion, The University of Chicago 
Press, London, 1969, p. 9. 
3 R. CRAWFORD, What is Religion?, Routledge, London and New York, 2002, p. 3. 
4 About the “grey areas” according to this principle, see E. FOKAS, Sociology at the 
intersection between law and religion, in Routledge Handbook of Law and Religion, edited by S. 
Ferrari, Routledge, Oxford-New York, 2015, pp. 59-74, (on “grey areas”, see p. 63).  
5 See J. BAUBÉROT, Religions et laïcité dans l'Europe des douze, Syros, Paris, 1994; La 
Laïcité à l'épreuve. Religions et Libertés dans le monde (collective work under the direction of 
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defines religion. After all, we are well aware that there are many different 
ways to be religious, also without God6. This wide religious pluralism is a 
common good that the law must protect and promote. Nevertheless, I need 
to restate that, as jurists, we need to understand what religion is if we intend 
to give it a juridical significance. If it is impossible to claim a normative 
definition by the State-law, on the one hand - as lawyers - we shall look for 
this result within the interiority significance of religion (and religiosity) 
seeking useful paradigms in the daily life7. On the other hand - as scholars 
- in order to find this “religious sense”, we can help ourselves with an 
interdisciplinary approach, especially linked to anthropology8.  
Italian scholars of Law and Religion did not pay enough attention to 
this question, so we have to look for the answer in the international arena. 
In this way we have the possibility to find several academic contributions 
entitled “Law and Religion”. Therefore, we hope that these books and 
essays can give us the help that we need. However, our research seems to 
be quite useless because our Colleagues studied “Law and Religion” as the 
relationship between these two terms to better define a new academic area9, 
without explaining them. So, both law and religion are mainly seen as 
mirrors of the social aspect of our daily life, as Harold Berman has written 
and taught in more than one paper related to religion10. 
Russel Sandberg summarized all these Anglo-Saxon approaches to 
conceptualize “law and religion as including both the study of religion law 
and religious law”11. He explained why “religion law” and “religious law” 
are more preferred labels than “ecclesiastical law”, “canon law” and “law 
and religion”, but he skipped over the main question, which is again what 
                                                          
J. Baubérot), Encyclopædia Universalis, 2004. 
6 R. DWORKIN, Religion without God, Harvard University Press, Cambridge and 
London, 2013.  
7 As judge O.W. Holme stated “Whether Anthropology” that “science of man” upon 
whose road set lawyers seeking a foundation for their profession (The Law as a Profession, 
in Law Review, 1886, pp. 741-742).  
8 See B. FAEDDA, L’antropologo culturale e il giurista. Per una moderna antropologia del 
diritto, in Materiale per una storia della cultura giuridica, 2002, pp. 533-544; S. FERLITO, Le 
religioni, il giurista e l’antropologo, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2005. 
9 A. BRADNEY, Politics and Sociology: New Research Agenda for the Study of Law and 
Religion, in R. O’Dair and A. Lewis (eds.), Law and Religion, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2001; N. DOE and R. SANDBERG (eds.), Law and Religion. New Horizons, Peters, 
Leuven, 2010. 
10 Inter alias, see H.J. BERMAN, The Interaction of Law and Religion, Abingdon Press, 
Nashville, 1974.  
11 R. SANDBERG, Law and Religion, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011, p. 
7. 
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religion is. I mean religion in a proper sense, not as a synonymous of 
“religious freedom”12.  
When Norman Doe argued the necessity to define “religion” at the 
national legal level, he highlighted that the States of Europe “do not 
generally define ‘religion’ in their Constitutions or other formal legislations, 
but rather, leave it to the courts to determine whether something is 
‘religion’”13, but he used ‘religion’ to define “religious communities” as 
stated bodies according to the national law. That is to say “confessioni 
religiose” or “Religionsgemeinschaften” using the Italian or Germany 
constitutional expressions14. That is not ‘religion’ in a proper sense; it is 
‘religion’ as an established faith15. Indeed, that it is something different. 
Giancarlo Anello explained in Bologna the difference between faith and 
religion: “Basically, the term ‘faith’ is defined as having ‘complete trust and 
confidence’, while the term ‘religion’ is normally used to name a set of 
objective and firm rules, and it includes the doctrine and the institutions. Of 
course, it is possible to have faith in God or a religion, but it is also possible 
to have faith in a secular text”16. He also quotes Wilfred C. Smith, who 
explains that it is more accurate to discriminate the “faith”, which is the 
personal faith, from the “cumulative tradition”, which is the set of overt 
objective data that constitutes the historical deposit of the past religious life: 
churches, literature, rites, myths, so that the link between the two is the 
living person. The importance of tradition in the legal context has been very 
well described by Patrick Glenn, and it is not necessary to repeat it here17. 
As a consequence, when we look at religion in a proper way we have 
to refer to the implicit personal background that reveals itself as a space of 
overlapped beliefs, faiths, traditions, ethics, spirituality, convictions, which 
is strictly united with the human conscience. Religion in a proper sense is 
not religion as a juridical body or as rituals: these can be consequences of a 
specific way to express religion, but the latter precedes the first. It is their 
                                                          
12 As did C. HAMILTON, Family, Law and Religion, Sweet Maxwell, London, 1995, p. 
VII. 
13 N. DOE, Law and Religion in Europe. A Comparative Introduction, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2011, p. 21. 
14 M. VENTURA, Religion and Law in Italy, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den 
Rijn, 2013, p. 58, uses “Religious denominations” and G. ROBBERS, Religion and Law in 
Germany, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 2010, p. 122 “Religious 
communities”.  
15 J. HAYNES, Religion in Global Politics, Harper Collins, London, 1998, p. 10.  
16 G. ANELLO, in G. ANELLO e M. ARAFA, The meaning of ‘Religion’ in the Legal 
Context. Some Remarks on the Pragmatics of Islam in Egyptian Law, infra.  
17 H.P. GLENN, Legal Traditions of the World: Sustainable Diversity in Law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2000. 
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origin. Therefore, if we want to conceptualize religion in a legal - and very 
concrete - way, we have to focus its source, the human conscience, and then 
its pragmatic expression, the spirituality, which appears in several different 
features.  
I know that this is quite strange to say in a juridical sense since the 
law is a concrete social issue that regulates very hard items: property, 
branch, industries and so forth. Nevertheless, as the law is a social issue, it 
involves all human perspectives, and religion - seen as spirituality - is a part 
of human life. It is a tile of a wider mosaic. It reminds us - as jurists - that 
the law does not imply only our material bodies, but our souls as well.  
In my book Diritto e religione I stated that “there is no doubt that 
human existence is not a mere biological fact. Human life is composed by 
feelings, emotions, memories that put each existence in a sacred space”18. 
Nowadays, the religious presence in the public space prevalently does not 
assume the appearances of churches as established bodies that claim to be 
respected by the States. At the same time, few people see their religious 
feeling mostly as their belonging to a church19. Churches and religious 
communities are institutionalized forms of the religious social presence. 
They are consolidated and therefore well known. Nevertheless, they do not 
give anymore the correct image of the religious presence in the social arena, 
which is more individual than social and more private than public20. So, if 
the law wants to be incisive, it must shift its traditional paradigm moving 
from the institutional level to a social and individual one. In other words, it 
is necessary to move from the actual legal vertical position of the law and 
religion relationship to a horizontal one. That is to say no more - at least, not 
prevalently - focused on Church and State relations, but on the social 
religious sense felt by people. In fact, the experience of transcendent, 
traditionally referred to God21, is actually conceived as a “self-
                                                          
18 P. CONSORTI, Diritto e religione, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2014, p. 8 s. 
19 G. DAVIE, Believing without Belonging: Is This the Future of Religion in Britain?, in Social 
Compass, 1990, pp. 455-469.  
20 See L. DIOTALLEVI, Fine corsa. La crisi del cristianesimo come religione confessionale, 
EDB, Bologna, 2017, who, inter alias, quotes Religions as Brands. New Perspectives on the 
Marketization of Religion and Spirituality, edited by J.C. Usunier and J. Stoltz, Ashgate, 
Farnham, 2015. See also Religion in Public Spaces. A European Perspective, edited by S. Ferrari 
and S. Pastorelli, Farnham, Ashgate, 2012. 
21 See S. FERRARI, New religious movements in western Europe, in Religioscope, Research 
and analyses, 2006 (http://religion.info/pdf/2006_10_ferrari_nrm.pdf), p. 4 s. “Until the 1970s 
defining religion was not a real problem in most European countries: religion was largely 
associated with the idea of belief in and worship of God. From that time onwards the 
borders between religion, philosophy, and psychology have become increasingly blurred”.  
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trascendence”22. Spirituality, ethics, religion are part of the human 
conscience, which is the focal point of personal identity. In some way, 
nowadays religion is something less political than in the last Centuries. 
Anyway, it involves politics as well as the everyday life of men and women, 
more than the traditional politics according to the “balance of powers” 
between Churches (understood in a broader sense as a set that includes also 
non-Christian religions) and States. This is a new approach that the law 
must consider in new contemporary ways23. 
 
 
3 - Is there a difference between religion and other kinds of faith?  
 
The well-known art. 17 (the Consolidated versions of the Treaty on the 
European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) 
gives the opportunity to change the paradigm as in few words it equalizes 
churches (and religious associations or communities) and philosophical and 
non-confessional organisations, compelling the European Union to 
“maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with” both churches 
and philosophical and non-confessional organisations. That is quite the 
same result reached in the law of the United States of America that, related 
to the First Amendment interpretation24, includes in the meaning of religion 
“religious and nonreligious, moral, philosophical, and other strongly held 
beliefs”25.  
The concordance between religion and belief is strictly defined in the 
international law, for example in the 1981 Declaration on the elimination of all 
forms of intolerance and of discrimination based on religion or belief: 
“nevertheless, the term “religion” remains undefined as a matter of 
international law”26. Since we have noticed the impossibility to define 
                                                          
22 H. JOAS, Braucht der Mensch Religion? Über Erfharungen der Selbsttranszendenz, 
Freiburg im Breisgau, Herder, 2004; see also G. FILORAMO, Ipotesi Dio. Il divino come idea 
necessaria, Bologna, il Mulino, 2016.  
23 See M. HEROLD, Going beyond reason? Variant of intertwining religion and law, in The 
Routledge International Handbook of Education, Religion and Values, edited by J. Arthur and T. 
Lovat, Routledge, New York, 2013, pp. 350-361; M. RICCA, Klee’s Cognitive Legacy and 
Human Rights as Intercultural Transducers. Modern Art, Legal Translation, and Micro-spaces of 
Coexistence, in CALUMET - intercultural law and humanities review, 2016, pp. 1-40.  
24 For a complete glance to this issue, see J.O. USMAN, Defining religion: the struggle to 
define religion under the first Amendment and the contributions and insights of other disciplines of 
study including theology, psychology, sociology, the arts, and anthropology , in North Dakota Law 
Review, 2007, pp. 121-223.  
25 L.J. STRANG, The Meaning of "Religion" in the First Amendment, in Duquesne Law 
Review, 2002, p. 204. 
26 T.J. GUNN, The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of “Religion” in International 
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religion in a unique way - undoubtedly in law - we can follow Jeremy 
Gunn’s suggestion and distinguish religion related to law in three different 
facets: religion as a belief, as an identity and as a way of life27. This suggestion 
can help us to differentiate the unique guarantee that the law provides 
explicitly related to religion (and belief) in three - but, probably, also more 
than the three facets evoked by Gunn - ways that express religion in our 
daily life, and therefore worthy of legal protection. This is a concrete 
consequence of the religious and legal pluralism that characterizes 
contemporary multicultural societies, and impedes to give a narrow 
definition of religion. As Mario Ricca stated,  
 
“Religion and culture, if considered from a historical and 
anthropological point of view, are closely intertwined. Traces of 
religions can be found in many cultural habits, encapsulated in 
people’s conduct and in the schemes they use to understand the world. 
The secularized and even the atheist contexts still encompass, as a 
result of cognitive resilience, paradigms of sense rooted in religious 
experience and traditions”28.  
 
Therefore, if the law cannot be disinterested in religion, it must be aware 
that religion in a broader sense is hidden in a very wide range of habits and 
behaviors. It is a part of the so called “Mute Law”29 that the law in act must 
be able to give voice. From this point of view, there is no difference between 
religion and belief.  
Rather, these arguments introduce the necessity to better define 
analogies and differences between religion and culture, especially in front 
of the law, or better, in front of the protection that traditionally the law 
reserves to religion (and belief) as tiles of personal identity, instead of 
culture, gender, and race too - as it is expressly named in a lot of laws (for 
example, in the Italian Constitution) despite without actual scientific 
grounds. I dealt with this issue in Conflitti, mediazione e diritto interculturale, 
which I refer to30.  
 
 
4 - Preliminary pieces of advice on this research 
                                                          
Law, in Harvard Human Rights Journal, 2003, pp. 189-215. 
27 T.J. GUNN, The Complexity, cit., p. 200. 
28 M. RICCA, A Modest Proposal. An Overgrown Constitutional Path to Cultural/Religious 
Pluralism in Italy, in CALUMET - intercultural law and humanities review, 2016, p. 10. 
29 R. SACCO, Mute Law, in The American Journal of Comparative Law, 1995, pp. 455-467.  
30 P. CONSORTI, Conflitti, mediazione e diritto interculturale, Pisa, Pisa University Press, 
2013; forthcoming Multiculturalist Conflicts and Intercultural Law, in Maps on Conflict: Law 
and Culture in Fragmented Societies, Routledge, 2017. 
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The essays published at the end of our research offer a specific point of 
view, which is at the meantime a strong and a weak element. We are - more 
or less31 - all Italian scholars who have joined the Italian Association of Law 
and Religion university professors. We decided to deal with the 
opportunity to face an important issue for our research, although we were 
aware of our different backgrounds and most of all, that any of us are real 
experts of the State law that each of us decided to study, except - of course 
- Maria Luisa Lo Giacco and Cristina Dalla Villa, who analyzed the Italian 
jurisprudence.  
Our first effort was addressed to give the wider European panorama 
during the symposium that was held in Bologna. As previously mentioned, 
we planned nineteen presentations32; three scholars were not able to attend 
the Conference33; two choose not to write their presentation34; and others 
missed the deadline to submit their paper35. Thus, we are able to publish 
                                                          
31 With the exceptions of Professor M. Arafa, who is Egyptian, and Professor J. Bonet 
Navarro, who is Spanish. 
32 Maria Gabriella Belgiorno de Stefano (International University of Rome - UNINT), 
The Meaning of “Religion” in EHRC; Susanna Mancini (Alma Mater - University of 
Bologna, Italy), The Meaning of “Religion” in Luxembourg Court Jurisprudence; Federica 
Botti (Alma Mater - University of Bologna, Italy), The Meaning of “Religion” for the States 
of Eastern Europe in ECHR; Marco Croce (University of Firenze, Italy), The Meaning of 
“Religion” in Eu States jurisprudence related to Scientology recognition; Giancarlo Anello 
(University of Parma - Italy) and Mohamed ‘Arafa (Alexandria University of Law, Egypt), 
The Meaning of “Religion” in Egyptian legal System; Ludovica Decimo, Antonio Fuccillo, 
Francesco Sorvillo, Angela Valletta(University of Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli”, Italy),The 
Meaning of “Religion” in the Religious Arbitration Courts; Rossella Bottoni (Catholic 
University of Milan, Italy), The Meaning of “Religion” in Turkish Case Law; Enrica 
Martinelli (University of Ferrara, Italy), The Meaning of “Religion” in Greek Case Law; 
Cristiana Pettinato (University of Catania, Italy), The Meaning of “Religion” in the Maltese 
legal system; Jaime Bonet Navarro (University of Valencia, Spain), The Meaning of 
“Religion” in Spanish Case Law; Luigi Mariano Guzzo (University of Catanzaro, Italy),The 
Meaning of “Religion” in Polish Case Law; Chiara Lapi (University of Pisa, Italy), The 
Meaning of “Religion” in Irish Case Law; Maria Luisa Lo Giacco (University of Bari “Aldo 
Moro”, Italy), The Meaning of “Religion” in Italian Constitutional Court Jurisprudence; 
Cristina Dalla Villa (University of Teramo, Italy), The Meaning of “Religion” in Italian 
Supreme Court Jurisprudence; Germana Carobene (University “Federico II” of Naples, 
Italy), The Meaning of “Religion” in Belgian Case Law; M. Cristina Ivaldi (University of 
Campania “Luigi Vanvitelli”, Italy), The Meaning of “Religion” in French Case Law; Maria 
d’Arienzo (University of Naples “Federico II”, Italy), The Meaning of “Religion” in French 
Cassation Court Jurisprudence; Adelaide Madera (University of Messina, Italy), The 
Meaning of “Religion” in U.K. Juriprudence; Maria Rosaria Piccinni (University of Bari, 
Italy), The Meaning of “Religion” in German Constitutional Court jurisprudence.  
33 Maria Gabriella Belgiorno de Stefano, Marco Croce and Maria Rosaria Piccinni.  
34 Susanna Mancini and Jaime Bonet Navarro.  
35 Ludovica Decimo, Antonio Fuccillo, Francesco Sorvillo, Angela Valletta.  
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thirteen papers on the subsequent legal areas: European Court of Human 
Rights, referred to the States of Eastern Europe (Botti); Egypt (Anello and 
Arafa); Austria (Bottoni36); Greece (Martinelli); Malta (Pettinato); Poland 
(Guzzo); Ireland (Lapi); Belgium (Carobene); France (d’Arienzo and Ivaldi); 
United Kingdom (Madera); and Italy (Lo Giacco and Dalla Villa). Our 
perspective is therefore limited, so our research can be considered as a first 
step to a larger one. 
Our temporary results show the heterogeneous meaning of religion 
in the examined jurisprudence, related both to the national levels and to the 
singular cases. At first, it is possible to verify the most traditional meaning 
of religion accorded to religions as established churches or communities. 
That is very well pointed out in Poland - as analyzed by Luigi Mariano 
Guzzo related to the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster - and in the 
United Kingdom - Adelaide Madera discussed the recent case of the Temple 
of the Jedi Order - as well as in Belgium - Germana Carobene examined the 
Scientology case. Secondly, we can focus on the differences among the Eu 
States related to their religiously oriented traditions: their historical roots 
influence their laws and their interpretation. That appears very well 
especially in Greece, Malta and Ireland - studied by Enrica Martinelli, 
Cristiana Pettinato and Chiara Lapi - as well as in the Court of Strasbourg 
jurisprudence related to the European Eastern States (former Socialist) - 
examined by Federica Botti. Those traditional elements are strictly 
connected to the most recent non-discriminatory areas that arise from the 
study of the French and the Italian case law - due to Maria d’Arienzo and 
M. Cristina Ivaldi for France, and Maria Luisa Lo Giacco and Cristina Dalla 
Villa for Italy. The latter area shows a progressive importance connected to 
the law in act since the freedom of religion is above all a principle that the 
state is against discriminations. Finally, the paper proposed by Giancarlo 
Anello and Muhammad Arafa opens a window on the other Mediterranean 
shore and on the problematics determined by the current Islamic presence 
in Europe.  
Leaving scholars to their own reading, I hope that our contributions 
will be able to give the possibility to enlarge the discussion to better 
understand how religion works in current multicultural societies.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 She decided to change its subject moving from Turkey to Austria.  
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Giancarlo Anello*, Mohamed A. ‘Arafa** 
(*Professor of Anthropology and Institutions of Islam, Department of 
Humanities, Social Sciences and Cultural Industries (DUSIC), University of 
Parma-Italy, **Adjunct Professor of Islamic Law, Indiana University Robert H. 
McKinney School of Law-USA) 
 
 
The meaning of ‘Religion’ in the Legal Context.  
Some Remarks on the Pragmatics of Islam in Egyptian Law * 
 
 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction - 2. The Egyptian case. Direct relevance of the religion in 
the legal context: the Constitutional clause and the central role of the Egyptian Supreme 
Constitutional Court - 3. The meaning of religion in the Egyptian legal context. The 
cultural (indirect) relevance of religion in the decisions of the Court of Cassation about 
the Egyptian concept of public policy. The restriction of the faith in the Abu Zayd’s case 
- 4. Conclusions 
 
 
1 - Introduction 
 
The epistemic problem of the meaning of religion in the legal context must 
take into account, the general issue of the definition of religion in the social 
sciences. “Religion” is a concept that originates out of the law - in a 
dimension of knowledge dominated by literature, sources, oral traditions 
and behaviors and their specific methodology37 -, then it relates to the legal 
language and its categories. This paper will try to analyze the major 
epistemological profiles of the meaning of religion and to context the 
concept of religion (i.e. Islam) within the Egyptian legal system. Even 
though this reduction is not deeply studied, it still represents one of the key 
concepts of the legal theory. It seems necessary to deepen it in order to 
regulate secular societies and guarantee the freedom of religion within 
them. In anthropological terms, there is a large disagreement about the 
basic assumption whether it is adequate to describe religions by means of 
specific sciences or whether it is necessary to respect the letter of religious 
revelations. Probably another way is practicable, linking the historical study 
                                                          
* Giancarlo Anello is Author of the paragraphs 1, 4; Mohamed A. ‘Arafa is Author of 
the paragraph 2; paragraph 3 is in common. 
 
37 J. WAARDENBURG, Classical Approaches to the Study of Religion. Aims, Methods, and 
Theories of Research. Introduction and Anthology, De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston, 2017, 3 ff. 
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of religions with the pragmatic model of varieties of forms of religious 
experience.  
To begin, it should be noted that the history of the term “religion” in 
the West does not define any strict concept. The Latin word religio has a 
discussed etymology: it implies both an attitude (quality) and a set of rites 
(substance). For example, Cicero derives the word from the verb relegere 
which refers to all those men who are carefully engaged in acts of divine 
worship and, so to speak, those who read them carefully, then they are 
“religious” (De natura deorum, II, 28, 72). Later, Augustine again makes 
mention of the word re-ligare (Retractationes, I, 13) and, considering that in 
Greek there is not a specific term for religion (the word “latraios” simply 
refers to something which is hidden) he connects the meaning of religio to 
the word threskeia which literally means worship and piety and, under this 
respect, “religion” (De Civitate Dei, X, 1). Going further from the historical 
point of view, another important scholar Wilfred C. Smith affirms that 
 
“men throughout history and throughout the world have been able to 
be religious without the assistance of a special term, without the 
intellectual analysis that the term implies. In fact, I have come to feel 
that, in some ways, it is probably easier to be religious without the 
concept; that the notion of religion can become an enemy of piety. One 
might almost say that the concern of the religious man is with God; the 
concern of the observer is with religion”38. 
 
This opens the door to the distinction between “faith” and “religion”. 
Basically, the term “faith” is defined as having “complete trust and 
confidence”, while the term “religion” is normally used to name a set of 
objective and firm rules and includes the doctrine and the institutions. Of 
course, it is possible to have faith in God or a religion, but it is also possible 
to have faith in a secular text such as a Constitution or a civil code (secular 
religion). More specifically, Wilfred C. Smith explains that it is more 
accurate to discriminate the “faith”, that is the personal faith, from the 
“cumulative tradition”, that is the set of overt objective data that constitute 
the historical deposit of the past religious life: churches, literature, rites, 
myths, so that the link between the two is the living person.  
In recent years, the debate on religion has added concepts coming 
from the Asian/Eastern traditions39. Asiatic scholars affirm that there have 
been in the past relatively few languages into which one can translate the 
                                                          
38 Cf. W.C. SMITH, The Meaning and End of Religion, Fortress Press, Minneapolis, 1991, 
19. 
39 W. COHN, “Religion” in Non-Western Cultures?, in American Anthropologist, New 
Series, vol. 69, no. 1 (Feb., 1967), pp. 73. 
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word “religion” outside of Western civilization (dharma is one of them). 
More exactly, in the oldest traditions, there is no word to reflect the modern 
term of “religion”, that is, the concept of a unitary system of beliefs 
embedded by people. This is the case of the Sanskrit texts of Hinduism, of 
the Buddhist Mahayana, and of the Pali Buddhism Theravada. This was 
also the case of the ancient Egyptian or Hebrew texts, of the classical 
Chinese, as well as of the Greek texts of the New Testament40. Normally, all 
of these sources describe vital aspects of human behaviors such as faith, 
obedience and disobedience, piety, truth, rites, but not a self-contained and 
systematic entity of notions and beliefs. Islam is partially an exception to 
this scheme. While other traditions represent themselves as a set of beliefs 
or obligations, Islam is one of the few religious beliefs that, from the origins, 
represents itself as a “religion” among religions. It aims to be the best 
among the religions of humanity (inna dyna Muhammadin khayr al-adyan) 
and in doing so, it is ready for an explicit religious global competition. For 
example, the Islam is endowed of a proper name (“Islam” itself is a verbal 
name - a masdar - of the verb aslama) and its culture possesses a term (dyn)41 
which describes the religion as a system of beliefs and objective rules42. 
Again, Wilfred C. Smith deepens this point: 
 
“the word dîn in the seventh century Arabia had, in fact, many 
meanings, which may be classed in three principal groups according 
to three distinct sources. There was the new concept, as part of the 
impingement on Arabia at that time of the new ideas, movements, and 
sophistications from the surrounding cultures: namely, the concept of 
systematic religion. This was new, of course, not only in the sense that 
the idea was only beginning to be found in Arab’s minds. It was new 
more inevitably in that in the traditional life of these Arabs there had 
previously been nothing in practice to which such an idea could have 
referred. Arabian life had had facets that modern scholars, as with the 
Aztecs or ancient Egyptians, may dub and indeed have dubbed “the 
religion of” the pre-Islamic Arabs. But the customs and orientations to 
                                                          
40 W.C. SMITH, The Meaning, cit., Foreword, p. vii. 
41 It is interesting to underscore that the religion is an element of the ‘just character’ of 
judges. A.H.A.I.M.H. AL-MAWARDI, al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah (The Laws of Islamic 
Governance), Ta-Ha Publishers, London, 1996 , p. 100, reads that a judge must be: “being 
true in speech, manifest in his fulfillment of a trust, free of all forbidden acts, careful to 
guard himself against wrong actions, free of all doubt, equitable both when content and 
when angry, chivalrous and vigorous both in his din and his world affairs. When such 
qualities are perfected in him, this quality of justice - by which his testimony is permitted 
and his judicial authority is acceptable - may be said to be present. If, however, he is lacking 
in any of these qualities, his testimony is not accepted, his words are not accepted and his 
decisions are not executed”. 
42 W.C. SMITH, The Meaning, cit., p. 81. 
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which the modern student gives that name had not been organized or 
systematized or reified either sociologically or conceptually in the area 
itself by their participants. It was only as new religious communities 
with new ideas of religious life and loyalty began from outside to filter 
down into Arabia that the Arabs began to see alternative ways of being 
religious and hence began for the first time to see also their own ways 
as something conceptually identifiable, though still not consolidated”. 
 
There was a verbal noun meaning “judging, passing judgment, 
passing sentence”; and along with this, “judgment, verdict”. This is found 
also in the Qur’an, for instance in the expression “day of judgment” (yawm 
al-dîn). This represents an ancient Semitic root (…). Finally, there was the 
indigenous Arabic meaning: as the verbal noun of a verb “to conduct 
oneself, to observe certain practices, to follow traditional usage, to 
conform”; and subsequently thence as an abstract noun “conformity, 
property, obedience”, and also “usages, customs, standard behavior”. 
There was no plural”43.  
Somehow the Islamic root of the word reveals the idea of the 
perceptivity that lies in every man, or his perceiving soul, understood as his 
religious faculty or organ44.  
In sum, in the history of revelations the word “religion” has not 
uniform meaning and - as a consequence - each observer tends to identify 
something as “religious” as an extrapolation from his own culture. In other 
words, in defining religions scholars apply the model of the tradition they 
know and - more - describe other traditions in terms of it. This 
methodological issue must be taken into account before referring to the 
meaning of religion in the legal context. More specifically, this premise 
introduces the following complex question: how to handle this concept of 
religion and reduce it into the legal language and discourse?  
This point involves some other remarks like what is the role of the 
people’s culture in defining the concept of religion in the legislation and 
courts’ decision? To what extent the legal definition of “religion” is 
influenced by the regulative aims of the legal language? To what extent the 
religious law takes over the secular law in the contemporary legal 
interpretation? And to what extent the definition of a certain religion can 
contribute to design a legal & political system? 
In order to answer, we consider it very useful to find a way to lessen 
the opposition between religion as a faith and religion as a set of rules. In 
this field, recent studies have tried to breach the mind-body great divide 
adopted since the Cartesian age, proposing a concept of embodied mind 
                                                          
43 W.C. SMITH, The Meaning, cit., pp. 101-2. 
44 W.C. SMITH, The Meaning, cit., p. 287, footnote n. 61. 
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that is always in touch with the world, as well as a pragmatic model of truth 
or verification that takes the body and the physical world seriously. When 
it come to religious studies these theories represent the human person as an 
integrated body-mind system following the laws of nature and produced 
by evolution45. So we apply the distinction outlined by William James, who 
divided the religion into “ritual” and “personal,”46 to the legal theory. The 
first concerns God and divinity and deals with its institutional forms of 
worship; the second concerns man and deals with the forms of religious 
conscience. James argued that the personal religion came before the ritual 
religion. For instance, James reads: 
 
“in one sense at least the personal religion will prove itself more 
fundamental than either theology or ecclesiasticism. Churches, when 
once established, live at second-hand upon tradition; but the founders 
of every church owed their power originally to the fact of their direct 
personal communion with the divine. Not only the superhuman 
founders, the Christ, the Buddha, Mahomet, but all the originators of 
Christian sects have been in this case; - so personal religion should still 
seem the primordial thing, even to those who continue to esteem it 
incomplete”.  
 
Then, William James describes the personal religion as follows: 
“Religion, therefore, as I now ask you arbitrarily to take it, shall mean for 
us the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so 
far as they apprehend”. 
In a historical and scientific perspective, we may accept the idea of 
William James (he was a prominent psychologist) and thought that religion 
has origin from the inside, from the deep soul of the individual. 
Furthermore, this definition takes into consideration the problem of the 
embodied mind and the possibility to describe a cultural cognition of 
religious tradition and their evolution in time and space. Also in a strict and 
religious perspective, we may accept the idea that the religious inspiration 
of the human soul has originated by the direct action of God. This double 
assertion is convincing and satisfies the conditions of a rational description. 
In the history of religions, the Revelation is an explicit locutio Dei ad homines 
and it consists in the transmission of the message of God to the Human 
gender, by different means and ways. As far as many prominent religions, 
we may find the core of Revelation itself either in the moment of inspiration 
                                                          
45 E. SLINGERLAND, Who’s Afraid of Reductionism? The Study of Religion in the Age of 
Cognitive Science, in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 76, No. 2 (Jun., 2008), 
pp. 378-9. 
46 W. JAMES, The Varieties of Religious Experience. A Study in Human Nature, Longmans, 
Green and Co., New York, London and Bombay, 1902. 
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of the human conscience, or in the act of God. Going further, we discover 
two different forms of Revelation: in the first, the divinity reveals herself, 
her existence, nature and her powers (we call this kind of disclosure, 
“epiphany”). In the second, the divinity reveals her will or her truths to a 
human mind, delivering to a particular people or individual the clear 
consciousness of the divine Truth. Anyway, we may observe that there is 
no contradiction between the inner and human origin of the religious 
feeling and the supposition of an act of God. Both represent a good platform 
to ground the religious discourse and to move forward and so we do, 
defining the Revelation as a human feeling or as an action of God and 
considering this definition as the platform from we move forward to the 
problem of the categorization of religion in the legal context. Once 
crystallized in some form of a historical revelation, the concept of religion 
is recognized and regulated by the legal language and its categories. This is 
the second level of reduction of religion that entails refracting the terms of 
a religious tradition through the language of the secular and modern State, 
and through the prism of a specific legal system. Thus, the following part 
of the paper tries to analyze the meaning of the word into the specific legal 
discourse, taking into account the particular religion to which it refers to, its 
context and its cultural framework, which is, in this case, the Egyptian law. 
 
 
2 - The Egyptian case. Direct relevance of the religion in the legal context: 
the Constitutional clause and the central role of the Egyptian Supreme 
Constitutional Court 
 
The concept of religion enforced into a legal system is not neutral towards 
the freedom of religion guaranteed by the same system. This is apparent in 
the current situation in of Egypt. The scuffle to define and explain the 
concept of “Islam” in Egypt has a long legal and constitutional history as 
those who favor political Islam square off against those who prefer a more 
secular-oriented form of government. Generally speaking, the State’s main 
obligation in any country is to preserve public order and to protect and 
defend its national citizens. This duty is generally difficult to harmonize 
with the accountability of any non-state dynamic. Under this respect, the 
Authors premise that Egyptian people expel the accusations proliferated by 
extremist streams and radical Islamists that the concept of a “civil (secular) 
State” is anti-religious or that it interests only the prosperous minority. Such 
untrue discourse and dialogue by extremists misinforms the folks, as 
human logic and knowledge shows that a State which is based on just laws, 
fair statutes, and respect for human rights is not antagonistic to religion, 
and is in the public interest of the whole community. Furthermore, playing 
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on religious sentimentalities by saying that God’s (Allah’s) sovereignty - as 
argued by some rigid classical religious jurists - rather than the people 
destabilizes the legal institutions and main foundations of the modern 
democratic civil state by adopting and codifying theocratic and radical 
notions takes Egypt back into the Dark Ages. Accordingly, this opens the 
door to complicated issues in constitutional litigation, and the enactment 
and repeal of legal rulings according to religious interpretations based on 
misunderstanding of the principles of divine sovereignty in Islamic law. In 
this domain, the conflation of Islam and Islamism has permeated the 
interpretation of Egypt’s ethnic and personal character, leading one legal 
and political scholar to label the Muslim Brotherhood at the time 
where they were in office, as “the Muslims” or “Islamic” while calling their 
opponents “non-Islamic”. Islamism is considered a vague politicization of 
a specific religious attitude throughout the Middle Eastern Arabian World 
and cannot be associated with Islam as a belief or faith. The Egyptian 
Government, along with the Egyptians, are in favor of having a place in a 
civil democratic Egypt for quiet, peaceful Islamists who would not want to 
change the State’s national character and the form of its government into an 
Islamic religious theocracy. 
Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution issued in 2014 declares that 
Islam is the religion of the State and that the Sharie‘a is the main source of 
legislation. The Supreme Constitutional Court has been reliable in 
interpreting what the Constitution instructs in its second article since its 
amendment in 1980 confirming that the principles of Islamic Sharie‘a are 
[the] chief source of legislation. The Court has said that the principles of the 
Islamic Sharie‘a bind both the legislative and executive authorities. Among 
those, are the provisions that it is not permitted for any statutory text to 
contradict the Sharie‘a rulings: al-ahkam al-shar‘iyya alqat‘iyya fi elthubut wa 
aldalalah. These rulings only not subject to ijtihad (analogy), as they indicate 
the mabadi’a kulliyya (universal principles) and its usuliha al-thabita (fixed 
roots), which admit neither interpretation nor replacement that are 
unequivocally certain regarding their authenticity and meaning, hence, 
ijtihad is forbidden, so it is unconceivable that the explanation of [such 
values] would amended with a change of time and place, as it is haram 
(forbidden) to breach them or rotate their meaning. Over time, Egypt’s 
Supreme Constitutional Court outlined an approach to such cases, based on 
modernist Islamic thought, led by diverse religious scholars, that focused 
on the query of how to cognize (interpret) the Sharie‘a in an appropriate 
manner for a modern society’s needs. The Court pointed out: 
 
“that the use of reasoning, where there is no [scriptural] text, develops 
qawa‘id ‘amliyya (practical guidelines) that are, in their implications, 
softer for the folks and more concerned with their daily affairs and 
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[that] better defend their masalihhim al-haqiqiyya (true interests).Thus, 
statutory texts seek to recognize factual welfares in a suitable way for 
the individuals, confirming that the essence of God’s law [Sharie‘a] is 
justice, and that closing it (i.e. prohibiting re-interpretation) is neither 
adequate nor necessary, as the Prophet’s companions who used ijtihad, 
often created decisions totally motivated by the public interests 
keeping them from darar (harm), and saving them from pain, bearing 
in mind that these benefits grow in light of the circumstances of the 
society’s needs.”  
 
Legally speaking, the legislator is bound by the constitutional 
parameters and cannot exceed, contravene, or decline them. The Court 
recited: 
 
“this is the Islamic [Sharie‘a] in its (roots and sources), developing by 
necessity, declining [stringency]. In situations where there is no 
[obvious] text, ijtihad is only constrained by its dawabituha alkulliyya 
(universal controls) and Islamic law goals are not congested, it is not 
permitted to require the wali al’amr (follow mere) opinions in issues of 
the practical Islamic al-ahkam al-fara‘iyya (legal rulings) that subject to 
development per se.”  
 
Also, the orthodox Islamic scholars’ views on subjects related to 
Sharie‘a are not granted any inviolability [sanctity] or placed beyond 
assessment or verification, as they can be switched by other [Islamic 
interpretations]. In the same vein, opinions based on ijtihad in contested 
queries do not have any binding force per se, applying to those who do not 
claim them, as it is not acceptable to hold [such opinions] to be stable and 
established Islamic law that cannot be infringed. The Court defined in its 
ruling ijtihad and its functions, as it “must track methods of reasoning out the 
alahkam (rulings) and (mandatory chains) for the Sharie‘a (branches), preserving 
the main maqasid (objectives)”.  
Thus, the Supreme Constitutional Court has approved its influential 
authorization devotedly and has responded with a robust disposition to use 
its validity and recently enlarged policymaking ability to improve a 
reasonable liberal interpretation of Sharie‘a norms, as in most cases, «ijtihad» 
is required. So, the Court has shifted from the prehistoric traditions of fiqh 
(Islamic jurisprudence) or the collective facts and studying the schools of 
jurisprudential thought and has established a new framework for deducing 
and understanding Islamic law as the fallible human effort to apprehend 
the content of that guidance. Then the Court elaborated: «[…] there is no 
duty to legislate following the classical fiqh contents, as the new legislation 
must not be in contrast with the bulk of the law, but only after enactment 
and must achieve the”common good”».  
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It should be noted that the legal interpretation of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court must be outlined considering the religion’s role “at 
large” in the society, as a cultural factor, even in a strictly legal perspective, 
and hence, the Court role is not to establish the religion in the legal system, 
rather it is a symbolic reference of the religion’s importance in the Egyptian 
society. So, the point is not so much whether the religion is mentioned in 
the Constitution or not, but rather its legal tie must be accommodated with 
the liberal commitment to democratize the society. Further, the Court 
highlighted that  
 
“it is responsible for the obligation to watch out for any transgression 
of these Islamic rulings that are absolutely certain and to transpose any 
[legislative] qai‘da (rule) that contradicts them. This provision located 
the Sharie‘a rulings in a superior place over these [statutory] rules.” 
 
The Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the appropriate Sharie‘a 
commands were contestable, lithe, and subject to development, it also ruled 
that the relevant religious (divine) law was not sacred and could be 
modified, adjusted/replaced. The Supreme Constitutional Court’s ruling 
on the niqab matter is remarkable. First, the Court echoed its obligation on 
a potential implementation of Article 2 to laws endorsed after the 1980’s 
historical amendment. Second, it extended the Supreme Constitutional 
Court’s jurisdiction to ministerial decrees, so escalating the scope of 
legislation that falls under Article 2. Third, it underscored the requisite for 
developing a moderate interpretation of the same article that would be 
reliable with other constitutional provisions defending public rights. 
Finally, the Court involved in a self-sufficient functional interpretation of 
both the Qur’an and authentic Sunnah. All in all, the Court established its 
specific interpretation of ijtihad irrespective of the opposing attitudes in 
Islamic jurisprudence, and its classical techniques, and thus, it situated itself 
as a de facto interpreter of divine ideals and legal guard on the Sharie‘a 
values to avoid any extreme ideology or radical philosophy. It has 
advanced a flexible method to interpreting the divine law that differentiates 
between “unalterable and universally binding principles, and malleable 
application of those principles”.  
Laws that breach a strict, irreversible principle are acknowledged 
unconstitutional and invalid (annulled), but in the meantime, ijtihad 
(contemplation) is allowable in cases of textual gaps or where the relevant 
rules are ambiguous/open ended. Moreover, the government has been 
given comprehensive legislative will in policy areas where the Sharie‘a is 
found to provide uncertain or numerous responses, provided that the 
statutory product does not violate the Sharie‘a spirit (purposes) based upon 
a sensible, impartial secular ijtihad. Based on that ruling, the individual 
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reasoning rules via a mujtahid (qualified scholar) regulate the individuals’ 
affairs to defend those interests that are legally appropriate. In Islam, a 
mujtahid is eligible if he possess the (a) ultimate awareness of legislating 
ayaat al’ahkam (verses) along with the knowledge of Sunnah and its 
narrator’s reliability; (b) understanding of nask’h (abrogating/abrogated 
provisions) rules based on the repel theory; (c) knowledge of ijm‘a 
(consensus) and the familiarity with ‘ilm usul al-fiqh (ijtihad’s methodology 
through a complete understanding of reasoning); (d) mastering the Arabic 
language along with piety (Islam); (e) thorough understanding of makasid 
al-sharie‘a (Sharie‘a objectives). 
Generally, the mujtahid’s knowledge should be necessary in which it 
can be absolutely certain and then undisputable. This ruling is significant 
to determine the concept of the religious clause in a contemporary State 
constitution and to track the possibility of a pluralistic interpretation of the 
Sharie‘a reference consistent with the democratic state’s governance. The 
crises of Islamic law are due to the conflict with the modern state 
institutions. Likewise, the “eternity clause” in the country’s constitution 
[basic law] is designed to guarantee that the legislation/ constitution cannot 
be altered by amendment, as it recognizes that certain principles are part of 
the legal system, above and beyond the written constitution, and must be 
protected. Harvard Law School Professor Noah Feldman argues that 
“secularism of the Western variety is not a necessary condition of 
democracy” in order to justify the lack of separation between religion and 
State under an “Islamic democracy”47. Likewise, Lama Abu-Odeh has 
stated:  
 
“Islamic law should be approached as one, but only one, of the 
constitutive elements of law that has not only been decentered by the 
transplant but also transformed. Not only have its rules been reformed, 
but also its modes of reasoning, and its jurist class. Its treatises have 
been turned into codes, and its qadis turned into modern judges. 
Moreover, its internal conceptual organization, has been transformed 
by being reduced to a rule structure positivized in a code and 
dependent on State enforcement. Consequently, its normative hold 
over people has changed”48. 
 
Judicial authorization through a Sharie‘a clause is an diverting 
secular approach; that the obsession with this clause is part of extreme 
                                                          
47 N. FELDMAN, After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy, Ferrar, 
Straus, and Giroux, New York, 2003, p. 12. 
48 L. ABU-ODEH, The Politics of (Mis)recognition: Islamic Law Pedagogy in American 
Academia, in American Journal of Comparative Law, Washington, vol. 52, Jan. 2004, pp. 789-
824. 
 20 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 39 del 2017 ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
constitutional interest; and that validation of religious issues flings the ball 
from the political field to the legal scene. So, constitutionalizing the Sharie‘a 
hampers the awareness of the main political duty. The acknowledgement 
of the puzzling presence of Islamic constitutionalism (Islam and democratic 
norms) should lead to the constant openness of the compromise between 
the ethical and political arenas (pluralism). Thus, when anticipating 
essential religion and state demands, constitutional courts in religious 
democracies (members’ philosophical favorites + their own perceptive 
strategies) are powerfully motivated to rule within the community’s 
interests and prospects of liberal groups and authority holders. Supreme 
Court justices may be observed as tactical artists to the level that they 
pursue to preserve or enrich the court’s influential position vis-à-vis other 
foremost domestic decision, law, and policymaking apparatuses. Judges 
may agree upon playing it safe either by abstaining to decide or issuing 
equivocal/conventional rulings when the established motivation structure 
or political circumstances within which they function are not beneficial to 
judicial modernization (hyperactivism). This judicial shifting creates a key 
conundrum: how to guarantee that the courts will release decisions that 
echo the authority’s ideological preferences. In constitutional systems, 
particularly those functioning in civil law practice, the constitution 
expressly mentions public rights/freedoms but leaves the issue of their 
meaning and regulation to legislation and this is a latent dodge, as a right 
can be robbed of much of its significance. In this case, the Court recited that 
“it is improper that any law can destabilize a freedom under the justification 
of regulating its practice, as once Muslims have acknowledged-with 
conclusiveness-a Sharie‘a universal principle (fixed rule in an undoubtedly 
authentic text with a definite meaning), they must follow this principle or 
rule “as is,” and may not try to elucidate it away or reason out an alternative 
legal norm. 
 
 
3 - The meaning of religion in the Egyptian legal context. The cultural 
(indirect) relevance of religion in the decisions of the Court of Cassation 
about the Egyptian concept of public policy. The restriction of the faith 
in the Abu Zayd’s case  
 
Another issue of general concern is about the role of the people’s culture in 
defining the concept of religion in the legislation and courts’ decision. 
Under this respect, it is possible to affirm that the culture has an indirect 
effect on the law in designing the meaning of the religion in the public 
sphere. The examination of the legal interpretations of the concept of 
“public policy” shows that it is deeply rooted in the religion of Islam, since 
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it is a component of the culture of the majority of Egyptians. This indirect 
influence is striking when we observe the concept of “Egyptian public 
policy”, as reflected in the legislation and in the case law of the Court of 
Cassation. 
i. Public policy as defined by the Egyptian legislation: aside from article 
6(2) of Law 462 of 1955, public policy is mentioned only in the Civil Code 
and the Code of Procedure. Egyptian law does not define this term. Of the 
Explanatory Memoranda, only the one to the Draft Law of the Civil Code 
elaborates on its concept, using the common European interpretation of 
public policy as a flexible concept which may change with time and space 
in accordance with society’s needs. The flexibility of the concept also 
manifests itself in the fact that the judge is its sole interpreter. This 
description might also apply to public policy in interreligious conflicts law, 
since the Court of Cassation regard “public policy” in Civil Law and Law 
462 as one and the same. 
ii. Public policy as defined by the Court of Cassation: the Court of 
Cassation gave the most elaborate definition of public policy in its ruling of 
17 January 1979. The Court begins by pointing out that public policy in both 
international and interreligious conflicts law is the same, and defines public 
policy as a secular concept: 
 
“[Public policy] comprises the principles (qawa‘id) that aim at realizing 
the public interest (al-maslaha al-‘amma) of a country, from a political, 
social and economic perspective. These [principles] are related to the 
natural, material and moral state (wada) of an organized society, and 
supersede the interests of individuals. The concept [of public policy] is 
based on a purely secular doctrine that is to be applied as a general 
doctrine (madhhab ‘amm) to which society in its entirety can adhere and 
which must not be linked to any provision of religious laws”49. 
 
The Courts then makes an exception to this secular concept: 
 
“however, this does not exclude that [public policy] is sometimes 
based on a principle related to religious doctrine, in the case when such 
a doctrine has become intimately linked with the legal and social order, 
deep-rooted in the conscience of society (damr al-mujtamd), in the sense 
that the general feelings (al-shifür al-‘amm) are hurt if it is not adhered 
to. This means that these principles [of public policy] by necessity 
extend to all citizens, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, irrespective of 
their religions. This is because the notion of public policy cannot be 
divided in such a manner that some principles apply to the Christians, 
and others to Muslims, nor can public policy apply only to a person or 
                                                          
49 M. BERGER, Public Policy and Islamic Law: The Modern Dhimmī in Contemporary 
Egyptian Family Law, in Islamic Law and Society, vol. 8, No. 1 (2001), p. 104. 
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a religious community. The definition (taqdyf) [of public policy] is 
characterized by objectivity, in accordance with what the general 
majority (aghlab ‘amm) of individuals of the community believes”. 
 
According to Maurits Berger, in so stating without explicitly 
saying so, the Court stipulates that Egyptian public policy is rooted in 
Islam, since it is Islamic law to which the “general majority” in Egypt 
adheres in personal status affairs. In a ruling issued twenty years later, 
the Court of Cassation is more outspoken: 
 
“[...] Islamic law is considered an [inalienable] right of the Muslims (fi 
haqq al-muslimin), and is therefore part of public policy, due to its 
strong link to the legal and social foundations which are deep-rooted 
in the conscience of society”50. 
 
In sum, although the Court of Cassation holds that public policy is a 
secular concept that applies to all Egyptians regardless of their religion, in 
its legal decisions it defines the public policy as «the principles which are 
deemed essential in Islamic law». In so doing, the Court admits that certain 
principles of Islamic law prevail over the laws of (Egyptians) non-Muslims. 
It should be noted that this implicit conception of the “culturally-religious” 
public sphere legally limits the freedom of religion of individuals in an 
indirect way, without any evaluation of the subjective position of the 
faithful and the objective contents of his opinion and behaviors. 
Another decision of Egyptian courts in a matter of public policy 
shows the danger of this limitation of meaning and interpretation: this was 
the case of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd51. Abu Zayd was an Egyptian and a 
Muslim assistant professor of Islamic studies and literature in the Arabic 
department of the Faculty of Literature at Cairo University. He was the 
author of several publications among which Imam al-Shafi`i and the 
foundation of medieval ideology (al-imam al-Shâfi`î wa ta'sîs alidyûlûjiyya al-
wasatiyya) and The concept of text: a study in the sciences of the Koran (Mafhûm 
al-nass: dirâsa fi `ulûm al-Qur'ân). In May 1992, he submitted an application 
for a promotion to full-time professorship. On the basis of one single 
unfavorable report (claiming the “obvious impiety” of Abu Zayd’s 
writings), the Promotion Committee decided that there was no ground for 
promotion and, on the 18th of March 1993, the Cairo University Council 
agreed to reject the request. Hitherto confined to the university walls, the 
case takes on a new aspect when, on the 16th of May 1993, a group of 
lawyers filed a lawsuit to the Personal Status division of the Giza Court of 
                                                          
50 M. BERGER, Public Policy, cit., p. 105. 
51 B. DUPRET, J.-N. FERRIÉ, The Inner Self and Public Order: About a Recent Egyptian 
Affair, in Yearbook of the Sociology of Islam, 2001, 3, pp. 141-162. 
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1st instance, in which they filed a suit against Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, 
requesting a verdict of nullification of his marriage with Ibtihal Yunis, his 
wife, an Egyptian and a Muslim, the motive being that the publications of 
the former  
 
“contain elements of impiety (kufr) thus excluding him from Islam”, 
“allowing him to be considered an apostate (murtadd)”, and “calling 
for the application, in his case, of the provisions (ahkam) related to 
apostasy (ridda)” and that, “among the unanimously recognized 
(mujma` `alayhâ) consequences (athâr) of apostasy in jurisprudence, is a 
judgment calling for the separation of the spouses”52. 
 
The defense of Abu Zayd was organized, among other ways, around 
the idea of the lack of personal interest of the claimants. But here the 
element of the hisba came in. That is how claimants claim their right to file 
a case in all matters related to Islam, the argument being that the personal 
interest of any Muslim is thus involved. Technically speaking, the 
possibility of invoking the hisba depends on the competence of the tribunals. 
The court of first instance, keen on demonstrating the isolation of a 
precedent of the Court of Cassation, preferred to refer all conflicts dealing 
with personal status to the provisions of civil procedure. By rejecting the 
hisba argument, the court could thus reaffirm that a personal interest in the 
cause is necessary for making a lawsuit pertaining to civil matters 
admissible. The conclusion was drawn that  
 
“all things taken into account, the request submitted puts all the claims 
introduced under the heading of a hisba request, based on Islamic 
Sharie‘a rules, and the claimants, when introducing it, cannot claim a 
direct and real interest as defined by the law”53. 
 
The group of lawyers, on the 10th of February 1994, appealed the 
decision. To begin with, the Court of Appeal declared invalid the 
interpretation of the first instance judge. In as much as, no legal text deals 
with the specific question of the hisba, it is appropriate to refer to the main 
texts of the Abu-Hanifa school. The Court goes on to affirm the validity of 
this procedure for all matters pertaining to one of God's rights (haqq Allâh), 
or to the violation of a prescription established by the Law of God. In this 
respect  
 
“the Court indicates that what is meant by the rights of the All-Mighty 
and His sacrosanct due (hurumâtihi) is everything related to the general 
interest, to the Islamic community as a whole (umma islâmiyya), as well 
                                                          
52 Extracts from the lawsuit, as quoted by the Giza court of 1st instance, January 27, 1994, 
judging the claim inadmissible. 
53 Court of 1st instance, 27 January 1994, judgment on the admissibility of the lawsuit. 
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as everything pertaining to God and what relates to the general interest 
of Islamic society, so drawing a distinction between the latter and 
peoples' rights as related to individual rights in a limited and 
particular way (`alâ sabîl al-tahdîd wa’l-ikhtisâs). [...] The point here is to 
denounce a reprehensible act (munkar) which occurred, and to 
command a rightful act (ma`rûf) which may have long been neglected. 
Consequently when the claimants filed their case asking for the 
separation of the first defendant [Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd] from his 
wife, the second defendant, they were claiming for a recognition of the 
fact that the former had committed apostasy against Islam, while the 
latter remains a Muslim, thus justifying a hisba action, bearing in mind 
all the preceding arguments”.  
 
Having thus established the basis for annulling the judgment 
pronounced by the court of first instance and judging the appeal admissible, 
the Court dealt with the issue of proving apostasy. Recognizing the absence 
of any text in Egyptian law or in the regulations governing personal status 
tribunals that would authorize any tribunal to judge the quality of a 
citizen’s Islam, and consequently his impiety or his apostasy, the Court 
affirmed that this absence did not affect the case when the apostasy left no 
room for doubt. Before evaluating Abu Zayd’s case according to this 
criterion, the Court created a very important distinction “between apostasy 
- a material act with its own bases, conditions and criteria of occurrence - 
and conviction”. By so doing, it gave apostasy a legal status by 
characterizing it as “a material act having an external existence”. 
 
“The investigation of the occurrence of apostasy is, consequently, part 
of matters of priority pertaining to the competence of the mentioned 
courts who cannot be set aside in the petition for separation. This 
matter of priority does not exceed their field of competence. The court 
does indicate that there is a distinction between apostasy - a material 
act with its own foundations (arkân), conditions (sharâ'it) and criteria 
of prevention (intiqâ' mawâni`ihi) - and belief (i`tiqâd). Apostasy 
necessarily pertains to material acts with an external existence. Such 
facts must, necessarily, manifest themselves without ambiguity (labs), 
without divergence about the fact that he lied to God - glory be to Him 
-, or lied to His Messenger - may the peace and blessings of Allah be 
upon Him - to the extent where he rejects (yajhad) what made him enter 
the faith of Islam. If it is heard saying that he committed no impiety by 
a precise act, or if the proof thereof is weak, one cannot draw a 
conclusion as to his impiety and this cannot lead to a declaration that 
he is impious because impiety is a very serious matter. One is not 
authorized to declare a Muslim as being impious as long as there is a 
report excluding his excommunication (`adam takfîrihi). As for 
conviction, it is what a man keeps confidentially within him (yusirru), 
that which he firmly believes within his heart and which he intends. 
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This is obviously different from apostasy which constitutes a crime 
(jarîma) endowed with its own material foundation and which is 
submitted to justice so that it may conclude as to its occurrence. This 
falls within the purview of what justice is competent to examine or of 
what has to be judged and what is relevant to it. Conviction is, on the 
contrary, what falls within the purview of the human soul and what is 
enclosed in a man's inner self. It is a matter to which justice has no 
access. People must not enquire about it. It has to do with the relation 
between man and his Creator. Apostasy is an exit, to the highest 
degree, from the Islamic regime, by obvious material acts. In positive 
law, this comes close to dissidence (khurûj) from the state and its 
regime or high treason (khiyâna `uzmâ). The judge and the mufti are the 
ones to decide in matters pertaining to apostasy”54. 
 
The comment of Dupret/Ferrié on the decision considers the 
rationale as a clear attempt to extend what is the culture and the religion of 
the majority under the cover of a restrictive definition of intimacy. They 
asserts: 
 
«[…] the judge operates a typically modern distinction between 
religion, which he defines as the intimate relation with the Creator, 
pertaining to the inner self, and the law of the state, thus differentiating 
an individual subject of God from another one, subject of the state; he 
declares the first subject to be a private man, as the “Moderns” had 
always wanted it to be; the second subject he considers to be a public 
man. By so doing he, involuntarily, displaces the issue of apostasy 
from the domain of a religious economy of meaning to the domain of 
the law, i.e. to a site where the constitutive constraints of the social link 
as a latitude for the individual are clearly defined. This displacement 
situates the issue of apostasy within a, henceforth, secular logic, 
whatever the reference to the religious idiom»55. 
 
 
4 - Conclusions 
 
The study of the notion of religion into the legal discourse first involves 
some methodological premises connected with the particular scientific 
history of the notion56, then implies some characteristic conceptual 
reductions in order to describe and regulate the different religious 
behaviors by the legal theory, logic, language, and reasoning. Analyzing the 
                                                          
54 Cairo Court of Appeal, Fourteenth Chamber of Personal Status Disputes, June 14, 
1995. 
55 B. DUPRET, J.-N. FERRIÉ, The Inner Self and Public Order, cit., pp. 160-1. 
56 J. WAARDENBURG, Classical Approaches, cit., 373 ff. 
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case of Egypt, we can distinguish almost four legal nuances of this 
linguistically-pragmatic process. At the same time, we must be aware that 
all those nuances have practical legal effects on human rights: 
1. The meaning of religion in the legal context often refers to an 
objective set of rules instead of a singular and inner faith: both the 
Constitution and the Supreme Constitutional Court cases have 
implemented this kind of conception57. According to the legal reasoning, a 
religion typically involves a particular and comprehensive set of rules, and 
this aspect of religion prevails over the idea according to which religion is 
a deeply held personal conviction of beliefs connected to an individual’s 
spiritual faith and integrally linked to one’s self-definition and spiritual 
fulfillment. The case of Abu Zayd tell us that the judges considered more 
the religion as an objective set of public legal rules rather than a faith, also 
in a case in which the sphere of intimacy was so deeply involved, in so 
doing evaluating only the conformity of the behavior of Abu Zayd, not his 
sincere faith. As we will see in short, this effect can represent a legal 
restriction of the freedom of individuals.  
2. The previous sense of religion in the legal context favors the 
collective form of religions: the present reduction is a consequence of the 
former effect. The idea of a set of collective practices, which allow subjects 
to foster a connection with the divine, thorough a community which follows 
the rules in a legal context entails that denominational postures prevails 
over individuals’. This is not only the case of the Islam. In some other 
countries, like Belarus or Estonia, all the legal definition of religion make 
only mention of religious collectivity, associations, monasteries, religious 
brotherhood, missions, and sects. This legal definition needs always a 
structured organization of only specific type, while there are other kinds of 
religious organizations or experiences that are not even mentioned in the 
public provisions, with the result that they legally do not exist58. Under this 
respect, the Egyptian case demonstrates that number of faithful and the 
religious majority count in defining the religion in the public and legal 
context and that the legal effects are not neutral from the particular religion 
that the community follows (Islam, Hinduism, Christianity, etc.). For 
example, in defining the public policy, courts admitted that certain 
principles of Islamic religion prevail over the laws of (Egyptians) non-
Muslims.  
                                                          
57 See in the same terms also Syndicat Northcret v. Ansalem, 2004 SC 47 [2004] 2 S.C.R. 
551. 
58 Cf. A. SHARMA, Problematizing Religious Freedom, Springer, Dordrecht Heidelberg 
London New York, 2012, p. 22. 
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3. The meaning of religions in the legal context often depends on the 
formal legal recognitions: religion is not considered per se, but it needs 
norms (constitutional, domestic & international laws, religious rules when 
directly applicable) normally defining the “freedom” of religion and its 
characteristics instead of an implicit recognition of the posture of the soul 
or the inner self attitude. This kind of reduction entails several problems 
faced in order to lay down a universal Human Rights’ formula which 
contains all the possible expressions of world religions, because the concept 
of religious freedom cannot be divorced from the concept of religion and 
vice versa. It has also been noted that the common used conceptualization 
of religious freedom seems to assume the characteristic of the western 
concept of religion, so that every religion possesses a creed; that every 
religion contains a distinction between the sacred and the secular; that one 
could belong to one religion at a time. This conception seems to emphasize 
the element of freedom to choose or to abandon a religion but seems to 
ignore the element of unrestricted access to religions without the need to 
convert. In a semantically enlarged context like that one of a multi-religious 
society, probably we should distinguish between proclamation of religions 
and proselytization of religions. By proclaiming religion, religious actors 
enhance religious freedom of the collectivity; by proselytizing they 
arguably limit the religious freedom of the collectivity59. In the first case 
they increase the awareness of religions in a given (globalized) society; in 
the second case, they can provoke an alternative choice which can be 
interpreted as a restriction of plural possibilities.  
4. The practical content of religious freedom depends on the concept 
of religion which is assumed in the norms: the Abu Zayd’s case is a clear 
example of the fact that the religious freedom cannot be divorced from the 
kind of religion to which it refers to. In the case, the - so to speak -“set of 
rules-meaning” (of religion) prevails over the “faith-meaning” (of religion). 
As a consequence, the hisba process - which is historically connected to the 
role of Islam in the public sphere and to the culture of the Egyptian society 
- limits the extent of the religious heterodoxy in the interpretation of the 
law. More in general, in the Islamic world, the more is the apostasy 
considered the denial of the religion as a “set of rules”, the less there will be 
room for the religion as a “faith”.  
 
ABSTRACT: No other idea than “religion” needs more to be qualified and 
recognized into the legal categories, in order to regulate societies and guarantee 
freedom of religion. The problem is that “religion” is a concept that firstly origins 
out from the law, in a dimension of knowledge dominated by the religious sources 
                                                          
59 A. SHARMA, Problematizing Religious Freedom, cit., p. 22. 
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and literature. Only in a second moment, the concept of religion is recognized and 
regulated by the legal language and categories. The aim of the paper is to make a 
comparison of the way to describe the idea of religion into the legal discourse, 
taking into account the ways to regulate the religion in the public sphere of 
countries of different culture. In order to achieve their goals the Authors try to 
comparatively use their respective legal cultures, by analyzing the context in 
which the term “religion” is defined in the Egyptian legal system, considering not 
only some important key-rules (Constitution, decisions of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court and Court of Cassation) but also the cultural background of 
the categorization, like the presence of religious actors, the role of the public 
opinion, and the importance of the academic knowledge. 
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The meaning of ‘Religion’ for the former Socialist Countries in ECHR 
 
 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction - 2. The laws of the former socialist states of Europe: 
characteristics and peculiarities - 3. The decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights on religious freedom in the former socialist countries - 4. Conclusions. 
 
 
1 - Introduction 
 
Religious freedom in former European socialist countries is a recent 
achievement when compared to the other continent states of a longest and 
more established democratic tradition.  
However, although the deployment of this freedom finds its origins 
in different vicissitudes, East and West Europe today are united by the duty 
to resolve the same issues. 
While in the West the acquisition of legislation for the defense and 
the protection of the religious phenomenon has had a constant and linear 
processing, this can not be said for former socialist countries. 
At a first stage, Eastern European countries, freed from state atheism, 
were subject to the assault of "new religious movements" who used a kind 
of vehicular, fast and cheap communication, such as the web. 
These new religious denominations have attempted to settle in 
territories that they considered at one time unrelated to religious 
experiences and at the same time in need of them, affecting the individual 
dimension of religious freedom through intense proselytizing. 
The countries concerned by this phenomenon, fearing to see their 
cultural references transformed, preferred to revitalize the traditional cults 
as an identity function, restoring their public role, in many cases 
establishing privileged relationships with them and managing 
relationships with religious communities through a new legislation that 
privileged in many cases relationships with one organization for each 
denomination60.  
                                                          
60 Bulgaria has chosen to privilege relations with the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, as 
Orthodox religion is identified in the Constitution as the traditional religion of the 
Bulgarian people (Article 13). A preference for Catholic religion was expressed by: 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Croatia and Lithuania. Instead, countries which opted for a 
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The next impact was the explosion of migratory phenomena These 
countries have at the same time become places of emigration, exporting 
their traditional cultures to the West, while immigration from the South of 
the world imported new cultures in their territories or, in an even more 
alarming way, revitalizing religious and ethnic communities that they had 
fought even using ethnic cleansing during the remodeling phase of their 
state61. 
It is therefore important to analyze this complex phenomenon 
because, on the one hand, it affects the multireligious composition of the 
Western Europe countries and, on the other, it explains the reasons why 
many of these Eastern countries are resolutely opposed to immigration62, 
which characterizes the current historical phase of Europe, and to the 
introduction of new cultures, which has strongly influenced the very 
concept of religious freedom that these nations have. 
These issues have created a number of conflicts that have become the 
subject of multi-level rights protection. 
This process has come to the attention of the European Court of 
Human Rights, especially in those apical themes that have characterized the 
various national societies. 
The case law of the Court must therefore be read in the light of the 
general framework outlined in order to be able to understand its 
characteristics, problems and decisions so that said case-law is seen in the 
perspective of the development of new rules capable of mediating the 
conflict. 
                                                          
somewhat equidistant position between the religious cults were Romania, Serbia, 
Montenegro, Macedonia, Slovenia and Ukraine, while Belarus has shown preference for 
relations with the Orthodox Church of Moscow obedience. Latvia and Estonia look more 
favorably at the Lutheran National Church, while the Czech Republic sees the atheist 
positions prevail among the population and thus maintains an equidistant position among 
the religious cults. Albania practices the absolute equality of cults and the separation 
between them and the state in the context of pluralist confessionism. 
61 G. CIMBALO, Libertà religiosa e cittadinanza nell’area balcanica, in Quaderni di Diritto e 
Politica Ecclesiastica, I, 2016, pp. 151-165. 
62 The Visegrád group was formed in 1991. Today, part of it are Poland, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia and Hungary. Their cohesion was strengthened in 1999 by the establishment of 
the Visegrád Investment Fund for the enhancement of their economies. These countries 
had opposed to the decisions of the European Union on the resettlement of immigrants by 
quotes in the countries of the Union. On 6 September 2017, the Court of Justice dismissed 
the actions brought by Slovakia and Hungary against the relocation of asylum seekers from 
Italy and Greece, confirming the (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015.  
The unsuccessful countries, supported by Poland and the Czech Republic, refuse to 
enforce the sentence even at the expense of having to abandon communitarian funding, 
claiming that they do not want to introduce people of Islamic faith in their territories. 
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2 - The laws of the former socialist states of Europe: characteristics and 
peculiarities 
 
The crisis of the states of socialist democracy has brought in all Eastern 
European countries the change of constitutional norms and the consequent 
introduction in the new Constitutions of norms aimed at the protection of 
religious freedom. 
With the set of rules in force before 1989, religious issues had been 
"resolved" with the imposition of state atheism. The latter had, from the 
point of view of the exercise in associate and organized form of the various 
cults, to the denial of the public role of the religious communities, while, as 
far as the individual aspect of the exercise of religious freedom had led the 
various socialist regimes to enact specific repressive standards.  
The abovementioned regimes thus left as legacy the new ones, 
established from the nineties of last century, the principle of separation 
between state and religious communities and the propensity, except for 
some exceptions, to a special form of protection for the traditional and 
prevailing religion in their respective country63.  
Indeed, although the proclaimed Soviet atheism has influenced the 
regulation of relations between the state and religious communities in that 
area, it has been realized in different ways to the point that it allowed - with 
the only exception of Albania - the survival of favorable relations, though 
limiting autonomy, with their respective traditional Churches. 
The proclaimed separatism and the negation of the autonomy of 
religious communities, in any case, did not exempt the latter from the 
emergence of inter - and intra - confessional conflicts which, even after the 
fall of socialist regimes, remained largely submerged for a long time due to 
the absence of legislative and jurisprudential intervention which in fact 
avoided the resolution of these issues. 
The incorporation into the Constitutions, in execution of the Treaty 
of Copenhagen (1995), of the subject of religious freedom as one of the 
conditions for the recognition of the democracies of the new regimes, put 
back at the top the issues highlighted. 
We find an evident track in the laws on religious freedom, emanated 
from almost all States 64. These laws necessarily had to take on the task of 
regulating at least some issues, such as: 
                                                          
63 The above-mentioned case of Bulgaria is emblematic. Other states such as Hungary, 
for example, make this choice by referring in this case (Article VII of the Constitution 3) to 
a special organic law or to the general law on religious freedom. 
64 All the laws on religious freedom emanated from Eastern Europe, in their historical 
succession, can be consulted on the website http://licodu.cois.it.  
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1. the presence of an official or identity religion and the 
relationship between it and other cults;  
2. conflicts within religious communities, also due to the 
interference made by the past regimes on the organization of the same in 
order to condition their autonomy; 
3. the presence of new cultures that were to be added to the 
traditional countries of the various countries that had come from the 
obscuring ashes caused by atheism. 
It should be added that the opening up of the political and cultural 
frontiers of these countries gave way to proselytism activities of the 
religious organizations from all over the world. The latter considered that 
the area under consideration was a fertile and virgin land of evangelization 
and therefore launched a massive religious propaganda campaign in these 
territories. This type of conduct has found a clear opposition of the 
traditional confessions that have appealed to new political authorities so 
that the laws on religious freedom would hinder or at least contain the 
phenomenon of new cults65. 
Thus, constitutional law legislation and the laws on religious 
freedom of ex-socialist countries of Eastern Europe faced the problems that 
we are currently facing among the actions of the EDU Court. 
 
 
3 - The decisions of the European Court of Human Rights on religious 
freedom in the former socialist countries 
 
One of the most relevant matters covered by the ECHR's decisions, is 
undoubtedly the contrasts that have arisen in traditional religious 
confessions in order to be accredited as unique and exclusive 
representatives of the religious denomination. 
Significant and emblematic in this sense is the conflict in Bulgaria 
between the Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and the 
Alternative Synod66.  
                                                          
It is exceptionally Albania that has refused to enact a specific law on religious freedom, 
but regulates the phenomenon with the norms of common law. On the Albanian case for 
all: G. CIMBALO, Pluralismo confessionale e comunità religiose in Albania, Bononia University 
Press, Bologna, 2012, pp. 1-242. 
65 F. BOTTI, La transizione dell’Est Europa verso la libertà religiosa, in Stato, Chiese e 
pluralismo confessionale, Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 31/2013. 
66 Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) and others 
v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, Applications nos. 412/03 and 35677/04, 16 September 2010, Final 21 
February 2011. 
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Decided through a copious and alternate jurisprudence of the 
national Courts of every order and degree, the issue was resolved politically 
with the recognition of the legitimate representation of the traditional 
Church of the Holy Synod, which lawfully claimed all the properties built 
before 198967. 
The case was brought before the ECHR to verify the compliance for 
the rights of religious freedom, the autonomy of religious communities and 
the recognition of property rights 68 on the goods claimed by the two 
confessional members. It ended with the acknowledgment, though partial, 
of the property rights to the Alternative Synod for parts of buildings built 
after 1989, although the ruling of the ECHR then had little effect on the 
Bulgarian legal system. 
Also in Bulgaria, under the 2002 Freedom of Religion law,69 it was 
necessary to resolve the conflict within the Bulgarian Islamic community, 
where two different parties contested the leadership of the Muslim 
community, contesting the regularity of the elections, so that alternately, 
they had seen both one and the other preside over the Supreme Council.70 
This case was also the subject of the EDU Court's interest, which 
found a violation of Art. 9 of the EDU Convention, reflecting the attitude of 
the state authorities and, as such, seriously damaging to pluralism within a 
democratic society.  
The two reported very complex events demonstrate a certain 
inadequacy of Bulgarian national legislation to peacefully resolve intra-
confessional conflicts and in any case to regulate in general the religious 
phenomenon as a whole. Also with reference to the space accorded by the 
legislation to the new cults.  
One can not ignore the fact that - for example - the attribution of the 
qualification of traditional and identity-based religion to the Bulgarian 
Orthodox Church, beyond constitutional declarations of equality between 
different religious communities and respect for the principle of separation 
between the state and Cults, shows the gaps in Bulgarian law on 
denominations71. 
                                                          
67 For an exhaustive reconstruction of these events: K.I. PETROVA, La Bulgaria e l’islam. 
Il pluralismo imperfetto dell’ordinamanto bulgaro, Bononia Univerity Press, Bologna 2015. 
68 Case of Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (Metropolitan Inokentiy) and 
others v. Bulgaria, Applications nos. 412/03 and 35677/04 (today in 
http://licodu.cois.it/?p=5589). On the same site, you can consult decisions of the 
Constitutional Court and other Bulgarian Courts on these matters. 
69 http://licodu.cois.it/?p=945 
70 Supreme Holy Council of the Muslim Community v. Bulgaria, ECtHR, no. 39023/97, 
16 December 2004 (in http://licodu.cois.it/?p=5587). 
71 There are countless cases of non-recognition of legal personality to new cults in 
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Lacks, to the view of the author, attributable to the pretense of the 
rule of law, through the Central Institute of Cults, which today is dependent 
on the Presidency of the Council, to rule on the legal status and internal life 
of religious communities. It is in fact within this organism - present with 
different denominations, but with similar tasks in all of the Eastern 
countries - that, in the example of Soviet experience, the various interests of 
religious organizations present in each individual State are mediated. 
The internal conflict within the Bulgarian Muslim community, 
among other things, shows another obvious limitation of the law on 
denominations, which forces the diverse and unequal Islamic religious 
world to a forced coexistence within a same confessional organization. 
Perhaps aware of the limits previously reported, the Romanian 
legislature, when it issued the Law on Religious Freedom in 200672, has 
better weighted the criteria for the identification of different cultures. As 
evidence, we note that the conflict between them is drawn to the attention 
of the EDU Court, solely in terms of the restitution of confiscated goods in 
connection with the general laws on the restitution of those goods and the 
identification of the ecclesiastical denominations, which possessed them 
prior to confiscation73. 
In this case, the conflict does not concern, as is the case in other 
countries, the restitution or compensation by the state of the confiscated 
goods, but the restitution of assets already belonging to the Greek-Catholic 
Church linked to Rome74 and attributed to the Roman Orthodox Church75, 
given the privileged role retained by the latter during the previous regime76. 
The issue of the restitution of ecclesiastical goods confiscated is, in 
fact, very extensive and affects almost all socialist democracies77. It has 
                                                          
Bulgaria. On the point see: L. VANONI, Pluralismo religioso e Stato (post) secolare: Una sfida 
per la modernità, Giappichelli, Torino, 2016, pp. 69 ss.; S. FERRARI, La Corte di Strasburgo e 
l'articolo 9 della Convenzione europea. Un'analisi quantitativa della giurisprudenza, in R. 
Mazzola (a cura di) Diritto e religione in Europa. Rapporto sulla giurisprudenza della Corte 
europea dei diritti dell'uomo in materia di libertà religiosa, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2012, p. 44 ss. 
72 http://licodu.cois.it/?p=1378 
73 V.: licodu.cois.it, section "Confiscation and restitution of property of religious communities".  
74 http://licodu.cois.it/?p=10011. 
75 Lupeni Greek Catholic Parish and others v. Romania, ECtHR, Application no. 
76943/11, 29 November 2016. 
76 I. ANGELI MURZAKU, Religion and Politics in Post-Communist Romania, by L. Stan 
and L. Turcescu, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007; L.N. LEUSTEAN, Orthodoxy and 
the Cold War. Religion and Political Power in Romania, 1947-65, Palgrave Macmillian, 
Basingstoke 2009; C. OPREA, Tra Roma, Bucarest e Mosca. Cattolici, ortodossi e regime 
comunista in Romania all'inizio della guerra fredda (1945-1951), Aracne, Roma 2013. 
77 F. BOTTI, I diritti di proprietà della Chiesa greco-cattolica tra il diritto interno albanese e la 
“sentenza pilota” della Corte EDU, in F. Botti (a cura di), L’Albania nell’Unione europea fra 
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given rise to copious national jurisprudence, although this has not always 
come to the attention of the EDU Court with a clear identification of the 
conflict between the State and the Religious Communities78. 
The problem of the uniqueness of denominations also applies to the 
Moldovan Orthodox Church, where the problem is the recognition of 
confessional autonomy and of the right under art. 9 of the ECHR 
Convention to have its own autonomous identity recognized. 
The Orthodox Church of Bessarabia, suppressed in 1944 by the 
Soviets after its failure to be recognized before the Moldovan State Courts, 
claims to be the legitimate heir to the historic Orthodox Church present in 
the country79. For this reason, it filed an appeal with the ECHR and obtained 
in 2012 recognition under the Law of denominations80, despite the fact that 
the Orthodox Church of Moldova linked to the Patriarchate of Moscow 
claimed the right to be the only orthodox identity of the country. 
However, strong pressure from the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe was needed to enforce the sentence, since the Orthodox 
Church of Bessarabia, as the legitimate heir to the ancient Orthodox Church, 
could demand the restitution of all the confiscated properties in 1948 
(buildings of worship, lakes, land, buildings). 
Or, again, in Ukraine, where the violation of art. 9 Convention by the 
State for having denied a member of the Orthodox Church to abandon the 
teachings of the Patriarchate of Moscow to embrace those of the Patriarchate 
of Kiev81. 
The problem is that the emergence of new nationalities after the 
Soviet Union crisis has stimulated within the Orthodox Church the 
tendency to constitute self-governing structures based on the existence of 
                                                          
tradizione e sviluppo della libertà religiosa, Bononia University Press, Bologna, 2017, 
pp.145,172; F. BOTTI, Properties of religious communities in Albania between the restitution or 
compensation of confiscated goods and the acquisition of new assets , in Jeta Juridike, III, 2015, pp. 
167 - 188. 
78 Cfr. Decision of the Constitutional Court for annulment of Articles of the Law on the 
Legal Status of Churches, religious community or a religious group. Decision No. 104/2009 
adopted on 22 September 2010 (in http://licodu.cois.it/?p=5358). Significant is the legal 
dispute that opposes the Tetovo Tetovo Bektashi community to the Islamic Community of 
Macedonia, which last, according to the 2008 denomination law, 
(http://licodu.cois.it/?p=5363) claims ownership of certain goods as sole Islamic 
denomination of the country. 
79 ECHR, Judgment on cult buildings Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia, Moldova , 15 
January 201 (in http://licodu.cois.it/?p=5727). 
80 Law on religious freedom of Churches and their members in 2007 (in 
http://licodu.cois.it/?p=1276). 
81 Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ucraina, ECtHR, Sez. I - Ric. 77703/01, 14 June 2007. 
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an independent nation82. The new regimes, precisely because of the laws on 
religious freedom adopted, were able to deal with these problems with 
difficulty. 
It should be stressed that this type of legislation does not arise by 
chance, but it is suggested by the Venice Commission, which, without 
knowing the internal affairs of the religious confessions of these countries 
and without taking any account of the reasons which had characterized the 
legislation before the end of World War II, has recommended advising the 
adoption of the Belgian Church-State Relationship model83, not suitable for 
dealing with these situations. Proof of this it’s the high interreligious 
conflict that the law has not been able to mediate and manage84. 
This makes us reflect on the fact that the Albanian regime, refusing 
to adopt its own law on religious freedom, and having wisely opted for the 
use of common law as a general tool for regulating relations with cults, 
makes every religious community see their civil legal personality 
recognized under the law governing such matters for non-governmental 
organizations. Thus, the Albanian system has managed to preserve 
religious peace and the absence of interreligious conflicts. 
Out of the scope of protection under art. 9 of the ECHR on Freedom 
and Rights of Religious Communities, we have to say that the Court has 
also focused its attention on the individual protection of religious freedom 
in relation to art. 11 of the ECHR. 
                                                          
82 See, for example, the constitution in Latvia of the autonomous Latvian orthodox 
Church that refers to the Ecumenical Patriarchate with the intent to distance itself from ties 
with the Russian Orthodox Church. See: Judgment of the Supreme Court of Latvia, Case 
No. SKC - 79, February 8, 2006 (in http://licodu.cois.it/?p=4784); Judgment Nr. A42673207 
AA43-0250-11/14 about entry in the register of the religious denominations of the 
autonomous Orthodox Church of Latvia (Ecumenical Patriarchate) 2011 (in 
http://licodu.cois.it/?p=4786&lang=en). 
83 G. CIMBALO, Pluralismo confessionale e comunità religiose in Albania, Bononia 
Univeristy Press, Bologna, 2012, p. 198 ss.; G. CIMBALO, Separatismo, laicità, pluralismo e 
politiche di convivenza, in F. Botti (a cura di), La convivenza possibile. Saggi sul pluralismo 
confessionale in Albania, Bononia University Press, Bologna, 2015, pp. 9-24. 
84 Relationships between religious confessions in Eastern European countries are 
characterized by a strong interreligious conflict that develops in different directions. 
Conflicts are common inside the general denominations (Orthodox Church, but also 
Muslim Communities) that contend for the representation of the entire denomination with 
a conflict fueled by the necessity and interest in recovering goods confiscated from the past 
regime. The other side of conflict is generated by the so-called new cults who have 
difficulty penetrating within the narrow meshes of the various denomination laws. These 
findings suggest to the European Union, and in particular to the Venice Commission, a 
critical reflection that is fueled by the copious case law of the ECHR, which we have 
repeatedly referred to. 
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A case of transition between the two issues is certainly constituted 
by the freedom of association right, raised by the Sindicatul Pǎstorul cel 
Bun85, concerning the exercise of trade union rights within a religious 
community, resolved by the Grand Chamber's pronouncement for which 
the refusal of the departmental tribunal to register the recurring union did 
not go beyond the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the national 
authorities in the matter and, therefore, is not disproportionate. 
By moving decisively on the ground of individual rights of religious 
freedom, a very important case of Macedonia, raised by a sanctioned 
worker after being absent from work to attend a Muslim festival86, must be 
reported. In response to the applicant's allegations, alleging that he had 
been forced to reveal his religious convictions, the judges stated (§ 39) that 
 
“it is not oppressive or in fundamental conflict with freedom of 
conscience to require some level of substantiation when that claim 
concerns a privilege or entitlement not commonly available and, if that 
substantiation is not forthcoming, to reach a negative conclusion”. 
 
Remaining on the subject of individual protection of religious 
freedom, but with different outcome and finding a full violation of art. 9 
Convention, worthy of note is the ruling on Ivanova vs. Bulgaria87. 
The plaintiff, director of the pool at a public education institute, 
complained of violation of his religious freedom for being dismissed 
because of her membership of an unregistered religious organization. This 
case emerges, with renewed evidence, the shortcomings of the 
denominations law which has among its main tasks that of containing the 
expansion of religious differentiation with the intent of safeguarding the 
country's religious identity. 
 
 
4 - Conclusions 
 
                                                          
85 F. BOTTI, L’esercizio dell’attività sindacale dei ministri di culto nella Chiesa ortodossa 
romena, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., n. 30/2012; F. BOTTI, Diritto sindacale 
e confessioni religiose alla luce della giurisprudenza della Corte di Strasburgo. Il caso rumeno: 
«Sindicatul Pa˘storul cel Bun c. Romania», in Quaderni di Diritto e Politica Ecclesiastica, 2013, 
vol. I, pp. 171-182; L.S. MARTUCCI, Libertà sindacale nelle confessioni religiose. Spunti 
comparativi, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, cit., n. 39 /2014. 
86 Kosteski v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, ECtHR, Application no. 
55170/00, 13 April 2006. 
87 Ivanova v. Bulgaria, Application no. 52435/99, 12 April 2007. 
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The case law of the Court has certainly highlighted the shortcomings and 
limitations of the laws on religious freedom, especially with regard to the 
option for a single denomination for each religious community. 
This choice harms the autonomy of the religious communities and 
forces them to unnatural and controversial compromises in order to find a 
modus vivendi within a single organization, regardless of ritual differences, 
traditions, structure of relations within the clergy, and touching on delicate 
aspects that concern differences on the theological and doctrinal plan, as 
well as the afferences to international cults. 
The sacrifice of confessional autonomy, just to obtain an apparently 
orderly classification of cultures, which actually conceals a need for control 
by the state of organisms such as the religious ones of which it deeply 
distrusts, re-launches the unresolved debate on differentiated agreements 
with different cultures and communities. Therefore it emerges that there is 
a need for bilateral or negotiated legislation or, alternatively, for the use of 
the common law to regulate the collective religious phenomenon. 
The case law on the protection of individual rights related to the 
exercise of religious freedom, however, highlights the need for the principle 
of religious freedom to be measured by the protection of human rights and 
the fundamental and irreplaceable principles that a liberal democracy 
system own and which cannot be disregarded. 
In essence, we can see the secularization of the right to religious 
freedom, though the Court’s jurisprudence, as well as the tendency oriented 
to confessionalization of interpersonal relations and the thrust of many cults 
to radicalize, resulting in infrequent conflict, or intrinsic, risking to question 
the peace and social cohesion, rights and political stability of this area of the 
world. 
The hope is that this process of secularisation and secularization 
linked to the protection of human rights can make a renewal and 
regeneration element on a more open basis for comparison by the 
traditional religious communities, making them to measure with the 
multiethnic and multireligious composition of the peoples and their need 
for peaceful coexistence. 
 
Keywords: Religion; Religion and Law; Science of Religion; European Court 
for Human Rights; Socialist Countries. 
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The Meaning of ‘Religion’ in Austrian Case Law  
 
 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction - 2. The Austrian Case - 3. The Meaning of “Religion” in 
Austrian Case Law - 4. Conclusions.  
 
 
1 - Introduction  
 
In Austria, like in other countries, the need to define “religion” was not an 
issue for a long time, because this term “was largely associated with the idea 
of belief in and worship of God”88. The emergence of new religious 
movements has challenged this interpretative category and has posed great 
challenges to legal systems like the Austrian one, where traditional religions 
enjoy a privileged status.  
This paper aims to examine recent Austrian case law concerning the 
meaning of “religion” in a two-fold perspective89. In the first place, it 
focuses upon judgments determining the legitimacy (or the illegitimacy) of 
specific legal rules and administrative practices, grounded on a 
differentiation between religious groups (for example, between “religious 
denominations” on the one side, and “sects” or “cults” on the other side). 
In the second place, it examines decisions concerning the relationship 
between a religious worldview and the religious groups established on the 
Austrian territory and claiming to represent that “religion”.  
 
 
2 - The Austrian Case 
 
According to Austrian scholars, the “Austrian specificity in comparison to 
other European countries” lies in the fact that the country’s catalogue of 
                                                          
88 S. FERRARI, New Religious Movements in Western Europe, in http://religion.info, October 
2006, p. 4.  
89 For older case law (1920s-1970s) see L. MUSSELLI, La libertà religiosa nell'esperienza 
costituzionale austriaca: primi materiali per un'analisi comparativa, in Studi in onore di Pietro 
Agostino d'Avack, Giuffrè, Milano, 1976, vol. III, pp. 361 ff. 
 40 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 39 del 2017 ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
fundamental rights is  
 
“embodied in Constitutional Acts or Treaties under International Law 
[…] that date from several historical epochs with a different state-
church relationship and a different understanding of fundamental 
rights”90. 
 
The origins of the Republic of Austria date back to 1918, when it was 
established as one of the successor states to Austria-Hungary. The 1920 
Constitution recognizes the equality of all citizens before the law and 
excludes privileges based inter alia upon religion (Art. 7 § 1), but it does not 
contain any provisions on either religious freedoms or religious 
denominations. In fact,  
 
“[t]he main political groups could not agree on a new catalogue of 
fundamental rights, basically because the Social Democrats demanded 
the incorporation of social rights that were emphatically rejected by the 
Conservatives. As a consequence, the 1867 Basic Law on the General 
Rights of Nationals […] remained in force”91. 
 
The 1867 law, inherited by Austria-Hungary and still legally binding, 
guarantees the right to freedom of conscience and creed (Art. 14 § 1) and 
introduces a distinction between recognized Churches and religious 
societies (Art. 15) and legally not recognized confessions (Art. 16). 
Fundamental freedoms (including the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion) are further protected by the 1919 Treaty of Peace 
signed in St. Germain-en-Laye92; the 1955 Treaty for the Re-establishment 
of an Independent and Democratic Austria93; the European Convention on 
                                                          
90 R. POTZ, Religious Freedom and the Concept of Law and Religion in Austria, in 
http://www.osce.org/odihr, 10 July 2009, p. 4; B. SHINKELE, Church Autonomy in Austria, in 
Church Autonomy. A Comparative Survey, ed. by G. Robbers, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Mein, 
2001, p. 563. See also A. GAMPER, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Austrian Federal 
Constitution, in ICL Journal, 2008, II/2, p. 94: “Fragmentation instead of incorporation was 
and to a smaller extent still is one of the key features of Austrian constitutionalism”.  
91 M. STELZER, The Constitution of the Republic of Austria. A Contextual Analysis, Hart 
Publishing, Portland, 2011, p. 9. 
92 In particular, under Art. 63, “Austria undertakes to assure full and complete 
protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Austria without distinction of birth, 
nationality, language, race or religion. All inhabitants of Austria shall be entitled to the free 
exercise, whether public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not 
inconsistent with public order or public morals”. 
93 According to Art. 6 on human rights, “1. Austria shall take all measures necessary to 
secure to all persons under Austrian jurisdiction, without distinction as to race, sex, 
language or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms, 
including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship, of political 
opinion and of public meeting. 2. Austria further undertakes that the laws in force in 
Austria shall not, either in their content or in their application, discriminate or entail any 
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Human Rights, which Austria signed in 1957 and ratified in 195894, and 
which has a constitutional status95.  
Austria’s ecclesiastical law system96 fits in what Silvio Ferrari has 
described as the European model of State-religions relations. Contemporary 
European countries are characterized by three common principles: the 
individuals’ religious freedom and equality, the religious denominations’ 
doctrinal and organizational autonomy, and the State’s selective 
cooperation with religious denominations97. The latter principle deserves 
special attention because of its relevance in Austrian case law on the 
meaning of “religion”.  
As early as 1972 the Constitutional Court stated that “differentiation 
between religious communities which are recognized by statute and other 
religions does not infringe the principle of equality”98. Potz has stressed the 
distinction “between two different forms of religious neutrality: the 
‘distancing’ neutrality (distanzierende Neutralität) and the including 
neutrality (hereinnehmende Neutralität)”. The former requires the State to 
avoid “any possible identification with religious or philosophical beliefs”, 
but the latter does not prevent it from promoting religious denominations 
“as socially relevant factors”. This assessment must be based on secular, and 
not religious characteristics: for example, the number of members99.  
The differentiation between religious communities has further 
deepened after the approval of the Law Concerning the Legal Status of 
Registered Religious Communities in 1998, which has amended the 1874 
Law concerning the Legal Recognition of Religious Communities, and 
which has in fact created a three-tier system100. At the top, there are 
                                                          
discrimination between persons of Austrian nationality on the ground of their race, sex, 
language or religion, whether in reference to their persons, property, business, professional 
or financial interests, status, political or civil rights or any other matter”. 
94 See L. MUSSELLI, La libertà religiosa nell'esperienza costituzionale austriaca…, cit., pp. 
339 ff. 
95 C. MAYER, H. WUTSCHER, Are Austrian Courts Obliged to Consider the Jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights when Interpreting the ECHR?, in ICL Journal, 2014, 
VIII/2, p. 202. 
96 An exhaustive description goes beyond the purposes of the present article. For more 
information, see R. POTZ, État et Églises en Autriche, in État et Églises dans l'Union 
européenne, ed. by G. Robbers, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2008, pp. 417-448. 
97 S. FERRARI, Dalla tolleranza ai diritti: le religioni nel processo di unificazione , in Stato, 
Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), January 2005. 
98 Quoted by L.L. GARLICKI, Perspectives on Freedom of Conscience and Religion in the 
Jurisprudence of Constitutional Courts, in BYU Law Review, 2001/ 2, pp. 492-493. 
99 R. POTZ, Religious Freedom, cit., p. 6.  
100 B. SHINKELE, Religious Entities as Legal Persons - Austria, in Churches and Other 
Religious Organisations as Legal Persons, ed. by. L. Friedner, Lueven, Peeters, 2007, p. 37.  
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(currently 16) religious societies (Religionsgesellschaften)101, which have a 
public-corporation status102 and enjoy a number of rights and benefits. Each 
                                                          
101 This status has been recognised by virtue of different legal provisions. The Catholic 
Church was “historically recognized”, but had its status renewed through the Concordat 
signed in 1933 and entered into force in 1934. A group of religious societies has obtained 
this recognition through ad hoc laws: the Jewish Religious Association through the Jewish 
Act of 1890; the Islamic Religious Community through the Islam Act of 1912, as amended 
in 2015; the Protestant Churches of Augsburg and Helvetic Confession (that is, Lutheran 
and Reformed respectively) through the Protestant Act of 1961; the Eastern Orthodox 
Church (including not only the Greek Orthodox Church, but also the Russian, Serbian, 
Romanian, and Bulgarian Orthodox Churches) through the Orthodox Act of 1967; the 
Syrian Orthodox Church, the Coptic Orthodox Church, and the Armenian Apostolic 
Church through the Oriental Orthodox Churches Act of 2003. Another group has been 
recognized by a ministerial ordinance under the 1874 Law concerning the Legal 
Recognition of Religious Communities, as amended in 1998: the Old Catholic Church in 
1877; the Methodist Church in 1951; the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 
(Mormons) in 1955; the New Apostolic Church in 1975; the Buddhist Religious Association 
in 1983; the Jehovah’s Witnesses in 2009; the Islamic Alevi Congregation in 2013; the Free 
Christian Churches (a federation of the Baptist Union, the Evangelical Alliance, the ELAIA 
Christian Community, the Mennonite Free Church, and the Free Christian Pentecostal 
Church) also in 2013. See R. POTZ, Religious Freedom, cit., pp. 1-4; Austria 2013 International 
Religious Freedom Report, in https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222401.pdf; G. 
CATALANO, Osservazioni sulla situazione concordataria della Repubblica Austriaca, in Il diritto 
ecclesiastico, 1963, I, pp. 390-406; A. TALAMANCA, Politica e legislazione ecclesiastica in 
Austria, Germania e Italia negli anni tra le due guerre mondiali; parallelismi, differenziazioni e 
prospettive di studio emersi in un recente colloquio italo-austro-tedesco, in Il diritto ecclesiastico, 
1974, I, pp. 349-354; R. BOTTA, Ispirazione pluralista e residui di giuseppinismo nei rapporti tra 
Stato e confessioni nella Repubblica austriaca. (Note in margine ad un recente incontro di studio 
italo-austriaco), in Il diritto ecclesiastico, 1982, I, pp. 132-137; P. CIPROTTI, E. ZAMPETTI, I 
Concordati di Giovanni XXIII e dei primi anni di Paolo VI. 1958-1974. (Austria, Germania, 
Jugoslavia, Spagna, Svizzera, Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Paraguay, El Salvador, Tunisia, 
Venezuela), Giuffrè. Milano, 1976, pp. 1-30; S. TESTA BAPPENHEIM, Brevi cenni 
introduttivi sull’istituzionalizzazione dell’Islam nella felix Austria, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo 
confessionale, Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), May 2007; H.C. SCHEU, The emergence 
of new minorities in Austria and current issues concerning their legal protection, in Acta Humana, 
2015/4, pp. 55-58; J. MOURÃO PERMOSER, S. ROSENBERGER, K. STOECKL, Religious 
Organisations as Political Actors in the Context of Migration. Islam and Orthodoxy in Austria, in 
Religious Actors in the Public Sphere. Means, Objectives and Effects, ed. by J. Haynes, A. 
Henning, Routledge, New York, 2011, pp. 77-95; D. HEINZ, Church, Sect, and Governmental 
Control: Seventh-Day Adventists in the Habsburg Monarchy, in Eastern European Quarterly, 
1989, XXIII/1, pp. 109-115. 
102 “Their legal status as public corporations includes the relative compulsory 
membership. All those belonging to a particular confession who are resident in Austria are 
members of it” (R. PUZA, Legal Position of Churches, Church Autonomy and Tendencies in 
Jurisprudence. Report of Austria, in Legal Position of Churches and Church Autonomy, ed. by 
Hildegard Warnik, Peeters, Leuven, 2001, pp. 57-58). 
 43 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 39 del 2017 ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
of them  
 
“has the right to joint public religious practice, arranges and 
administers its internal affairs autonomously, and retains possession 
and enjoyment of its institutions, endowments and funds devoted to 
worship, instruction and welfare”103. 
 
Religious societies inter alia receive subsidies, and are granted tax 
exemption and State-funded religious instruction in public schools. They 
are also “entitled to give an opinion to law drafts as long as they are of 
relevance for them and their religious and social activities”104. 
The 1874 Law recognized a religious denomination as a 
Religionsgesellschaft  
 
“if their teachings, services, internal order and chosen name [do] not 
contain anything unlawful or morally offensive, and if the setting up 
and continued existence of at least one community of worship 
(Cultusgemeinde) is ensured”105.  
 
The 1998 Law has envisaged further conditions, which have been criticized 
by scholars106: 
 
“- existence of the religious association for at least twenty years in 
Austria, for at least ten years as a registered religious community; 
- a minimum number of two out of a thousand of the Austrian 
population;  
- the use of income and other assets for religious purposes, including 
charitable activities; 
- a positive attitude toward society and the state; 
- no illegal interference with recognized or other religious 
communities”107. 
 
The demographic requirement, which is currently estimated at 
                                                          
103 Art. 15 of the 1867 Basic Law on the General Rights of Nationals. On its traditional 
and actual interpretation, see B. SHINKELE, Church Autonomy in Austria, cit., pp. 564 ff. 
104 R. POTZ, State and Religion in Austria, in State, Law and Religion in Pluralistic Societies 
- Austrian and Indonesian Perspectives, ed. by R. Potz, S. Kroissenbrunner, A. Hafner, Vienna 
University Press, Vienna, 2010, p. 20. 
105 C. HOFHANSEL, Recognition Regimes for Religious Minorities in Europe: Institutional 
Change and Reproduction, in Journal of Church and State, 2013, LVII/1, p. 93. 
106 See inter alia C.J. MINER, Losing My Religion: Austria's New Religion Law in Light of 
International and European Standards of Religious Freedom, in BYU Law Review, 1998/2, pp. 
607-647. 
107 C. HOFHANSEL, Recognition Regimes for Religious Minorities, cit., pp. 93-94. 
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approximately 17,400 members108, is especially “prohibitive”109.  
The middle tier is occupied by (currently 8) registered religious 
communities (religiösen Bekenntnisgemeinschaften)110. This is a new status 
introduced by the 1998 Law, which can be applied for by a religious group 
having at least 300 members. As legal persons, they can purchase property 
in their own name and contract for goods and services, but they are not 
entitled to the financial and educational benefits granted to religious 
societies111. 
At the bottom, there are all other religious communities, who do not 
qualify for neither of the abovementioned statuses112, and whose members 
“may practice their religion at home, in so far as this practice is neither 
unlawful, nor offends common decency”113. Many are organized as non-
profit associations, like Scientology. According to Art. 3 a) of the 
Association Law of 1951, this law does not apply to orders, congregations 
and religious groups, on the grounds that they are subject to laws and 
regulations approved specifically for them. In other words, in Austria, 
unlike other European countries, religious groups may not be organized as 
private associations. In fact, until the beginning of the 1908s, only 
associations with a partly religious function were registered. However, now 
- in the light of Arts. 11 and 14 ECHR which guarantee the right to freedom 
of association without discrimination - any religious groups of at least three 
people are allowed to register as associations114.  
Between 1983 and 2003 no religious denomination was recognized as 
a Religionsgesellschaft, and in the meantime the 1998 Law was approved to 
make requirements stricter. One of the reasons has been the reaction to the 
                                                          
108 Austria 2016 International Religious Freedom Report, in https://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/269032.pdf, p. 4.  
109 R. POTZ, State and Religion in Austria, cit., p. 18. 
110 They are the Bahai Faith, the Christian Community-Movement for Religious 
Renewal, the Pentecostal Community of God, the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, the 
Hindu Mandir Community, the Islamic-Shia Community, the Old-Faith Alevis, and the 
Family Federation for World Peace and Unification (Unification Church). See Austria 2016 
International Religious Freedom Report, cit., p. 4. 
111 Austria 2016 International Religious Freedom Report, cit., p. 4. 
112 See Austria 2016 International Religious Freedom Report, cit., p. 5. 
113 Art. 16 of the 1867 Basic Law on the General Rights of Nationals.  
114 R. POTZ, New Religious Movements in Austria, in New Religious Movements and the Law 
in the European Union - Les nouveaux mouvements religieux et le droit dans l'Union européenne , 
Giuffré, Milano, 1999, p. 78; B. SCHINKELE, W. WIESHAIDER, Le statut juridique des 
communautés religieuses en Autriche, in Revue de droit canonique, 2004, LIV/1-2, pp. 135-136; 
R. PUZA, Legal Position of Churches, cit., p. 73; C. HOFHANSEL, Recognition Regimes for 
Religious Minorities, cit., p. 99. 
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emergence of new religious movements115 - or, alternatively, to the claims 
of religious denominations which are not new, but revolve around a notion 
of “religion” different from the traditional one. The “explanations” 
(Erläuternde Bemerkungen) to the 1998 Law  
 
«for the purpose of differentiation to “Weltanschauung“ define 
“Religion“ as “a historically developed concept of convictions 
explaining man and world with a transcendent reference, including 
specific rites and symbols giving precepts for acting according to its 
fundamental doctrines, and which is presentable regarding its 
contents“»116. 
 
Miner has reported that in the 1980s and 1990s more than twenty 
religious groups applied to be recognized as religious societies117. 
 
“This increase in applications may have stemmed from the fact that in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, more Austrians than ever before were 
leaving traditional churches and joining nontraditional churches. 
However, a rising antiforeigner movement soon began to turn the tide 
of Austrians leaving traditional churches for beliefs that often came 
from other countries”118.  
 
Thus, the process of recognizing new Religionsgesellschaften 
 
“was brought to an end with the emerging of new religious 
movements. On the one hand, the conception on which the legal 
recognition is based did not seem suitable to be transferred on some of 
these groups owing to different structures. On the other hand in 
several cases the administrative body hesitated to confer public law-
status on some of these groups for reasons pertaining to socio-political 
considerations”119.  
 
The emergence of new religious movements is also the context 
framing the approval, in 1998, of the Law for the Establishment of a 
Documentation and Information Office for Matters Concerning Sects120. Its 
                                                          
115 A very recent case has involved a request by a member of the “Church of Flying 
Spaghetti Monster” (CFSM): “[i]n 2011, Austrian cit.izen Niko Alm requested and received 
the right to sport a colander on his head on the passport picture he used on his driver's 
license. This “hat” is one of the pastafarians’ signs of allegiance, along with the pirate 
costume. Not satisfied with this relative victory, Alm went further by applying for official 
recognition of the CFSM as religion by the Austrian government” (L. OBADIA, When 
Virtuality Shapes Social Reality. Fake Cults and the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster, in 
Online. Heidelberg Journal of Religions on the Internet, 2015, VIII, p. 125). 
116 Quoted by R. POTZ, New Religious Movements in Austria, cit., p. 75. 
117 C. J. MINER, Losing My Religion, cit., p. 613. 
118 C. J. MINER, Losing My Religion, cit., p. 614. 
119 R. POTZ, Religious Freedom, cit., p. 4. 
120 See R. POTZ, État et Églises en Autriche, cit., p. 446. 
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purpose is “to show the endangerings that can be caused by sects or similar 
movements or the risks somebody runs when establishing contact with 
such groups”121. These developments have been sharply criticized inter alia 
by the NGO Foref (Forum for Religious Freedom): “Austria, with a 
population of 8, 2 Million has no less than 34 Anti-Sect offices operating in 
the country. Proportionally, this marks an unmatched record in Europe and 
even on a global scale”122. 
 
 
3 - The Meaning of “Religion” in Austrian Case Law 
 
If we understand “religion” as a worldview, Austrian case law, like the 
jurisprudence of other European countries, has not given a definition of this 
term. As stressed by scholars, “religion” is an undetermined legal notion 
and the State’s competence to define this concept is controversial123. 
However, like elsewhere in Europe, courts have been called to decide 
whether a specific legal status guaranteed to “religions” (here to be 
understood as self-defined religious groups) could be conferred or not. This 
status “may not be granted to an organization that, for example, represents 
national socialist ideology or is based on a particular language or ethnic 
identity”124. As stated by the Constitutional Court in the 1950s with regard 
to the movement “Gotteserkenntnis Ludendorff, characterised by a Nazi 
and racist ideology, “the practice of an at least primitive and rudimentary 
cult is a necessary precondition for being protected as manifestation of 
religion”125. 
In more recent times, as noted above, this issue has not concerned so 
much revived Nazi or racist movements, as groups whose self-
identification with a religion is contested by Austrian authorities. As 
regards specifically case law, only rarely may the term “sect” be found. In 
the judgment of 29 March 1995, the Supreme Court quoted the scholar 
Gerhard Schimdtchen’s statement that «it is part of the nature of a sect that 
                                                          
121 B. SHINKELE, Church Autonomy in Austria, cit., p. 573. 
122 FOREF, Statement and Recommendations to the 2007 Human Dimension Implementation 
Meeting, in http://www.osce.org/odihr/27023?download=true, 25 September 2007, p. 1. In this 
sense, see also C. BRÜNNER, T. NEGER, FECRI and Its Affiliates in Austria. State and 
Mainline Religions Against Religious Diversity, in Religion-Staat-Gesellschaft, 2012, XIII/2, pp. 
307-339; C.J. MINER, Losing My Religion, cit., pp. 620-621. 
123 B. SCHINKELE, W. WIESHAIDER, Le statut juridique, cit., p. 131.  
124 L.L. GARLICKI, Perspectives on Freedom of Conscience and Religion in the Jurisprudence 
of Constitutional Courts, in BYU Law review, vol. 2001, Issue 2, p. 487. 
125 R. POTZ, New Religious Movements in Austria, cit., pp. 75-76. 
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“the border of the group becomes for the members the border of the reality 
of their life”»126. In other instances, the Supreme Case had to decide whether 
the use of the term “sect” was defamatory and thus could be deemed as a 
legal ground to demand compensation127.  
Beyond terminological issues, Austrian courts have examined more 
frequently substantive problems, such as the question of the extent to which 
a new religious movement - or a not-so-new group whose characteristics 
are negatively connoted in public perception - could be offered legal 
protection. 
Under the 1874 Law concerning the Legal Recognition of Religious 
Communities, religious groups were recognized by an administrative act, 
against which they were not entitled to appeal. In a case originated in an 
application by Scientology128, the Constitutional Court has stated that the 
differentiation between Religionsgesellschaften and other religious 
denominations is constitutionally justified, only if - inter alia - there is an 
enforceable legal right to recognition. In application of the principles of 
equality and rule of law, the Ministry of Education must formally issue a 
negative decision when it denies recognition, it, and the concerned religious 
group has the right to apply to the court (judgment no. 11931 of 12 
December 1988)129.  
Whereas, in the aftermath of this decision, the Association Law 
started being applied to religious groups, the Administrative Court only 
subscribed to the Constitutional Court’s reasoning nine years later 
(judgment no. 96/10/00049 of 28 April 1997). This decision was issued in 
the context of the twenty-year long judiciary saga, which concerned the 
recognition of the Jehovah's Witnesses, and which was also subject to a 
ruling by the European Court of Human Rights. By virtue of the 
                                                          
126 Quoted by R. POTZ, New Religious Movements in Austria, cit., p. 76. See also L. 
MUSSELLI, La libertà religiosa nell'esperienza costituzionale austriaca, cit., pp. 364-366. 
127 R. POTZ, New Religious Movements in Austria, cit., p. 76. 
128 According to Art. 144 § 1 of the Constitution, “[t]he Constitutional Court pronounces 
on rulings by an Administrative Court in so far as the appellant alleges an infringement by 
the ruling of a constitutionally guaranteed right or on the score of an illegal ordinance, an 
illegal pronouncement on the republication of a law (treaty), an unconstitutional law, or 
an unlawful treaty”. For a brief outline, see R. FABER, The Austrian Constitutional Court - 
An Overview, in ICL Journal, 2008, II/1, pp. 49-53. 
129 R. PUZA, Legal Position of Churches, cit., p. 73; B. SHINKELE, Church Autonomy in 
Austria, cit., p. 572; R. POTZ, New Religious Movements in Austria, cit., p. 70; B. 
SCHINKELE, W. WIESHAIDER, Le statut juridique, cit., p. 124; S. SCHIMA, Focus: 
Freedom of Religion in Austria, in ICL Journal, 2009, III/3, p. 202; C. HOFHANSEL, 
Recognition Regimes for Religious Minorities in Europe, cit., p. 105. 
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abovementioned decision, the Administrative Court for the first time  
 
“issued a binding decision (Erkenntnis) to the effect that the Minister 
had a duty to decide on the request for recognition within eight weeks 
and set out the principles which the Minister had to take into account 
when taking this decision”130.  
 
The Minister’s subsequent negative decision was grounded on reasons 
indicating well the public perception of what may be legitimately 
encompassed by the notion of “religion” and what may not. 
 
«The Minister of Education, Elisabeth Gehrer, […] stated that she 
“could not be responsible for the possible influence of the Witnesses 
on the youth through state-supported religious instruction“. The 
Minister gave three reasons for the rejection: the intolerant attitude of 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses toward the government, their refusal of blood 
transfusions (especially for children), and the fact that the church 
would be led from Brooklyn, New York»131. 
 
A further conservative reaction was the approval of the 1998 Law 
Concerning the Legal Status of Registered Religious Communities. As 
mentioned, this act contains restrictive conditions, among which is the 
requirement of existence as a registered religious community for at least ten 
years. When the Jehovah’s Witnesses were found unable to meet this 
condition, they lodged a complaint with the Constitution Court, which 
nonetheless dismissed it. According to its case law (judgments nos. 
16102/2001 and 16131/2001), the concerned requirement was consistent 
with the Constitution132. 
These judgments should be placed in the context of Austrian case law 
concerning the right to internal autonomy, which is affirmed, as mentioned, 
by Art. 15 of the 1867 Law on the General Rights of Nationals. 
 
“All Austria’s three highest courts, the Constitutional Court, the 
Administrative High Court and the Supreme Court were involved […] 
in clarifying the interpretation and the development of what 
constitutes internal affairs and the distinction between these and 
                                                          
130 ECtHR, Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and Others v. Austria, application no. 
40825/98, judgment of 31 July 1998, para. 25. See also B. OHMS, Recognizing Jehovah's 
Witnesses as a Religious Society: A Case Winding its Way Through the Courts,  in ICL Journal, 
2009, III/3, pp. 201-217. 
131 C.J. MINER, Losing My Religion, cit., p. 615. The reference to an allegedly undue 
foreign influence is especially interesting, as it bears a resemblance to the argument which 
led Locke to exclude Catholics from the regime of toleration.  
132 S. SCHIMA, Focus: Freedom of Religion in Austria, cit., p. 202; R. POTZ, État et Églises 
en Autriche, cit., p. 424; B. SCHINKELE, W. WIESHAIDER, Le statut juridique, cit., p. 124; 
C. HOFHANSEL, Recognition Regimes for Religious Minorities in Europe, cit., p. 105. 
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external affairs. In 1974 and 1987 the Supreme Court defined internal 
affairs as those which affect the inner core of ecclesiastical activity, and 
in which, in the absence of autonomy, religious societies would be 
restricted in the promulgation of the salvific truths which they teach 
and in the practical exercise of their faith”133.  
 
Despite this acknowledgment, which correctly identifies autonomy 
as something that is at the very core of the contemporary notion of religious 
freedom, only Religionsgesellschaften are recognized the right to arrange and 
administer their internal affairs autonomously134, as confirmed by the 
Constitutional Court’s case law (see for example the abovementioned 
judgment no. 16102/2001). It should be agreed with Potz that this position 
est à critiquer dans la mesure où ce droit est à concevoir comme une 
conséquence du droit fondamental à la liberté de religion et est ainsi en 
général à garantir indépendamment du statut juridique en cause135. 
In fact, this opinion is consistent with the position of the European 
Court of Human Rights, which 
 
“reiterated that the right of a religious community to an autonomous 
existence was indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and 
thus it is at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords. 
Even the creation of auxiliary associations with legal personality could 
not compensate for the authorities’ prolonged failure to grant legal 
personality”136. 
 
In the aftermath of the Strasbourg judges’ ruling, the clause “as a 
religious association for at least twenty years, of which at least ten years”, 
contained in the 1998 Law, was declared illegitimate by the Constitutional 
Court (judgments nos. G 58/10 and G 59/10). This legal provision was thus 
repealed with effect from 30 September 2011137. By contrast, when 
                                                          
133 R. PUZA, Legal Position of Churches, cit., p. 70. See also S. SCHIMA, Focus: Freedom of 
Religion in Austria, cit., pp. 203-204. A detailed exam of this issue goes beyond the purposes 
of this paper. Suffice it to mention an example. In the judgment no. 2944 of 19 December 
1955 the Constitutional Court declared the illegitimacy of the legal provision punishing the 
celebration of a religious marriage before the civil marriage. The celebration of a marriage 
by a religious society was regarded as a part of its internal affairs, because this act had no 
consequences and produced no effects in the State legal system. See R. POTZ, Religious 
Freedom, cit., p. 11, fn. 27; L. MUSSELLI, La libertà religiosa nell'esperienza costituzionale 
austriaca, cit., pp. 367-368. 
134 R. PUZA, Legal Position of Churches, cit., p. 63. 
135 R. POTZ, État et Églises en Autriche, cit., p. 429. 
136 F. TULKENS, The European Convention on Human Rights and Church-State Relations. 
Pluralism vs. Pluralism, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, Rivista telematica 
(www.statoechiese.it), February 2011, p. 9. 
137 T. MANTANIKA, Legal recognition of religious communities, in ICL Journal, 2010, IV/4, 
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examining a complaint lodged by the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, 
which only has 5,770 members in Austria, concerning the requirement of a 
minimum number of 2‰ of the Austrian population, the Constitutional 
Court had regarded this condition as legitimate and consistent with Art. 9 
ECHR (judgment no. B 516/09 of 16 December 2009). This decision was not 
adopted unanimously, though, and dissenting judge Steiner referred to the 
European Court of Human Rights’ judgment concerning the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses138.  
Austrian case law has investigated the meaning of “religion” not 
only as regards the issue of recognition, but also with respect to the problem 
of representation: can a religion be represented by more than one religious 
denomination? This question has been addressed in a set of judgements 
concerning Judaism and Islam. 
The Israelitische Kultusgemeinde Wien (IKG) is the largest Jewish 
community, it accounts for 98% of the Austrian Jewish population, and it is 
spread in five out of nine provinces of the country. Its representatives 
constitute the leadership of the IRG (the Israelitische Religionsgesellschaft, that 
is, the Jewish society recognized by the Jewish Act of 1890). In the 1950s 
some Jewish groups started complaining about the IKG and demanding 
recognition as a separate community. In the 1970s a group called Agudas 
Israel applied to the Constitutional Court to have the provision concerning 
the compulsory Einheitsgemeinde repealed. The Einheitsgemeinde (unity 
community) refers to the centralization, at the local level, of the community 
structure, which encompasses all streams of Judaism. In the judgment no. 
G 31/79 of 2 July 1981, the Constitutional Court ruled that the 
Einheitsgemeinde-related provisions were unconstitutional, insofar as the 
principle of equality was breached. According to the judges, any person 
self-defining as a Jew according to his or her own conception had to be 
regarded as a Jew (it is interesting to note that this interpretation is 
inconsistent with the halakhic definition); any group of Jews had the right to 
form a Jewish community (legally recognized), besides the one already 
existing on a given territory. The importance of this decision lies in the 
circumstance that the Court was called to intervene in Jewish internal 
affairs. However, in doing so, Austrian case law affirmed for the first time 
the prevalence of the individual dimension of the right to religious freedom 
over the collective sphere139. 
The Islam Act was enacted in 1912, but only in 1979 was a religious 
                                                          
p. 707. 
138 B. MOSER, Freedom of religion and legal recognition as a church or religious community: 
VfGH 16.12.2009, B 516/09, in ICL Journal, 2010, IV/2, pp. 232-234. 
139 S. COHEN-WEISZ, Joining the Jewish Fold: The Changing Conversion Policies in Austria 
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society recognized: the Islamic Religious Authority of Austria (Islamische 
Glaubensgemeinschaft in Österreich, henceforth IGGiÖ)140. In the judgment 
no. 11574/1987, the Constitutional Court interpreted the Islam Act of 1912, 
which formerly applied only to the adherents of the Hanafi school, as 
applying to the other Sunni schools as well as to other streams of Islam, like 
Shi’ism. According to the judges, this limitation breached Art. 15 of the 1867 
Law141. However, this decision did not solve the problems of representation 
within Islam in Austria. Alevis, whom the IGGiÖ refused to consider as 
Muslims, tried for years to obtain a recognition but, according to the 
competent Ministry, only one Islamic community could be recognised. In 
the judgment no. B 1214/09-35 of 1 December 2010 the Constitutional Court 
declared the Ministry’s decision illegitimate. In the same month, the Islamic 
Alevi Congregation (Islamische Alevitische Glaubensgemeinschaft, henceforth 
IAGÖ), one the Alevi groups seeking recognition, succeeded in being 
registered as a religious community (the new legal status introduced by the 
1998 Law) and, in 2013, it was upgraded to the status of 
Religionsgesellschaft142. The 2015 amendment to the Islam Law has inter alia 
strengthened the status of both the IGGiÖ and the IAGÖ 143, but problems 
of representation have not been solved yet. A dissenting Alevi group  
 
“has contested IAGÖ’s claim to represent all Alevis. Considering that 
                                                          
and Germany since 1945, in Becoming Jewish. New Jews and Emerging Jewish Communities in a 
Globalized World, ed. by T. Parfitt, N. Fisher, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle 
upon Tyne, 2016, p. 139-143; R. POTZ, Religious Freedom, cit., p. 3. 
140 C. SCHEU, The emergence of new minorities in Austria, cit., p. 55. 
141 P. OBERNDORFER, B. WAGNER, Legislative Omission as a Problem of Constitutional 
Review. Report of the Austrian Constitutional Court XIV. Congress of the Conference of European 
Constitutional Courts Vilnius, Lithuania, June 2-7, 2008, in 
http://www.confeuconstco.org/reports/rep-xiv/report_Austria_en.pdf, p. 10; L. MUSSELLI, 
Edilizia religiosa, Islam e neogiurisdizionalimo in Europa. Alcune note sul nuovo «Islamgesetz» 
austriaco e sul divieto di edificare minareti in Svizzera, in Quaderni di diritto e politica ecclesiastica, 
2015/2, p. 451; L.J. ABID, Muslims in Austria: Integration through Participation in Austrian 
Society, in Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 2006, XXVI/2, p. 268; A. SKOWRON-
NALBORCZYK, A Century of the Official Legal Status of Islam in Austria: Between the Law on 
Islam of 1912 and the Law on Islam of 2015, in Muslim Minorities-State Relations. Violence, 
Integration and Policy, ed. by R. Mason, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2016, p. 66. 
142 A. ÇAKIR, The Struggle of the Alevi Religious Community for Recognition: Formatting of 
Alevism into Liberal Islamic Alevism, in Migration und Integration - wissenschaftliche 
Perspektiven aus Österreich, Vienna University Press, Vienna, 2016, p. 230; T. 
SCHMIDINGER, Austria, in Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, ed. by J.S. Nielsen, Brill, Leiden, 
2011, vol. III, p. 34; F. HAFEZ, Institutionalised Austrian Islam: One institution representing the 
many, in Debating Islam. Negotiating Religion, Europe, and the Self, ed. by S.-M. Behloul et al., 
Transcript Verlag, Bielefeld, 2012, p. 236; A. SKOWRON-NALBORCZYK, A Century of the 
Official Legal Status of Islam in Austria, cit., p. 68. 
143 C. SCHEU, The emergence of new minorities in Austria, cit., p. 57. 
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Alevism as a distinct religious community that stands outside Islam, 
the Federation of Alevi Communities in Austria (Föderation der Aleviten 
Gemeinden in Österreich, AABF) also applied for registration. Another 
such application is expected from the Islamic Shi’i Religious 
Community in Austria”144. 
 
The last, but not least Muslim organization unhappy with the current 
legal regulation is the Österreich Turkisch-Islamische Union (Austrian Turkish 
Islamic Union, henceforth ATIB), an umbrella association financed and 
staffed by Turkey’s Presidency of Religious Affaits, and one of the IGGiÖ’s 
largest constituent members. The 2015 amendment to the Islam Law 
prohibits the funding of religious services by entities outside Austria - a 
limitation that does not apply to any other religion in Austria. In June 2015, 
ATIB applied to the Constitutional Court. Legal experts doubt that this 
clause may hold up to its scrutiny - or that by the European Court of Human 
Rights - because it breaches both the principle of equality and religious 
denominations’ right to internal autonomy145. It will be interesting to see 
how the Constitutional Court will assess the lawmakers’ notion of 
“religion” and attempt to establish an Austrian Islam. 
 
 
4 - Conclusions 
 
The Republic of Austria has inherited and - despite changes and 
adjustments made in the course of time - basically confirmed the 
ecclesiastical law system inherited from Austria-Hungary. This system, 
defined by Austrian scholars as a “denominationally neutral system in 
ecclesiastical matters”146, aimed to overcome the previous situation, 
characterized by a confessionist regime privileging the Catholic Church. 
This aim - like in other European countries - was not attained through the 
repeal of the privileges and benefits formerly guaranteed to the Catholic 
Church, but through their extension to denominational groups, whose 
worldview inter alia could be encompassed in the notion of “religion” 
commonly held by Austrian authorities and the public at large. As seen, this 
conformity was attested by the recognition of a specific legal status.  
The increasing religious diversity of Austrian society has started 
challenging the pattern of Religionsgesellschaften from both “outside” and 
                                                          
144 K. ÖKTEM, Austria, in Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, ed. by J. S. Nielsen, Brill, Leiden, 
2015, vol. VII, p. 47. 
145 K. ÖKTEM, Austria, in Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, ed. by J. S. Nielsen, Brill, Leiden, 
2016, vol. VIII, p. 52. 
146 See inter alia R. POTZ, Religious Freedom, cit., p. 1.  
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“within”. From “outside”, new religious movements or not-so-new 
movements whose religion is negatively connoted in public perception 
have tried to accede to the privileged legal status offered to religious 
denominations. From “within” dissenting religious groups have 
complained about the traditional institutional architecture of religious 
societies. In this process, Austrian courts have played and are playing a very 
important role, which has an impact on the definition of the meaning of 
“religion”. Despite the variety of situations examined in Austrian case law, 
it seems possible to conclude that they all revolve around the same essential 
issue: that is, the striking of a fair balance between the individual and the 
collective dimensions of religious freedom, in order to prevent the 
infringement of an individual’s fundamental right based only on the legal 
status of the religious group he or she belongs to. 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper aims to examine recent Austrian case law concerning the meaning of 
“religion” in a two-fold perspective. In the first place, it focuses upon judgments 
determining the legitimacy (or the illegitimacy) of specific legal rules and 
administrative practices, grounded on a differentiation between religious groups 
(for example, between “religious denominations” on the one side, and “sects” or 
“cults” on the other side). In the second place, it examines decisions concerning 
the relationship between a religious worldview and the religious groups 
established on the Austrian territory and claiming to represent that “religion”.  
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(Researcher at the University of Teramo, School of Law)  
 
 
The Meaning of ‘Religion’ in Italian Supreme Court Jurisprudence  
Labour Cases 
 
 
SOMMARIO: 1. Performance of work - 2. Discriminatory layoff - 3. Ideological 
agreement - 4. Different treatment. 
 
 
1 - Performance of work 
 
Freedom of religion provides believers with the right to believe or not in a 
specific religion, express their affiliation to a church and change their faith 
at any time, as well as the right to abide by the specific precepts required by 
their religion. Religious precepts are nothing but life rules, or rather “a rule 
aimed to affect the life choices of individuals and, as such, it ends up 
affecting not only the person’s life but also their relationship with the 
surrounding community”147.  
The general conviction is that a person’s behaviour in compliance 
with a religious precept does not affect the appropriate performance of their 
work and that their exercise absolutely cannot prevent the worker from 
being hired, or keep their job or enjoy specific benefits. Thus, any 
contractual clauses that jeopardize the worker’s ability to follow their 
religious precepts shall be considered void, as they are not justified by the 
need to protect the employer’s freedom of economic initiative. 
Employees belonging to another religion shall autonomously take all 
the measures that are necessary to comply with the food requirements of 
their religion. The issues related to the different religious prescriptions 
about holidays and weekly rest day are also strictly connected. Our 
regulations do not include a general right to skip work in order to take part 
in religious celebrations and rites, nor that the weekly rest day matches the 
religious holidays of workers. 
This is also confirmed by the fact that the weekly rest day shall not 
be considered as related “to the exercise of freedom of religion, but rather 
to the protection of the workers’ health and psycho-physical integrity, 
                                                          
147 V. PACILLO, Contributo allo studio del diritto alla libertà religiosa nel rapporto di lavoro 
subordinato, Giuffrè, Milano, 2003, p. 178. 
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promoting their resilience”148, thus there is no connection to religious 
festivities. Therefore, the Italian legislator has chosen Sunday as the fixed 
weekly rest day in accordance with the customs and traditions of the 
Country, without giving it a particular religious meaning but connecting it 
to the enjoyment of the so-called free time. 
Some scholars have claimed that the special rules regulating the 
Jewish and Adventist holidays provide a greater protection for Adventist 
and Jewish workers than for Catholic ones, as  
 
“religious choices are considered as autonomous causes of absence 
from work and subject to protection through the provision of an 
individual right”149, whereas “Sunday cannot be imposed nor required 
as rest day by the worker declaring to be Catholic”150.  
 
This interpretation cannot be accepted for several reasons: first of all, 
by express agreement, the days or hours in which the worker was absent 
must be performed on a Sunday or any other day, without the right to 
receive extra remuneration. Moreover, any work performed by a Jewish or 
Adventist employee on a Saturday or other holiday is not related to any 
form of extra payment, as it happens for Catholic workers performing work 
on holidays.  
This is in conflict not only with the principles of ideological, religious 
and cultural pluralism, but also with our case law; as a matter of fact, the 
Corte di Cassazione right to a proportionate remuneration to the quantity 
and quality of the work performed.  
The agreements between the State and non-Catholic churches do not 
ensure that workers can celebrate their religious holidays but, at the same 
time, the lack of an understanding that allows workers the right to celebrate 
their rites, non-Catholic workers can be subject to disciplinary or 
remunerative penalties that are legitimate on paper. Thus, workers who 
belong to a church that has no agreement with the Italian State do not have 
the right to skip work to celebrate their holidays.  
With this respect, it is worth remembering the position of the 
Consiglio di Stato about a teacher who did not go to work on two days that 
are considered holidays according to the Serbian Orthodox Church; the 
Council has stated that  
 
                                                          
148 L. MUSSELLI, La rilevanza civile delle festività islamiche, in R. BENIGNI, L’identità 
religiosa nel rapporto di lavoro, Jovene, Napoli, 2008, p. 46. 
149 P. BELLOCCHI, Pluralismo religioso, discriminazioni ideologiche e diritto del lavoro, in 
ADL, Argomenti di diritto del lavoro, n. 1, 2003, p. 206. 
150 P. BELLOCCHI, Pluralismo religioso, discriminazioni ideologiche e diritto del lavoro, in 
ADL, Argomenti di diritto del lavoro, cit., p. 207. 
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“according to the system implemented by our Constitution, the civil 
relevance of specific holidays referred to a specific religion must be 
subject to an agreement aimed to regulate the relationship between 
that religion and the Italian State”151. 
 
The case law on religious holidays not only refers to non-Catholic 
churches, but many decisions also involve Catholic workers. As a matter of 
fact, the Corte di Cassazione has recently passed a judgment stating that the 
disciplinary measures against a worker who skipped work on a Sunday, for 
religious reasons, and caught up during his rest day were disproportionate.  
In this specific case, the Supreme Court stated that what was 
questionable was not the penalty per se but its proportionality with the 
worker’s violation. For this reason, the Court - considering the confidence 
“induced by the company behaviour, that had led the worker to think that 
the management would tolerate his absence on the Sunday”152, and the 
worker’s collaborative attitude who showed up on his day off - concluded 
that the penalties given to the worker for not working on Sunday were not 
proportionate.  
The above-mentioned case clearly shows that it is often very difficult 
to find the right balance between the two rights, both protected by our 
Constitution: the employers’ right to organize their company in accordance 
with the production needs and the workers’ right to abide by the precepts 
of their religion. 
 
 
2 - Discriminatory layoff 
 
The institution of discriminatory layoff is disciplined by several legal 
provisions, some of them dating back to some time ago, offering protection 
from any conducts that are against the principles of equality, freedom and 
human dignity that are guaranteed by our Constitution.  
It is easy to understand the difficulty for workers to prove that the 
layoff is based on a discriminatory reason; however, this is made easier by 
the so-called simple presumptions, which, according to art. 2697, must be 
“serious, accurate and concordant”.  
Therefore, a layoff based on the religious convictions of the worker 
belongs in the category of discriminatory layoff and must be considered 
void, regardless of the reasons offered by the employer.  
                                                          
151 Consiglio di Stato, Counsel 11 February 1998, in R. BOTTA, Dieci anni di 
giurisprudenza su fattore religioso e diritto del lavoro, in Quaderni di diritto e politica ecclesiastica, 
n. 3, 2001, p. 729. 
152 Corte di Cassazione, Labour Section, 22 February 2016, n. 3416. 
 57 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 39 del 2017 ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
Thus, the layoffs resulting from the workers’ belonging to a 
particular church and those resulting from the assumption of any 
ideological position towards a religion shall be considered forbidden for 
discriminatory reasons.  
Moreover, as already pointed out, a layoff shall be considered 
discriminatory when based on the religious practices - or rather, precepts - 
that the worker has or has not followed in his/her life at work and outside 
work, i.e. not only the actual rites but all the behaviours that are directly 
related to compliance with a religious precept.  
Similarly, the layoff of a manager who allowed a religious 
organization - with which he was affiliated - to administer aptitude tests to 
employees was not considered discriminatory.  
The Supreme Court has stated that  
 
“the fact that the organization that administered the tests belongs to a 
particular religious-ethical stance was taken into consideration to the 
extent in which it had adversely affected the company context, as the 
survey performed by that organization had upset the employees due 
to the invasive nature of the tests with respect to their privacy and the 
resulting negative impact”153. 
 
The Court finally stated that the layoff of the manager was legitimate, 
as there was no violation of the rules on discriminatory treatment based on 
ideology or religion. Apart from these cases, when an employer wants to 
cause damage to an employee due to their religious choices, there can be no 
valid reason, no balance of the interests in conflict, because in this case the 
only interest to protect is the worker’s freedom of religion. 
The observations of the Courts with respect to freedom of religion 
within religion-based organizations were inspired by the need to protect 
not the religious staff but the non-clerical staff involved in specific activities. 
The first issue brought to the attention of the Italian Courts is the possible 
relevance for layoff of some private behaviours of an employee that might 
be in contrast with the moral directions of the religious employer. 
The Supreme Court, setting aside the previous decisions on the 
matter, moves from the assumption that the layoff - being “connected to the 
worker’s exercise of constitutional rights such as the freedom of opinion, 
the freedom or religion and, with respect to schools, the freedom to teach” 
- can be considered legitimate  
 
“only if it is necessary to ensure the exercise of other constitutional 
rights, such as the freedom of political parties and trade unions, the 
freedom of religion and the freedom of schools and only in the cases 
                                                          
153 Corte di Cassazione, Labour Section, 16 February 2011, no. 3821. 
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where ideological compliance is a requirement for the performance of 
work”.  
 
Any ideological discordance between the clerical authorities and the 
teacher or any moral or behavioural profiles that stay within the teacher’s 
private life are not relevant; however, on the other hand, a layoff can be 
based on the actual impact of a teacher’s behaviour on the religious morals 
of the organization. 
Another issue brought to the attention of the Courts is related to the 
right of a worker, who is employed by a religion-based organization, to 
promote another faith or religious ideology even when it is contrary to the 
one followed by the employer. 
It is important to point out that the Court does not consider the layoff 
illegitimate based on the worker’s right to freely promote a religion that is 
in contrast with the ideology that inspires the employer, but based on the 
fact that the employer’s reaction is disproportionate with respect to the 
employee’s behaviour. 
 
 
3 - Ideological agreement 
 
Authors and jurisprudence define ideologically oriented organizations as 
those “institutions established and operating for pursuing ideal, 
confessional, denominational, political, labour or cultural aims”154. The 
notion of ideologically oriented organization, in other words, refers to  
 
“all the socio-economic entities in which the production of goods or 
the delivery of services is strictly related to the intention of 
implementing specific ideological goals: this intention can be the 
exclusive purpose of the employer or contribute to profitable 
activities”155.  
 
The peculiarity of these organizations can be identified in the 
inherent ideology of the aim pursued and the subsequent involvement of 
the worker, therefore, “the factor of difference is the ideological 
involvement of the worker and the attraction of ideal or denominational 
profiles into the object of control”156. Religious organizations, more than 
other entities characterized by an ideology, required a theory of the 
                                                          
154 G. PERA, Le organizzazioni di tendenza nella legge sui licenziamenti, in Riv. it. dir. lav., 
1991, I, p. 455; R. DE LUCA TAMAJO, F. LUNARDON, Aziende di tendenza e disciplina dei 
licenziamenti individuali, in Quaderni di diritto e politica ecclesiastica, n. 3, 2004, p. 704 ss. 
155 V. PACILLO, Contributo allo studio, cit., p. 229. 
156 R. DE LUCA TAMAJO, F. LUNARDON, Aziende di tendenza e disciplina dei 
licenziamenti individuali, in Quaderni di diritto e politica ecclesiastica, cit., p. 704.  
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ideologically oriented organizations and “experienced the relevant 
jurisprudential and regulative evolution”157. 
For a long time, before adopting a criterion for balancing the 
employer’s needs and the worker’s freedom of religion, authors and 
jurisprudence  
 
“had to research the regulatory basis for a juridical relevance of the 
employer’s ideology and define a theory of the ideologically oriented 
-organizations, because the legislator regulated the matter only in 1990, 
however not completely filling the regulatory gap”158:  
 
the first legislative intervention will be the 108/1990 Law reforming 
individual layoffs and thus, for these reasons, it has been said that 
ideologically oriented -organizations in our system are “the effect of an 
empirical observation, rather than a juridical one”159.  
Therefore, in the Italian legal system, an ideology bearer can be 
defined as “the individual or collective subject that processes the content of 
the message of opinion and organizes its strengthening and spreading also 
using employees”160. 
The criterion for settling any possible conflict between the individual 
and the group, also for ideologically oriented organizations, was searched 
in art. 2 of the Italian Constitution, which “requires that groups maintain 
their specific identity in order to allow the individuals to choose the social 
formation that matches their line of thinking between the various available 
ones”161.  
Therefore, the fulfilment of work obligation is not jeopardized 
simply by the existence of an ideological contrast, but any possible non-
fulfilment shall be evaluated individually with respect to the activity 
required on the part of the worker and his/her behaviour, admitting the 
possibility for the parties to establish behavioural obligations aimed to 
protect the ideology of the organization while restricting the worker’s 
freedom of religion:  
 
"the existence of an area of non-application of the prohibitions set to 
protect the constitutional rights of the worker can be tolerated only if 
the employer - as well as pursuing or drawing inspiration from 
                                                          
157 R. BENIGNI, L’identità religiosa, cit., p. 167. 
158 R. BENIGNI, L’identità religiosa, cit., p. 144. 
159 F. SANTONI, Le organizzazioni di tendenza e i rapporti di lavoro, in R. BENIGNI, 
L’identità religiosa, cit., p. 146. 
160 R. BENIGNI, L’identità religiosa, cit., p. 147. 
161 M.G. MATTAROLO, Il rapporto di lavoro subordinato nelle organizzazioni di tendenza , 
in R. BENIGNI, L’identità religiosa, cit., p. 147.  
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religious or ideological aims - performs an activity that is aimed at 
spreading the ideology”162.  
 
In particular, this non-application area only refers to those workers 
who operate to spread the ideology of the group and only if the lack of 
compliance with these obligations is required to protect the genuineness of 
the ideology.  
While waiting for systematic rules and regulations on the matter, 
authors and jurisprudence have looked for laws that could be applied to the 
employer. At first, employers running an ideologically oriented 
organization were considered as not belonging in the category of 
entrepreneurs and, as a matter of fact, this figure is not entitled to the rights 
provided for by chapter III of the Workers’ Statute.  
This issue was addressed by the Supreme Court, judging the 
rightfulness of art. 35163 of Law no. 300 of 1970 with respect to the part where 
it rules out the application of art. 18 and chapter III of the Statute to private 
non-entrepreneur employers. According to the Court, the exclusion of the 
rights ensured by chapter III of the Workers’ Statute is valid also for 
ideologically oriented -organizations  
 
“or for private organizations with cultural, sport-related, recreational 
and charitable purposes, and any other non-entrepreneur employers, 
such as professionals, whose simple organizational structures are 
normally not fit for allowing the trade-union activities that are usually 
carried out within larger enterprises”164.  
 
Therefore, ideologically oriented -organizations are considered and 
subject to a special set of rules not because of the need to protect its 
ideology, but because of its non-entrepreneurial nature.  
The Corte di Cassazione brought the statements of the Supreme 
Court to the extreme consequences: as a matter of fact, it defines 
ideologically oriented -organizations as “employers that do not aim to make 
                                                          
162 V. PACILLO, Contributo allo studio, cit., p. 237; A. DE OTO, Precetti religiosi e mondo 
del lavoro: un’analisi giuridica, Ediesse, Roma, 2007. 
163 “As regards industrial and commercial enterprises, the provisions of Chapter III, 
with the exception of the first paragraph of article 27, apply to each branch, facility, office 
or department that employs more than fifteen people. The same provisions apply to 
farming enterprises that employ more than five people. The above mentioned rules also 
apply to industrial and commercial enterprises that employ more than fifteen people 
within the same municipalità and farming enterprises that employ more than five people 
within the same territory, even if each individual production unit does not reach that limit. 
Without prejudice to the provisions of articles 1, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16 and 17, collective 
employment agreements apply the principles set by this law to shipping companies with 
respect to travelling personnel”. 
164 Constitutional Court, 8 July 1975, n. 189. 
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profit and do not carry out productive or economic activities with an 
entrepreneurial organization”165.  
The lack of a pecuniary purpose, which prevents these organizations 
from being considered as enterprises, involves the exemption from the 
application of Chapter III and art. 18 of the Workers’ Statute, granting actual 
protection in case of layoff.  
This nature was confirmed in several judgments of the time; as a 
matter of fact, the Court of Naples stated that  
 
“the predominance of the denominational and ideological purpose of 
the activity carried out by the organization absorbs any other 
entrepreneurial character of the institution, so as to neutralize any 
concurring profit-making purpose”166.  
 
Thus, when defining the ideologically oriented -employers, the ideal 
purposes leave space to an objective analysis of the structure and activity 
performed, leading to breaking the “dogma of incompatibility between 
ideologically oriented -organization and enterprise”167.  
This evolution particularly comes out at jurisprudential level; 
starting from healthcare and hospital facilities, the judges start getting 
ahead of the conclusions of the Supreme Court of 1975.  
In 1980, as a matter of fact, the Corte di Cassazione confirms the 
entrepreneurial nature of state-recognized church institutions that 
professionally perform healthcare activities; in particular, the Court states 
that church institutions that perform these activities can be considered “as 
enterprises if their activity is objectively organized and performed so that it 
can potentially produce profit”168.  
Finally, the Corte di Cassazione completely embraces this stance, 
“explaining that the object of the investigation for the purposes of 
entrepreneurial classification must be the aim of the activity performed by 
the institution”169, ending up stating that “for the purposes under 
discussion, the main aim - the destination of the goods produced or services 
delivered - is negligible, whereas only the purpose of the activity performed 
is crucial”: this goes beyond the position of the Supreme Court, ending up 
admitting that the ideologically oriented organizations, that also perform 
an economic activity, shall be considered as enterprises170.  
 
                                                          
165 Corte di Cassazione, Labour Section, 30 March 1982, n. 1986. 
166 Court of Naples, 1 February 1980, n. 12530. 
167 R. BENIGNI, L’identità religiosa, cit., p. 170. 
168 Corte di Cassazione, Labour Section, 15 February 1980, n. 1138. 
169 Corte di Cassazione, 11 April 1994, n. 3354. 
170 R. BOTTA, Dieci anni di giurisprudenza, cit., p. 729 ss. 
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4 - Different treatment 
 
In the organizations characterized by a specific religious orientation, 
religion can exceptionally become the cause for a different treatment of the 
employees of the organization and, therefore, it can represent a crucial and 
essential requirement for the performance of the work activity within that 
particular institution.  
Thus, for some activities, the European Directive lets the Member 
States allow that the employer includes the affiliation to a specific religion 
or a certain ideology as a preferential requirement for the applicants. 
Moreover, it can be possible for some groups of employers to 
lawfully dismiss those who do not believe in a specific religion or agree on 
a certain ideology. However, in order for this exception to be considered 
lawful, there are two specific requirements: first of all, there must be a 
legitimate purpose; secondly, the exception must be proportionate to the 
extent of the activities for which it is taken into consideration.  
With respect to the proportionality principle, it is important to point 
out that the Court of Justice considers this principle as “being one of the 
general principles of community law”171, which requires that any action 
taken is necessary and appropriate with respect to the aims pursued. 
This involves that, pursuant to the Directive 2000/78/EC, art. 4, 
paragraph 1, the  
 
“particular nature of the productive activity does not justify an 
unlimited sacrifice of equality, but only as much as it is necessary in 
order to prevent the worker’s activity from becoming unproductive or 
counterproductive”172. 
 
Specific reference to ideologically oriented organizations is 
introduced in the second paragraph of the same article, which also provides 
that the Member States can keep in their national legislations in force before 
the application of the Directive - or include in a future set of rules 
recognizing the current customs - provisions for a difference of treatment 
based on religion or personal convictions, in the case of churches or other 
public or private organizations whose ethics is funded on religion or 
personal convictions.  
This difference does not represent discrimination if, due to the nature 
of the activities or the context in which they are performed, religion or 
                                                          
171 Court of Justice, 11 July 1989, lawsuit 265/87, in V. PACILLO, Contributo allo studio, 
cit., p. 289. 
172 F. ONIDA, Il problema delle organizzazioni di tendenza nella direttiva 2000/78/CE 
attuativa dell’art. 13 del Trattato sull’Unione Europea, in Il Diritto Ecclesiastico, I, 2001, p. 907. 
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personal convictions represent an essential, legitimate and justified 
requirement for the performance of the work activity, taking into 
consideration the ethics of the organization. 
Also in paragraph 2 of art. 4, specifically dedicated to religious 
institutions, there is indirect reference to the proportionality principle: this 
reference can be considered as indirectly resulting from the fact that the last 
part of paragraph 2 provides that the differences in treatment allowed by it 
shall be implemented in compliance with, among other things, the general 
principles of community law, which include the proportionality one. 
Thus, the community directive allows the sacrifice of some basic 
rights, such as freedom of religion or thought, only as an exception and as 
long as they are in contrast with other basic principles, such as the 
protection of the ideology genuineness. 
The 2000/78/EC Directive was implemented into the Italian legal 
system by Legislative Decree no. 216 of 9 July 2003, with which the legislator 
had recourse to the powers granted by the European Commission, creating 
a special system deviating from the principle of equal treatment without 
religion-based distinctions. 
Experts did not find the implementation of the Directive on the part 
of the Italian legislator in line with the community Directive. As a matter of 
fact, art. 3, paragraph 5, does not make reference to the essential 
proportionality principle and this leads to think that the Italian law breaks 
the limits set by the Community Directive.  
As well as the lack of reference to the proportionality principle, it is 
important to notice that the law allows the possibility to deviate from the 
equal treatment principle not only to religious institutions but also to other 
public or private organizations.  
Therefore, it includes all  
 
“public or private employers, regardless of the fact that they have or 
do not have an exclusive or predominant religious purpose; this 
benefit certainly does not apply only to employers that are not 
structured as an organized group”173. 
 
Subsequently, all organized groups can set restrictions, distinctions 
or preferences based on the worker’s belonging to a certain religion with 
respect to both the access to the employment and the conditions for layoff.  
The Italian system grants this benefit to a much wider range of 
subjects than those defined by the European Commission, which caused 
several doubts about its rightfulness:  
 
                                                          
173 V. PACILLO, Contributo allo studio, cit., p. 297. 
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“the overall set-up created over time by jurisprudence with respect to 
the balance between workers’ rights and ideologically oriented -
employers’ rights allows for exceptions to the general rules set by the 
equal treatment principle, but in a stricter way compared to the 
community rules”174. 
 
This setting involves, as confirmed by jurisprudence, the possibility 
to accept a rightful dismissal “caused by a major ideological disagreement 
between the organization and the worker performing ideologically oriented 
activities”175; that is, making an exception to the prohibition of 
discrimination, “there is no unjust reason for dismissal in the event of a 
failure to comply with the ideology and institutional goals of the 
employer”176. 
The Corte di Cassazione has also specified that, for the purposes of 
the application of art. 4,  
 
“employers can be classified as entrepreneurs according to the nature 
of their activity, which shall be evaluated in accordance with the 
ordinary criteria that are related to the type of organization and 
economic character of its management, regardless of the existence of 
an actual profit and whether the delivery of services - if carried out 
with entrepreneurial economic and organizational methods - is 
performed exclusively to the associates of the subject delivering them 
or not”177.  
 
Therefore, the entrepreneurial nature of an activity and its 
subsequent exclusion from the exemption provided for by art. 4 results  
 
“from the objective economic character of the activity, as it is aimed at 
covering the expenses with the revenues as anyone who produces 
wealth is an entrepreneur, regardless of the fact that its goods or 
services are destined to third parties or other institutions directly 
related to the organization”178. 
 
In setting the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religious 
convictions and practices, the Consolidation Act of 1998 offers broader 
                                                          
174 N. FIORITA, Le direttive comunitarie in tema di lotta alla discriminazione, la loro 
tempestiva attuazione e l’eterogenesi dei fini, in Quaderni di diritto e politica ecclesiastica, n. 2, 
2004, p. 361. 
175 Corte di Cassazione, 8 July 1987, n. 189, in R. DE LUCA TAMAJO, F. LUNARDON, 
Aziende di tendenza e disciplina dei licenziamenti individuali, in Quaderni di diritto e politica 
ecclesiastica, cit., p. 707. 
176 R. DE LUCA TAMAJO, F. LUNARDON, Aziende di tendenza, cit., p. 707. 
177 Corte di Cassazione, 26 January 2004, n. 1367, in P. Cendon (ed.), Il lavoro, 4th ed., in 
Il diritto privato nella giurisprudenza, Utet, Milano, 2009, p. 202. 
178 P. Cendon (ed.), Il lavoro, cit., p. 202. 
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protection compared to Legislative Decree no. 216 of 2003, which only refers 
to religion leading to doubt that  
 
“cult acts and behaviours that are work-related or not and directly 
relatable to the compliance (or non-compliance) with a religious 
obligation, even if they do not affect the appropriate performance of 
work, are excluded from the factors of different treatment that can 
result in discrimination”179. 
 
A special evidential system was introduced, as it helps workers 
prove the casual connection existing between different treatment and 
discrimination factor. In particular, once workers can prove the existence of 
a negative treatment towards them with respect to the chosen benchmark, 
then the employers shall provide verifiable facts in order to assess - in the 
event of direct discrimination - the inexistence of discrimination and thus 
the existence of a non-discriminatory reason for the different treatment, or 
the existence of an exemption from the prohibition of discrimination; on the 
other hand,  
 
“in the event of indirect discrimination, the inexistence of 
discrimination or the traceability of the potentially detrimental 
criterion or practice to a legitimate aim pursued with appropriate and 
necessary means, so that the employer is totally responsible for 
proving the inexistence of discrimination or its justification”180.  
 
Moreover, recent jurisprudence has defined that whether “an 
employer threatens a worker’s fundamental right, including freedom of 
religion and conviction, the worker can have recourse to self-protection by 
refusing to perform the work required”181. 
 
Keywords: Religion; Religion and Law; Science of Religion; Italian 
Constitution; Labour and Law.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
179 M. DE GIORGI, Osservatorio UNAR: libertà religiosa e discriminazione nell’ordinamento 
italiano, in Quaderni di diritto e politica ecclesiastica, n. 1, 2013, p. 172. 
180 E. TARQUINI, La Corte di Cassazione e il principio di non discriminazione al tempo del 
diritto del lavoro derogabile, in Rivista italiana del diritto del lavoro, n. 3, 2016, p. 740. 
181 J. PASQUALI CERIOLI, Il lavoro, in G. Casuscelli (a cura di), Nozioni di diritto 
ecclesiastico, 5th ed., Giappichelli, Torino, 2015, p. 182; ID., Il divieto di discriminazione religiosa 
sul luogo di lavoro: riflessioni critiche, in Quaderni di diritto e politica ecclesiastica, n. 1, 2005, p. 
94 ss.; ID., Parità di trattamento e organizzazioni di tendenza religiose nel «nuovo» diritto 
ecclesiastico europeo, in Quaderni di diritto e politica ecclesiastica, n. 1, 2013, p. 71 ss. 
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The Meaning of ‘Religion’ 
in the French Cour de cassation Jurisprudence * 
 
 
SUMMARY: 1. Law and Religion in French Legislation. Terminological Issues - 2. Civil 
Insignificance of Confessional Statutory Regulations - 3. Religious Freedom and 
Contractual Relationships - 4. The Expression of Religious Convictions in the workplace  
 
 
1 - Law and Religion in French legislation. Terminological Issues  
 
The pronouncements of the Civil Court of Cassation are the perspective that 
I have chosen for the analysis of the meaning of ‘religion’ in French law. 
This choice has been determined by the greater variety of civil litigation 
stances in comparison to those pertaining to penal law. Such a variety 
allows for a more complex analysis of the interpretative method with which 
the judge, in identifying criteria for the application of juridical rules, 
establishes the jurisprudential hermeneutics concerning the amplitude and 
the limits of religious freedom rights. Furthermore, the balancing of rights 
in actual court cases is taken into account. 
As in all interpretation processes, the juridical definition of “religious 
facts” in sociological terms182, meets with limitations based both on the 
vagueness and on the terminological variety used in legal texts183. The Act 
of Separation of the Churches and the State of 1905 established the main 
restrictions that define the juridical analysis method: respect for freedom of 
conscience (art. 1)184 and the neutrality of the State (art. 2)185. 
                                                          
*A quite similar Italian version has been published in Diritto e Religioni, 23, 1-2017, pp. 
112-123. 
 
182 É. DURKHEIM, De la définition des phénomènes religieux, in L’année sociologique, 1898, 
pp. 1-28. 
183 On the matter concerning a juridical definition of religion, starting from 
terminological varieties in the French normative texts, see F. MESSNER, P. H. PRÉLOT, 
J.M. WOEHRLING, Traité de droit français des religions, Litec, Paris, 2th ed., 2013, p. 33 ss. 
184 “La République assure la liberté de conscience. Elle garantit le libre exercice des 
cultes sous les seules restrictions édictées ci-après dans l’intérêt de l’ordre public”. 
185 “La République ne reconnaît, ne salarie ni ne subventionne aucun culte”. 
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The preamble to the French Constitution of 1946 enshrines the 
principle of non-discrimination for reasons of sex, origin and religion186. 
This principle is confirmed in the First Article of the Constitution of 1958, 
which establishes the equality of all citizens before the law, and the respect 
of all religious beliefs187.  
Hence, the term religion in the Constitution indicates the dimension 
of everyone’s identity. The twofold standpoint which the juridical notion of 
religion is composed of is specified in the subsequent declaration contained 
in the Constitution which states that all beliefs, including convictions of 
conscience, are equally respected by the legal system. 
On the one side, there is the criterion of the citizen’s affiliation to a 
range of values, doctrines and rituals typical of a religious community; on 
the other, priority is given to the conviction, belief, or creed, not necessarily 
religious, shaping the conscience of each individual188. 
The first aspect deriving from the juridical qualification assigned to 
the notion of religion is precisely the individual feature of value options. 
What is relevant for the French law is not the normative essence of religion. 
Its wider and more complex meaning is not acknowledged, but religion is 
viewed as a faith or a creed that is different from all other convictions, 
                                                          
186 “[…] le peuple français proclame à nouveau que tout être humain, sans distinction 
de race, de religion ni de croyance, possède des droit inaliénables et sacrés. Il réaffirme 
solennellement les droits et les libertés de l’homme et du citoyen consacrés par la 
Déclaration de 1789 et les principes fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de la République”.  
187 Constitution de la République Française du 4 octobre 1958, art. 1: “La France est une 
République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale. Elle assure l’égalité devant la loi 
de tous les citoyens sans distinction d’origine, de race ou de religion. Elle respect toutes les 
croyances”. Freedom for all before the law with no distinction of [...] religion, and respect 
for all convictions allow to specify the concept of secularism as neutrality-separation, and 
the prohibition to discriminate in matters of religion, but also as a protection of the freedom 
of conscience not only limited to beliefs relating to religion and cult. See G. KOUBI, La 
laïcité dans le texte de la Constitution, in Revue de Droit public et de la science politique en France 
et à l’étranger, 5, 1997, pp. 1301-1321 (especially p. 1309). In other terms, unlike the version 
of 1946, in the Constitution of 1958 the term ’religion’ referred to the prohibition to 
discriminate appears, even though the protection of each and every conviction without 
specifications highlights that religious choices are on the same footing as those produced 
by agnostic, non-religious' or merely philosophical beliefs. On this point, see M. 
d’ARIENZO, La religione della laicità nella Costituzione francese, in P. BECCHI, V. PACILLO, 
Sull’invocazione a Dio nella Costituzione federale e nelle Carte fondamentali europee, Eupress, 
Lugano, 2013, p. 143. 
188 Concerning the distinction in meaning of terms such as “creed”, “opinion” and 
“thought” pertaining to religious matters, see C. MAGNI, Interpretazione del diritto italiano 
sulle credenze di religione. Possibilità operative analitiche e strutture d’ordine delle scelte normative, 
Cedam, Padova, 1959, p. 88 ss.  
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philosophical creeds or opinions, as expressions of the freedom of 
thought189. 
Consequently, in legal decisions, the subjective prevails over the 
objective aspect, which stems from the collective standpoint. This 
conceptualization is reflected in the much more frequent use of the term 
“cult” which is used in the technical-legal sense as a synonym for “religion”, 
albeit with overlapping meanings190. Such usage betrays an underlying 
guilty ideology. It considers religion only for its cultural and ritual features, 
as the exterior expressions affecting the social field, thus ratifying the 
distinction and the separation between the private and the public spheres191 
of religious affiliations. 
 The terms “cult” and “cultual association” can be traced in the 
provisions of the Act of Separation of 1905, which states, “the French 
Republic does not recognize subsidies or funding for any worship”192. 
Therefore, the term ‘cult’ is used to qualify religious institutional and 
communal forms of organization in legal terms193. More often, it is used to 
specify the right to religious freedom194. 
                                                          
189 Concerning the lack of the clear distinction in the French law between terms such as 
opinion, convictions of conscience and religious faith. 
190 Regarding the term “cult” in the French Law, see F. MESSNER, P.H. PRÉLOT, J.M. 
WOEHRLING, Traité de droit français, cit., p. 6 ss. The over simplification of legal 
vocabulary carried out by overcoming the distinction between Churches and other forms 
of religious organization by means of the only legal denomination of “cult” is ratified by 
Loi du 18 germinal an X (8 avril 1802) relative à l'organisation des cultes.  
191 See Droit des cultes, edited by X. Delsol, A. Garay, E. Tawil, Dalloz, Paris, 2005, p. 25.  
192 Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Églises et de l’État, cit., art. 2. A first 
formula of separation between State and religious confessions was ratified by the 
Thermidorian Convention with the Constitution of the year III (1795), which stated in art. 
354: “nul ne peut être empêché d’excercer, en se conformant aux lois, le culte qu’il a choisi. 
Nul ne peut être forcé de contribuer aux dépenses d’un culte. La République n’en salarie 
aucun”. See J. BAUBEROT, J.P. SCOT, C. DELACAMPAGNE, H. PEÑA-RUIZ, R. 
RÉMOND, Faut-il réviser la loi de 1905?, Puf, Paris, 2005; É. POULAT, M. GELBARD, 
Scruter la loi de 1905: la République française et la religion, Fayard, Paris, 2010. On the 
distinction between the idea not to subsidize any affiliation and the idea of secularism, see 
G. KOUBI, Les voiles de la laïcité ou la laïcité sans le voile, in Les Petites Affiches, n. 145, 1989, 
pp. 4-9, especially pp. 5-6. 
193 See F. MESSNER, P.H. PRÉLOT, J.M. WOEHRLING (2003), Traité de droit français, 
cit., where it is specified that even though “Le mot culte reste associé à l’idée de contrôle et 
de régulation publique” - and therefore maintains a more restrictive connotation of the 
term ‘religion’ - “au plan des textes juridiques internes il existe une certaine équivalence 
entre les termes de religion et de culte”, p. 23. See also, P. ROLLAND, Qu’est-ce qu’un culte 
aux yeux de la République? in Archives de sciences sociales des religions, 129, 2005, pp. 51-63.  
194 C. LANDHEER-CIESLAK, La religion devant les juges français et québécois de droit civil, 
Ed. Yvon Blais, Cowansville, 2007, p. 255; L.P. RAYNAULT-OLLU, G. ZUCCHI, Droit et 
religion. Concepts de religion dans le droit. Étude éclectique des approches juridiques à la définition 
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The equivalence in meaning assigned to the terms “cult” and 
“religion” probably traces its origins to the laws prior to 1905, which only 
provided for four recognized cults, while the others remained without a 
specific juridical regulation195. Consequently, the word “cult” has been used 
as the legal term to refer to religion giving it a more global and extended 
meaning. 
 Essentially, the normative silence concerning the meaning of the 
terms “religion” and “cult” is echoed in the principle of separation intended 
as neutrality constitutive, but not exhaustive of French secularism196. 
Moreover, the latter term also lacks a legal definition and is often used as 
an adjective in legal texts, i.e. “Republic, indivisible, secular, democratic, 
social” (art. 1, Const. 1958) or in reference to public school teaching that is 
free and secular (art 46)197. 
                                                          
et au droit à la liberté de religion, in Revue Juridique Thémis de l’Université de Montréal, 2013, pp. 
649-477. 
195 The law of 9 December 1905 put an end to the distinction between the four 
recognized cults - Catholic, Lutheran, Reformed, Israelite - which benefited from a specific 
legal system, and the other cults not recognized by public law. 
196 A. BOYER, Comment l’État laïque connaît-il les religions?, in Archives de sciences sociales 
des religions, 2005, pp. 37-49; D. KOUSSENS, L’État français et l’expression des confessions 
religieuses: entre neutralité confessionnelle et neutralité référentielle, in Politique et sociétés, 2010, 
pp. 39-60; ID., La religion “saisie” par le droit. Comment l’État laïque définit-il la religion au 
Québec et en France?, in Recherches sociographiques, 2011, pp. 811-832. On French secularism, 
ex plurimis, C. DURAND-PRINBORGNE, La laïcité, Dalloz, Paris, 2004; G. HAARSCHER, 
La laïcité, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 2017 (first ed. 1996); R. SCHWARTZ, Un 
siècle de laïcité, Berger-Levrault, Paris, 2007; J. BAUBEROT, Histoire de la laïcité en France, 
Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 2010; ID., Les sept laïcités françaises. Le modèle français 
de laïcité n'existe pas, Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris, 2015. 
197 “L’organisation de l’enseignement public gratuit et laïque à tous les degrés est un 
devoir de l’État”, Préambule de la Constitution française du 27 octobre 1946, cit. About the 
principle in the Constitution of secularism in French Republic cf. É. POULAT, Notre laïcité 
publique. “La France est une République laïque” (Constitutions de 1946 e 1958), Berg, Paris, 2003. 
Concerning the history of secularism in French schools, cf. P. CHEVALLIER, La séparation 
de l’Église et de l’école. Jules Ferry et Léon XIII, Fayard, Paris, 1981; D. GROS, La séparation de 
l’Église et de l’École (1878-1886). Principes juridiques fondateurs de la laïcité scolaire, in J. 
BAUDOUIN, P. PORTIER, La Laïcité. Une valeur d’aujourd’hui? Contestations et 
renégociations du modèle français, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes, 2001, pp. 51-63; 
L. GARREAU, L’École, la religion et la politique de Condorcet à Ferry, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2006; 
B. BASDEVANT GAUDEMET, École publique, école privée. L’épiscopat devant le Conseil 
d’État en 1883, in Revue d’Histoire de l’Église de France, 1988, pp. 245-259; EAD., L’épiscopat 
français et le centenaire de la Révolution, in Les catholiques français et l’héritage de 1789. D’un 
centenaire à l’autre, Actes du colloque de l’Institut Catholique de Paris (Paris, 9-11 March 
1989), Textes réunis sous la direction de P. COLIN, Paris, 1989, pp. 29-44; P. VALDRINI, 
Evoluzione dei rapporti tra Chiesa cattolica e Stato nelle scuole cattoliche francesi, in Quaderni della 
scuola di specializzazione in diritto ecclesiastico e canonico, 7, Studi di diritto ecclesiastico e 
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The legal concept of secularism is a method to regulate the separation 
between the public sphere, based on shared and universally shareable 
values, and the private sphere, based on values connected with personal 
affiliation and biased198. Hence, secularism allows to regulate the 
coexistence of subjective liberties as the principle to carry out the 
organization of public authorities and public services199. 
The perspective for the survey of the legal aspects of religion in 
France, produced by the Supreme Court in reference to the dialectics 
between the right to religious freedom, the right to equality and secularism 
is based on three approaches. Specifically: neutrality, as the separation 
between law and religion; freedom of individual conscience; the principle 
of non-discrimination based on religion or convictions of other nature200.  
 
 
2 - Civil Irrelevance of Confessional Statutory Regulations  
 
In reference to the first approach concerning the interpretation of neutrality 
as separation, the judgments of the Second Section of the Civil Court of 
                                                          
canonico, Jovene, Napoli, 2002, pp. 65-77; A. FERRARI, Libertà scolastiche e laicità dello Stato 
in Italia e Francia, Giappichelli, Torino, 2002. On the relationship between Liberal 
Protestantism and Secularism, see F. BUISSON, Éducation et République, Introduction, 
présentation et notes de P. HAYAT, Kimé, Paris, 2003; P. OGNIER, J. BAUBÉROT, Une 
école sans Dieu? 1880-1895. L'invention d'une morale laïque sous la IIIe République, Presses 
Universitaires du Mirail, Toulouse, 2008. 
198 J. LALOUETTE, La séparation des Églises et de l'État: genèse et développement d'une idée, 
1789-1905, Éd. du Seuil, Paris, 2005. Concerning the evolution of the concept of Secularism-
Separation, as an institutional model between public and private spheres, see M. 
d’ARIENZO, La laicità secondo Nicolas Sarkozy, in Diritto e Religioni, 2008, p. 259; EAD., La 
laicità francese: “aperta”, “positiva”, o “impositiva”?, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), dicembre 2011, e in Diritto e Religioni, 2011, p. 355; 
P. ROLLAND, La Séparation comme forme de régulation de la pluralité religieuse, in Annuaire 
Droit et religions 2010-2011, 2010, pp. 167-181. 
199 C. KINTZLER, Qu'est-ce que la laïcité?, Vrin, Paris, 2014.  
200 J. BAUBÉROT, M. MILOT, Laïcités sans frontières, ed. Seuil, Paris, 2011; J. 
WOEHRLING, Quelle place pour la religion dans les institutions publiques? in J.F. 
GAUDREAULT-DESBIENS (dir.), Le Droit, la religion, le “raisonnable”. Le fait religieux entre 
monisme étatique et pluralisme juridique, Montréal, Éd. Thémis, 2009, pp. 115-168; J.M. 
WOEHRLING, Réflexions sur le principe de la neutralité de l'Etat en matière religieuse et sa mise 
en œuvre en droit français / Reflections Concerning the Principle of Religious neutrality of the State 
and its Implementation in French Law, in Archives de sciences sociales des religions, 1998, pp. 31-
52; ID., Le principe de neutralité confessionnelle de l'État, in Société, droit et religion, 2011, pp. 
63-85; C. FOUREST, Génie de la laïcité, Grasset, Paris, 2016. 
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Cassation pronounced in 2012201 against CAVICAM, (the Pensions and 
Social Security Fund of the main Cults)202, emphasizes that the religious 
rules establishing membership status within a community or a 
congregation have no relevance for civil law. Therefore, no formal or 
material reference is made to confessional statutory norms concerning the 
commencement date for the calculations of pension provisions. Such cases 
regarded the years spent in religious seminaries or to the year of novitiate. 
CAVIMAC’s internal regulations conformed the religious rules with 
which one became a member of a congregation or a territorial community 
to administrative regulations, thereby calculating pension rights from the 
time of completion of the pronouncement of one’s first vows or first tonsure.  
The French Court of Cassation has instead determined that the status 
of a member is not determined by confessional criteria, which are 
established within each religious order203, but exclusively by law, according 
to the objective circumstances marking communal life. 
When a clerical student, a postulant or a novice is carrying out daily 
communal services in obedience and under the supervision of a higher 
authority, and in addition to ”activities serving religion”, they are 
considered to all effects members of the congregation and religious 
communities. Their status is established, for all confessional institutions 
and communities, by the law of 1978, based on a tacit civil contract, in 
accordance with Art. 1101 and Art. 1102 C.C. and Social Security Code204. 
                                                          
201 Cour de Cassation, deuxième chambre civile, Arrêt n° 97, 20 janvier 2012, pourvois nn. 
10-24.603 et 10-24.615; Arrêt n° 101, 20 janvier 2012, pourvois nn. 10-26.845 et 10-26.873; Arrêt 
n. 882, 31 May 2012, pourvois nn. 11-15294 et 11-15426; Arrêt n° 1074, 21 juin 2012, pourvoi 
n. 11-18782; Arrêt n° 1045, 21 juin 2012, pourvois 11-18801 et 11-19079; Arrêt n° 1620, 11 
octobre 2012, pourvoi n. 11-20775. 
202 La Caisse Assurance, Vieillesse, Invalidité et Maladie des cultes (CAVIMAC) is a National 
Organization established by law n. 78 on 4 July 1999, handling Social security for all of the 
members of congregations, Ministers of Cult and religious communities.  
203 Concerning the legal recognition of consecrated life, in French legislation and 
jurisprudence, see C. BURGUN, La vie consacrée en droit canonique et en droit public français, 
ed. Artège Lethellier, Paris, 2016. 
204 Cassation rejects the appeal of the Association diocésaine de Djion stating that: ”[…] la 
cour d’appel, sans méconnaître les dispositions des articles 1er de la loi du 9 décembre 1905 ni les 
stipulations de l’article 9 de la Convention de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés 
fondamentales ni le principe de la contradiction, et en appréciant souverainement la valeur et la 
portée des preuves qui caractérisent l’engagement religieux de l’intéressé manifesté, notamment, par 
un mode de vie en communauté et par une activité essentiellement exercée au service de sa religion, 
a pu déduire de ces constatations et énonciations que celui-ci devait être considéré, dès son entrée au 
grand séminaire, comme membre d’une congrégation ou collectivité religieuse au sens de l’article L. 
721-1, devenu l’article L. 382-15 du code de la sécurité sociale, de sorte que la période litigieuse 
devait être prise en compte dans le calcul de ses droits à pension”: Cour de Cassation, deuxième 
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The Court's judgments of 2012 confirmed the tendency that had been 
affirmed in 2009205, which would be reiterated in 2015206. 
 Specifically, the civil legal status and the period of spiritual 
preparation preceding the vows overlap. In fact, the preparation period is 
comparable to a trial period, as under religious law, one is not yet a full 
member of the congregation. Hence, tax obligations are therefore at the 
expense of religious congregations and diocesan associations from the time 
one becomes a seminarian, a postulant or a novice207. 
 It is interesting to note that the legal judgment includes a reference 
to activities serving religion, referring this term to the organizational form 
in which the declaration of faith is practiced. Clearly, the substitution of the 
term “cult” confirms the correspondence of the terms “religion” and “cult”. 
As is evident, the principle of neutrality is not the result of the simple 
separation between the spheres of the state and religion. Rather, it is a sort 
of “indifference” we could define “active”, as it is aimed at affirming the 
supremacy of French law and, consequently, the juridical insignificance of 
religious rules for the protection of individual rights even within religious 
communities. 
 
 
3 - Religious Freedom and Contractual Relationships 
 
The second approach can be represented by the limitations placed by the 
law on religious practices in contractual relationships. In accordance to 
                                                          
chambre civile, Arrêt n° 882, 31 mai 2012, pourvois nn. 11-15294 and 11-15426, 
(http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?id Texte=JURITEXT000025961379). 
205 Since 2009, the Court of Cassation constantly states that clerical students are 
“ministers of cult, members of congregations” due to their religious obligations, according 
to L. 382-15 of Social Security Code. Cf. Cour de cassation, deuxième chambre civile, Arrêt 
n° 1607, 22 octobre 2009, pourvoi n. 08-13656, available at site: 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuri.Judi.do?idTexte0JURITEXTE000021194385 . 
206 Cour de cassation, deuxième chambre civile, 8 octobre 2015, pourvoi n. 14-25097. 
207 “Attendu […] que l’admission au noviciat résulte d’une demande de la postulante soumise à 
l’approbation de l’autorité religieuse, commence par une prise d’habit qui sera porté tout au long de 
la période du noviciat, cette période étant consacrée à la formation spirituelle, à la connaissance de 
la règle, à la pratique des exercices communs de la congrégation; qu’il résulte des constatations ci-
dessus que tant la période du postulat que celle du noviciat peuvent être considérées comme 
analogues à une période d’essai au sein de la congrégation, résiliable librement et sans condition par 
l’une ou l’autre des parties à tout moment, la postulante et, plus encore, la novice, exerçant de fait, 
au sein de la congrégation, des activités de la nature de celles des membres de celle-ci”: Cour de 
Cassation, deuxième chambre civile, Arrêt n° 101, 20 janvier 2012, pourvois nn. 10-26845 
and 10-26873. 
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settled case law, Cassation affirms the preponderance of the compulsory 
strength of contracts with respect to religious freedom. 
In fact, on 30 September 2015, the Court of Cassation ruled in favor 
of the legitimacy of the repeal of the gratuitous loan of a hall, which had 
been granted to a Muslim community since 1971. Hence, the hall was to be 
employed as a multi-purpose space to include its use as a prayer hall. 
The violation of the freedom to exercise worship practices, invoked 
by the claimants as a result of the closing of the only meeting room available 
to Muslims in that area was not recognized by the Court. It established, in 
fact, that the owning company was not qualified to warrant worship 
practices for residents. The availability of the premises had only facilitated 
its use as a prayer hall, as no specific utilization had been established in the 
agreement between the parties. Therefore, the closure of the premises was 
not a limitation of a fundamental liberty, nor could it be considered 
discriminatory for religious reasons, as residents could practice “their 
religion” without using the prayer hall or could attend another mosque 
which was less than two kilometers away208. 
In another pronouncement in 2015, the Court disqualified the 
Association Consistorial Israelite of Paris from carrying out cultural activities 
and ceremonies in the halls of its owned propriety, as the premises were 
located within a shared property area. The reason was that the 
transformation of a space, originally designated for residential or 
commercial purposes, into a community center was against the intended 
use of the property, according to co-ownership regulations. In point of fact 
and as specified in the judgement, given the sensitivity of the issue, the 
worship practices as such were not running against co-ownership 
regulations. Rather, it was the extremely noisy nature of the functions 
caused by the large number of participants and by the performance of 
religious chants at all hours of the day, in addition to meetings held even in 
common areas, that disturbed the other inhabitants of the shared 
property209. 
This decision confirms the tendency already affirmed in 2006 
concerning the removal of a hut built on the balcony of a Jewish couple’s 
apartment during the celebration of Succoth to symbolize the errant Jews in 
the desert after the flight from Egypt. The reason was that the construction 
                                                          
208 Cour de cassation, Prémière Chambre civile, 30 septembre 2015, 14-25709 (available 
at site: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?idTexte=JURITEXT000031264149). 
209 “La pratique d’un culte ne saurait être interdite en tant que telle par un règlement de 
copropriété. Mais si son exercice régulier, dans une boutique au rez-de-chaussée, entraîne des 
nuisances excessives pour les habitants de l’immeuble, la copropriété peut exiger qu’ il y soit mis 
fin”: Cour de cassation, Troisième Chambre civile, 16 septembre 2015, 14-13518..  
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of the hut was against the town planning limitations imposed by 
condominium regulations. The pronouncement stated that “religion, albeit 
a fundamental right may not violate previsions stated by co-ownership 
regulations”210. 
Previously, in 2002, the Court of Cassation had affirmed that 
‘practices dictated by the religious convictions of tenants, do not imply any 
specific obligation on the part of the lessor, unless there is a specific 
agreement211.  
In light of these decisions, it is possible to affirm that in the contrast 
between the right to religious freedom and contractual secularism, what 
prevails is the respect for secularism, which can be identified as the basis of 
the adopted legal decision. The right to religious freedom, like all 
fundamental rights is not absolute, but it can be proportionally limited to 
the rights of freedom of others. However, this interpretation highlights the 
non-inclusive and non-pluralist connotation of French secularism, which 
sets limitations on expressions of religious freedom in the juridical 
regulation of individual liberties. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to focus on the use of the terminology 
used in the judgments related to the expression of religious identity. While 
in the ruling of 2002 the reference is to “practices dictated by religious 
beliefs”, in 2006, the Court referred to religious freedom as being a 
fundamental right. Yet, in the ruling of 2015, the reference to religious rights 
was expressed by “the practice of one’s own religion”. What can be 
observed in the jurisprudence of the French Civil Court of Cassation is that 
firstly, the term ‘cult’ is used less frequently, even as an adjective, to qualify 
external expressions of religious affiliation. However, above all, the 
expressed reference to religion, as no longer exclusively corresponding to 
or interchangeable with ‘cult’ is not without significance. In other terms, 
juridical semantics seem less imbued with laicism, and more sensitive to 
qualifying religious phenomenology as codes determining the behavior of 
believers. Religious practices are not only considered expressions of 
                                                          
210 Cour de cassation, Troisième Chambre civile, 8 juin 2006, 05-14774: “Attendu, d’autre 
part, qu’ayant retenu à bon droit que la liberté religieuse, pour fondamentale qu’elle soit, ne pouvait 
avoir pour effet de rendre licites les violations des dispositions d’un règlement de copropriété et relevé 
que la cabane faisait partie des ouvrages prohibés par ce règlement et portait atteinte à l’harmonie 
générale de l’immeuble, la Cour d’Appel, en a exactement déduit que l’assemblée générale était 
fondée à mandater son syndic pour agir en justice en vue de l’enlèvement de ces objets ou 
constructions“.  
211 “Les pratiques dictées par les convictions religieuses des preneurs n'entrent pas, sauf 
convention expresse, dans le champ contractuel du bail et ne font naître à la charge du bailleur 
aucune obligation spécifique“: Cour de cassation, Troisième Chambre civile, 18 décembre 
2002, pourvoi n. 01-00.519. 
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religious convictions and are therefore qualified as the result of individual 
choices. Rather, they follow the principle of affiliation to a religious 
community which is provided with its own regulations and which is 
therefore qualified as being religious in a global sense and no longer 
exclusively from the point of view of the individual.  
 
 
4 - Expressing Religious Convictions in the Workplace  
 
The law has adopted a different position concerning matters of freedom of 
religious expression in working relationships. Two rulings representative 
of this approach were pronounced by the Chambre Social of the Cour de 
Cassation, concerning the dismissal of a woman from work because of her 
Islamic veil. In ruling n. 536 of 19 March 2013, the Court confirmed the 
dismissal of the CPAM employee because she had refused to remove her 
veil. For the first time “the principles of neutrality and secularism of the 
public service and therefore the duty not to express religious affiliations 
with visible signs during the performance of one’s duties” was being 
extended to organizations which answer to private law, as participants in 
the public service and thereby subjected to the previsions of the Labor 
Code212. On the contrary, in the case of the nurse employed by Baby Loup 
kindergarten, the Cassation stated that dismissal due to the Islamic veil was 
illegitimate, as deemed discriminatory and harmful to religious freedom213. 
The different judicial solutions resulted from the different nature of 
the employees’ functions, which were public in the first case and private in 
the second 
Undoubtedly, this ruling is a sign of a new legal tendency of the 
Court in the dialectics between secularism, i.e. the equal treatment of all 
beliefs both religious or not, and safeguarding the individual’s full freedom 
of conscience. This ruling definitely marks a stop in the extension of 
neutrality and to the interpretation of secularism as all encompassing and 
restrictive of specific identities, while encouraging, instead, a new inclusive 
and pluralist vision. 
 Moreover, a different juridical tendency safeguarding individual 
religious conscience vis-à-vis the secularism of the institutions is obvious 
also in a new and interesting pronouncement, which took place on 1 
                                                          
212 Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale, 19 mars 2013, arrêt n° 537, pourvoi n. 11-690. 
213 Cour de cassation, Chambre sociale, 19 mars 2013, arrêt n° 536, pourvoi n. 11- 28845. 
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February 2017. The pronouncement related to the dismissal of an RATP214 
employee who refused to take an oath as provided by the law of 15 July 
1845 for railway police staff215, in the case of a permanent contract, after a 
trial period for train conductors. 
The employee objected that her Christian religion prevented her 
from pronouncing the form of oath “I swear”, required by law, according 
to the evangelical prohibition prescribed both in the Gospel of Mathew 5, 
34 and in Saint James’ letter 5, 12216. 
The alternative form of oath proposed to the President of the Court 
by the employee reproduced the same spirit of solemn obligation expected 
by law, according to EU laws and to the general principles of common law, 
but was rejected by the President of the Tribunal de Grande Instance of 
Paris217. 
The Court of Cassation annulled the pronouncement of the Court of 
Appeal on the grounds that art. 23 of the Railway Police Law does not 
inforce a preordained form of oath and it does not prohibit that the form of 
oath can reflect the forms accepted by one’s own religion218. It therefore 
                                                          
214 RATP stands for Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens, founded in 1948, by the 
fusion of Compagnie du Chemin de Fer Métropolitain de Paris and Société des Transports en 
Commun de la Région Parisienne.  
215 Art. 23 of Loi du 15 juillet 1845 sur la police des chemins de fer, provides the following: 
“Au moyen du serment prêté devant le tribunal de grande instance de leur domicile, les agents de 
surveillance de l'administration et des concessionnaires ou fermiers pourront verbaliser sur toute la 
ligne du chemin de fer auquel ils seront attachés“. 
216 In reality, the dismissal was subsequent to the verbalization of the missed oath of the 
worker by the president of the Court. The discrimination inherent in the refusal of 
accepting the new form of oath, respectful of the religious beliefs of the worker as an 
alternative to the expected one, based on a custom does not therefore seem ascribable to 
the employer. 
217 Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 1 février 2017, pourvoi n. 16-10459 settled: “qu’il 
résulte de l'article 23 de la loi du 15 juillet 1845 sur la police des chemins de fer que le serment des 
agents de surveillance exerçant au sein des entreprises visées par cette disposition peut être reçu 
selon les formes en usage dans leur religion“; and deduced from that “que la salariée n'avait 
commis aucune faute en proposant une telle formule et que le licenciement prononcé en raison des 
convictions religieuses de la salariée était nul“. It is obvious that the Chambre Sociale interpreted 
Art. 23 of Law 15 July 1845 in the light of Art. 9 of Cedu.  
218 On the religious foundations of taking oath cf. É. BENVENISTE, Vocabolario delle 
lingue indoeuropee, II, Einaudi, Torino, 2001, p. 406 ss.; G. AGAMBEN, Il sacramento del 
linguaggio. Archeologia del giuramento, Laterza, Bari, 2008. Regarding the sacral function of 
the oath see A. MAGDELAIN, La sponsio internationale, Bibl. Cujas, Paris, 1943, p. 163; P. 
NOAILLES, Du droit sacré au droit civil, Sirey, 1949, p. 275 ss. For the process of secularism 
of sacramentum, cfr. R. Verdier (ed.), Le serment, I-II, CNRS Éditions, Paris, 1991; M. 
HUMBERT, Droit et religion dans la Rome antique, in Mélanges Félix Wubbe, Editions 
universitaires, Fribourg, 1993, p. 191 ss.; M. JASONNI, Il giuramento. Profili di uno studio sul 
processo di secolarizzazione dell’istituto in diritto canonico, Giuffrè, Milano,1999; P. 
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ruled against the pronounced dismissal due to the employee’s religious 
convictions finding the pronouncement discriminatory. 
In conclusion, with respect to the imposition of a uniformity, which 
fossilizes a secular oath whose nature is, in any case, religious, the Court 
interpreted the norm in a way that is much more compliant to the 
expression of specific identities. 
Therefore, neutrality is no longer conceptualized as the consecration 
of approved secularism excluding religious options within the public 
sphere, but increasingly more open towards an axiological and, as such, 
pluralist impartiality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
CHIAPPINI, Le droit et le sacré, Dalloz, Paris, 2006, p. 209 ss. Concerning taking oath as a 
sacrament of public power, cf. P. PRODI, Il sacramento del potere. Il giuramento politico nella 
storia costituzionale dell’Occidente, il Mulino, Bologna, 1992; M. JASONNI, Il giuramento 
politico nella grecità, in ID., La lealtà indivisa. Autonomia soggettiva e sacralità della legge alle 
origini e nella tradizione d’Occidente, Giuffrè, Milano, 2004, p. 31 ss.; C. BORGHERO, Il 
giuramento dell’infedele: stato di diritto, tolleranza e obbligazione politica, in I castelli di Yale. 
Quaderni di filosofia, 2004, pp. 9-29; N. BANNEUX, D’une formule unificatrice aux fondements 
d`une déontologie contemporaine: étude de droit constitutionnel sur le serment des magistrats 
judiciaires, in Revue belge de Droit constitutionnel, 2008, pp. 81-116; ID., Brèves observations sur 
le caractère religieux du serment au XIXe siècle à travers l’affaire “Michel”, in D. HEIRBAUT, X. 
ROUSSEAUX, A. WIJFFELS, Histoire du droit et de la justice/Justitie -en rechts- Geschiedenis, 
Presses Universitaires de Louvain, Louvain, 2010, pp. 499-509. 
Formattato: Tipo di carattere: (Predefinito) Palatino, 10 pt,
Inglese (Stati Uniti)
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The Meaning of ‘Religion’ in Polish Law 
 
 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction - 2. Law and religion in the Polish legal system - 3. A legal 
definition of religion in Poland? - 4. Two cases-law about the meaning of religion - 4.1. 
The Polish Raelian Movement (1999) - 4.2. The Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster 
(2013) - 5. What is the idea of sacrum in Polish law? - 6. Conclusion. 
 
 
1 - Introduction 
 
Despite the anti-Church policy of the Communist regime, Poland is still a 
largely Catholic country, where «at least 90 percent of Poland’s 38 million 
inhabitants still declare themselves of catholic religion»219.  Furthermore, 
Poland220, with Greece221, is the European nation with the highest 
Herfindahl measure regarding religious diversity (85)222, with the result of 
being a country of religious uniformity223. This observation is important for 
a study about law and religion as it shows that Polish society is in fact one 
                                                          
219 See J. LUXMOORE, From Solidarity to Freedom. The Mixed Fortunes of Churches in 
Postcommunist Eastern Europe, in A.D. HERTZKE, The future of Religious Freedom. Global 
Challenges, Oxford University Press, New York, 2013, p. 186. 
220 K. COMPLAK, Will Poland be the most confessional state on the European Union?, in 
Jurisprudencija, 1 (119), 2010, pp. 85-95, concludes that the constitutional provisions on 
religious matters demonstrate that the regulations or provisions on religious matters “in 
the Polish basic statute are not more confessional than those established in other European 
Union countries” (p. 93). 
221 About the co-evolution of the collective dimension of religious freedom and the 
shifting concepts and antonyms used for the construction of collective identities in Greek 
culture, see A. GROMITSARIS, Pluralism, Secularism and New Constitutionalism: On Art. 3 
of the Constitution of Greece, in Diritto e questioni pubbliche, 1/2016, pp. 56-71. 
222 F.B. CROSS, Constitutions and Religious Freedom, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2015, p. 187: «A common measure of religious diversity uses a Herfindahl-
style index. This takes the percentage of people for each religion, squares that number, and 
then adds the squared totals. The more diverse a nation, the lower these scores will be. The 
index was designed to measure competition, with scores ranging from zero to one, the 
latter representing a monopolistic lack of competition». 
223 See M. RYNKOWSKI, State and Church in Poland, in G. Robbers (ed.), State and Church 
in the European Union, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2005, pp. 419-420; M. PIETRZAK, Church and 
State in Poland, in S. Ferrari, W. C. Durham Jr., E.A. Sewell (ed.), Law and Religion in Post-
Communist Europe, Peeters, Leuven-Paris-Dudley, 2003, p. 218.  
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of the more religiously homogeneous societies in Europe: that may cause 
problems in order to religious freedom protection 224. Nevertheless, the 
secularization process affected also Poland, mostly after the Pope John Paul 
II's death in 2005: the  2011 political elections gave the opportunity to join 
the Parliament to an anticlerical party that based its electoral campaign on 
the promise of “secularizing the State”225. 
These evolution is a background for my essay, focused on seeking a 
definition of “religion” in Polish legal system. At first, I have to emphasize 
that this issue is, for its nature, open to debate226. Defining religion is a 
process very difficult for public powers, because this seems more a 
theological, philosophical or moral issue to debate on rather than a legal 
question227. Anyway, to clarify the concept of religion in a legal system is 
important, because the protection of religious freedom and the right of not 
being discriminated depends also on the meaning of religion. As Norman 
Doe states, “at the national level, it may be necessary to define ‘religion’ in 
order to determine whether legal benefits and burdens apply in particular 
circumstances, for example whether a claim is properly one of religious 
freedom, whether an exception to discrimination law is religious, or 
whether an activity is for the advancement of religion”228. 
This paper is divided in two spheres of action, a constitutional one 
and an applicative one229. The Polish legal system provides a specific 
                                                          
224 There is an association between religious freedom and religious diversity. «Nations 
with less religious diversity have less religious freedom», because religious freedom is 
associated with greater religious diversity in a nation: «Religious freedom might result in 
more or less religiosity. If religious freedom encourages religious pluralism, which in turn 
produces a market in religions, one might expect it to produce greater religiosity, as 
consumers were better able to find a program on beliefs that they liked», F. B. CROSS, 
Constitutions, cit., pp. 188-189.  
225 See J. LUXMOORE, From Solidarity to Freedom, cit., p. 186. 
226 See P. CONSORTI, Diritto e religione, Laterza, Rome-Bari, 2014, p. 88. About the 
difficulty to find a concept of religion in Italian and European legal order, see A. 
MANTINEO, Associazioni religiose e “nuovi movimenti” religiosi alla prova del diritto comune 
in Italia e del diritto comunitario, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, October, 2009, and 
J. PASQUALI CERIOLI, I principi e gli strumenti del pluralismo confessionale, in G. Casuscelli 
(ed.), Nozioni di Diritto ecclesiastico, 5a ed., Giappichelli, Turin, 2015, pp. 87-90. For the 
contradictory nature of “non-Catholic” cults in the definition of religious beliefs in Italy see 
also D. BILOTTI, I ministri dei culti acattolici: incompiutezze definitorie e inderogabilità 
funzionali, Giuffrè, Milan, 2013. 
227 A jurisprudential approach to an original concept of religion who includes theistic 
and non-theistic beliefs can be found in R. DWORKIN, Religion without God, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge-London, 2013. 
228 See N. DOE, Law and Religion in Europe. A Comparative Introduction, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2011, 21. 
229 Even Ferrari seems to prefer this method. In fact, according to him, a proper 
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definition of religion contained in a statute (the Act of June 13th, 2003), 
refering to one category of subjects: the refugees. But this notion is not 
applicable in the whole legal system, because there is an implicit 
Constitutional definition of religion, which is further confirmed in the 
administrative practice and in the cases-law, using a judicial substantive-
content approach230. 
The constitutional idea of religion is expressly related to the 
Christian roots. This concept is written right in the Constitutional Preamble, 
which contains a reference to God, as stated:  
 
“We, the Polish Nation - all citizens of the Republic, both those who 
believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty, as well 
as those not sharing such faith but respecting those universal values as 
arising from other sources […]”.  
 
This appeal to God and to conscience has been considered an adhesion of 
the State to the natural law theory231. Although religious and atheistic 
citizens, regardless their source, are connected by the values of truth, justice, 
good and beauty and that this is a guarantee of non-discrimination, it 
should be noted that this Preamble gives an Abrahamic and personalist idea 
of God as a source of values. As a matter of fact, in the same Preamble we 
can see a reference to Christian heritage. This Abrahamic and personalist 
                                                          
methodology, therefore, requires first to verify the presence of  “the religious fact specific 
techniques” (and which ones they are); then, in case of affirmative answer, to apply them 
in order to clarify the notion of religious confession, finally evaluating the consequences 
that this concept could have on the norms that discipline the religious-oriented groups 
recognition and activity, S. FERRARI, La nozione giuridica di confessione religiosa (come 
sopravvivere senza conoscerla), in V. Parlato, G.B. Vernier (eds.), Principio pattizio e realtà 
religiose minoritarie, Giappichelli, Turin, 1995, p. 20 (free translation). 
230 The two main methods of elucidating the meaning of religion ascertainable in the 
case law are the “subjective-functional approach” and the “substantive-content approach”, 
R. AHDAR, I. LEIGH, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State, 2a ed., Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2013, pp. 145 ff.  
231 K. COMPLAK, Will Poland be the most confessional state, cit., pp. 86-87: “This 
declaration of responsibility before God and conscience should be treated rather as a bond 
of the state with the natural law. This feature implies a ban on state totalitarianism. 
Examination of the particularly rich German case law on this matter reveals that the legal 
content of the religious appeal is only tantamount to a pledge to not absolutize popular 
sovereignty and to the renounce atheism as a type of established state church.  In this way, 
the declaration can be seen as cultural (symbolic) or as a precaution against any 
uncontrolled and unlimited models of state power. These elements are included in the law 
as reflection of positive values,power. These elements are included in the law as reflection 
of positive values, especially those directed against the voluntaristic theories of popular 
sovereignty. The reference to God is not a general, pro-Catholic directive on the 
interpretation of the Polish basic statute. In particular, the appeal to God does not preclude 
tolerance of other religions or beliefs or the openness of the Constitution of Poland”.  
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idea of God as a source of values affects the normative notion of religion in 
the Polish legal system.  
Nevertheless, I demonstrate that in Poland the meaning of religion is 
still a highly disputed issue, and a cause of unequal treatment and 
discrimination related to religious faith. 
 
 
2 - Law and religion in the Polish legal system 
 
As Poland is a cooperative State232, its sources of law approach religions and 
beliefs233 as those of other similar European countries, such as Spain and 
Italy234. The most important source of law is the Constitution of April 2nd, 
1997. Art. 25235 reads as follows: 
 
                                                          
232 See A. LICASTRO, Il diritto statale delle religioni nei Paesi dell’Unione Europea, 2a ed., 
Giuffrè, Milan, 2017, pp. 55-56. 
233 About law and religion in Poland, see P. STANISZ, Relations between the State and 
Religious Organizations in Contemporary Poland from Legal Perspective, in W. Rees, M. Roca, 
B.Schanda (ed.), Neuere Entwicklungen im Religionsrecht europäischer Staaten, Dunker & 
Humblot, Berlin, 2013, pp. 687 ff; P. STANISZ, The Presence of the Cross in Public Spaces in 
the Context of the Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion: A Polish Perspective, in P. 
Stanisz-M. Zawiślak-M. Ordon (ed.), Presence of the Cross in Public Spaces. Experiences of 
Selected European Countries, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Cambridge, pp. 155 ff.; P. 
STANISZ, Religion and Law in Poland, Kluwer Law International, Alphen aan den Rijn, 
2017.  
234 For an historic legal approach to the cooperative model State, see M. CANONICO, I 
sistemi di relazione tra Stato e Chiese, 2a ed.,Giappichelli, Turin, 2015, pp. 167-207. 
235 If art. 25 is a provision on collective religious freedom (because it refers to churches 
and religious communities), art. 53 protects the individual religious freedom, who is 
considered equally to the conscience freedom: “1. Freedom of conscience and religion shall be 
ensured to everyone. 2. Freedom of religion shall include the freedom to profess or to accept a religion 
by personal choice as well as to manifest such religion, either individually or collectively, publicly 
or privately, by worshipping, praying, participating in ceremonies, performing of rites or teaching. 
Freedom of religion shall also include possession of sanctuaries and other places of worship for the 
satisfaction of the needs of believers as well as the right of individuals, wherever they may be, to 
benefit from religious services. 3. Parents shall have the right to ensure their children a moral and 
religious upbringing and teaching in accordance with their convictions. The provisions of Article 
48, para. 1 shall apply as appropriate. 4. The religion of a church or other legally recognized religious 
organization may be taught in schools, but other peoples' freedom of religion and conscience shall 
not be infringed thereby. 5. The freedom to publicly express religion may be limited only by means 
of statute and only where this is necessary for the defence of State security, public order, health, 
morals or the freedoms and rights of others. 6. No one shall be compelled to participate or not 
participate in religious practices. 7. No one may be compelled by organs of public authority to 
disclose his philosophy of life, religious convictions or belief”. This English translation is adopted 
by the Polish Sejm’s official website: http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm.  
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1. Churches and other religious organizations shall have equal 
rights. 
2. Public authorities in the Republic of Poland shall be impartial 
in matters of personal conviction, whether religious or philosophical, 
or in relation to outlooks on life, and shall ensure their freedom of 
expression within public life. 
3. The relationship between the State and churches and other 
religious organizations shall be based on the principle of respect for 
their autonomy and the mutual independence of each in its own 
sphere, as well as on the principle of cooperation for the individual and 
the common good. 
4. The relations between the Republic of Poland and the Roman 
Catholic Church shall be determined by international treaty concluded 
with the Holy See, and by statute. 
5. The relations between the Republic of Poland and other 
churches and religious organizations shall be determined by statutes 
adopted pursuant to agreements concluded between their appropriate 
representatives and the Council of Ministers. 
 
 
Pay attention to Section 4, that is a constitutional guarantee for the in force 
Concordat of 1993 between Poland and the Holy See, that is as well an 
important source of law in this matter. Furthermore, there are other special 
statutes regarding the relations between the State and various Churches or 
religious communities, adopted either by the President of the Republic's 
ordinance (Eastern Old Rites Church, March 22nd, 1928) or by Acts of 
Parliament (the Muslim Religious Association April 21st, 1936; the Karaite 
Religious Community, April 21st, 1936; the Roman Catholic Church, May 
17th, 1989; the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church, July 4th, 1991; the 
Augsburg-Confession in the Republic of Poland, better known as the 
Lutheran Church, May 13th, 1994; the Protestant Reformed Church, May 
13th, 1994; the Protestant Methodist Church, June 30th, 1995; the Baptist 
Christians Church, June 30th, 1995; the Seventh Day Adventists Church, 
June 30th, 1995, the Polish Catholic Church, June 30th, 1995; the Union of 
Jewish Confessional Communities, February 20th, 1997; the Catholic Church 
of the Mariavites, February 20th, 1997; the Pentecostal Church, February 
20th, 1997)236. It is worth underlining that these statutes do not implement 
sect. 5 of art. 25 Const., because they are just unilateral acts, not based on 
“agreements” as constitutional provision requires237. Indeed, Section 5 has 
still not been implemented in practice, and twenty years after the adoption 
                                                          
236 See M. RYNKOWSKI, Churches and Religious Communities in Poland with Particular 
Focus on the Situation of Muslim Communities, in Insight Turkey, vol. 17, 1 (2015), pp. 159-160.  
237 M. RYNKOWSKI, Poland, in G. Robbers, W. Cole Durham Jr., D. Thayer (ed.), 
Encyclopedia of Law and Religion, vol. 4, Brill-Nijhoff, 2016, cit., p. 301. 
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of Constitution there is not even one statute leading the relationship 
between the State and churches or religious communities238. 
Finally, there is the Act of May 17th, 1989, on the guarantees of 
freedoms of conscience and faith, in which art. 10 states: “Poland is a lay 
state, neutral in terms of religion and conviction”239 (it is interesting to note 
that this statute was adopted by the Communist parliament, so if this Act 
expresses religious tolerance and freedom, the terminology is related to the 
Communist constitution of July 22nd, 1952240). This statute sets out the rules 
for the recognition of the legal status of religious communities by 
registration at the Minister of the Interior and Administration241 (Originally, 
the principal requirement to be enrolled in the Official Register of the 
Churches and cults was the applicant group to have at least fifteen 
members, now this lower limit has been increased to one hundred 
members)242. 
Consequently, in brief, in Polish Law there are four methods of 
regulating the legal status of religious organisations:  
(a) an international treaty concluded by the State and the Holy See, 
for the Catholic Church (art. 25, sect. 4, Const.);  
(b) for other churches and religious organizations, the statutes 
adopted pursuant to agreements concluded between appropriate 
representatives of religious organizations and the Council of Ministers,  (art. 
25 sect. 5, Const.);  
(c) for the Catholic Church (art. 25, sect. 4, Const.) and for other 
churches and religious organizations, special statutes on the relations 
between the State and certain religious communities; 
(d) an entry in the register maintained by the Minister of Interior and 
Administration, made upon the request of the interested party and after 
conducting registration proceedings, according to the Act of 1989 that 
grants the freedom of conscience and faith and, also, on the Regulation of 
1999 for the registration of churches and religion communities. 
 
 
3 - A legal definition of religion in Poland 
 
                                                          
238 M. RYNKOWSKI, Poland, cit., p. 300.  
239 I am using the English translation adopted by M. RYNKOWSKI, Churches and 
Religious Communities in Poland, cit., p. 145. 
240 T. BUKSINSKI, The struggle for the Legal Status of Religion in Polish Consititution, in 
International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, 25 (2012), p. 578. 
241 See M. RYNKOWSKI, Poland, cit., pp. 302-303. 
242 See A. LICASTRO, Il diritto statale delle religioni, cit., pp. 55-56, note 129. 
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The Act of June 13th, 2003 offers protection to foreigners in the Republic of 
Poland also defining religion243, as amended on May 29th, 2008, in art. 14, 
sect. 2, lets. a), b) and c): 
 
“…the notion of religion shall include particularly: 
- having theistic, non-atheistic or atheistic convictions, 
- participation or refraining from participation in religious 
ceremonies, exercised in public or in private, individually or 
collectively, 
- other acts of religious character, expressed convictions or 
forms of individual or collective behaviours, resulting from or 
related to religious convictions”.  
 
This normative notion qualifies the refugee status, taking into account the 
persecution for religious reasons, protected by the Geneva Convention of 
1951. Thus, according to the Polish definition, “the concept of religion shall 
in particular include holding theistic, non-theistic or atheistic beliefs”244. It 
should be noted that this definition is very close to the concept of religion 
expressed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which has a 
liberal approach to the definition of beliefs, considering within this notion 
doctrines such as scientology, druidism, pacifism, or atheism245. Indeed, in 
the Guidelines for Review of Legislation Pertaining to Religion or Belief published 
by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in 2004, is 
stated: “The ‘belief’ aspect typically pertains to deeply held conscientious 
beliefs that are fundamental about the human condition and the world. 
Thus, atheism and agnosticism, for example, are generally held to be 
entitled to the same protection as religious beliefs” (sect. A, par. 3). So 
atheistic, agnostic, sceptic beliefs are ratified by art. 9 of the ECHR, but it is 
further emphasized that these “beliefs” (or in the French text, “convictions”) 
denote “views that attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion 
and importance”246. In this perspective, according to the Court of ECHR,  
 
“[…] freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the 
foundations of a "democratic society" within the meaning of the 
Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital 
elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their 
conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, 
sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a 
                                                          
243 See M. RYNKOWSKI, Poland, cit., p. 300.  
244 See N. DOE, Law and Religion in Europe, cit., p. 24. 
245 For case-law references, see N. DOE, Law and Religion in Europe, cit., p. 21.  
246 See Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom, n. 7511/76, 7743/76 (1982), par. 36. 
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democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, 
depends on it”247.  
 
 Nevertheless, this “liberal” legal definition of religion does not fit in 
the entire legal system in Poland: “[…] its content and, above all, its position 
in the legal system suggest that the legislator was forced to invent a 
definition but did not intend to create a generic definition applicable to the 
whole legal system”248. The Democratic Polish Constitution provides a 
different definition of religion. In fact, the term “religion” is used to identify 
the “phenomena associated with experiencing and manifesting reality 
recognized as supernatural”249, and it seems to rule out therefore any 
atheistic beliefs. As the Constitutional Tribunal emphasized: “freedom of 
religion is recognized in the Constitution very broadly as it encompasses all 
religions and all religious associations”250. 
 Furthermore, as above mentioned, the Polish Constitution includes 
the principle of equal rights for all religious organizations (“churches and 
other religious organizations shall have equal rights” (art. 25, sect. 1) 
without suggesting a “hierarchization”251 between churches and religious 
organizations, as this distinction has only a traditional and symbolic 
significance. Generally, “churches” are Christian religious communities 
(e.g., Roman Catholic Church, Protestant Reformed Church, Pentecostal 
Church, …) and “religious organizations” are non-Christian religious 
                                                          
247 See Kokkinakis v. Grecia n. 14307/88 (1993).This decision “breaks the wall of silence” 
of the Court about the art. 9 of the ECHR, see S. FERRARI, La Corte di Strasburgo e l’articolo 
9 della Convenzione europea. Un’analisi quantitative della giurisprudenza, in R. MAZZOLA, 
Diritto e religione in Europa. Rapporto sulla giurisprudenza della Corte europea dei diritti 
dell’uomo in materia di libertà religiosa, il Mulino, Bologna, 2012, p. 27. About the case law of 
ECHHR in religious issues see M. PARISI, Linee evolutive dell’interpretazione 
giurisprudenziale dell’art. 9 della Convenzione di Roma. Sviluppi e prospettive per il diritto di 
libertà religiosa nello spazio giuridico europeo, in N. Fiorita, D. Loprieno (Ed.), La libertà di 
manifestazione del pensiero e la libertà religiosa nelle società multiculturali, Firenze University 
Press, Florence, 2009, p. 247 and ss. 
248 M. RYNKOWSKI, Poland, cit., p. 300. 
249 P. STANISZ, Law and religion in the workplace: Poland, in M. Rodriguez Blanco (ed.), 
Law and Religion in the workplace, Proceedings of the XXVIIth Annual Conference, Granada, 
2016, p. 323 ss.  
250 Judgment of Constitutional Tribunal of 16 February 1999. 
251 Instead, according the contrary legal interpretation of Małajny, the wording of art. 
25, sect. 1 of the Constitution “may suggest certain hierarchization” in that it divides the 
subjects at issue into “better ones (churches) and worse ones (other religious 
organizations)”, R.M. MAŁAJNY, Regulacja kwestii konfesyjnych w Konstytucji III RP 
(refleksje krytyczne), in R. Tokarczyk, K. Motyka (eds.), Ze sztandarem prawa przez świat. 
Księga dedykowana Profesorowi Wieńczysławowi Józefowi Wagnerowi von Igelgrund z okazji 85-
lecia urodzin, Kraków, Zakamycze, 2002, p. 289.    
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communities (Muslim Religious Community, Karaite Religious 
Community, …). Actually, the "religious communities" organization is 
stated by the 1989's act that grants the freedom of conscience and religion: 
“[…] set up in order to profess and spread religious faith, having their own 
organization, doctrine and cultic rituals”252 (art. 2 p. 1). Therefore, the three 
features that characterize a “religious community” are: having a personal 
organization, a doctrine and some rituals. Nevertheless, it is clear that this 
is a circular definition, because the phrase “religious community” is 
referred to a “religious faith”, and, consequently, the doctrine of a religious 
community has to be a “religious” doctrine. But the issue of what 
“religious” actually means in law remains open.  
So, the question is: when can a faith be considered “religious”? An 
answer can be deduced by analysing the procedure for the registration of 
religious organizations in Poland made by the Minister of Interior and 
Administration. 
 
 
4 - Two cases-law about the meaning of religion 
 
Between 1989 and 2016 One hundred and sixty-four religious organizations 
and five inter-church organizations were registered. This may seem a large 
number in Poland, however about 50 applicants were refused and not only 
because they did not respect formal criteria, but also for substantial 
reasons253. Firstly, the Minister may refuse the registration if the aims of the 
religious organization are against the limitations contained in article 9 par. 
2 of the European Convention of Human Rights, such as public order or 
security. Secondly, a test set by the Minister may determine if the applicant 
has or not a religious character, regarding the “doctrine” of the group, 
because a group without a religious character cannot be registered as a 
religious organization, and this evaluation depends on an administrative 
process. This is the criterion adopted by the administrative will regarding 
the recognition of religious organizations’ status.  
There are two very interesting cases-law about this second issue254.  
 
                                                          
252 I am using the English translation adopted by P. STANISZ, The Status of Religious 
Organizations in Poland: Equal Rights and Differentiation, Third ICLARS Conference 
“Religion, Democracy, and Equality”, The International Consortium for Law and Religion 
Studies, Richmond (Virginia, USA), 21st-23rd August 2013, p. 5 (unpublished). 
253 M. RYNKOWSKI, Poland, cit., p. 303. 
254 About the two following cases-law, see P. STANISZ, Law and religion in the workplace, 
cit., p. 323 ss.  
 87 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 39 del 2017 ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
4.1 - The Polish Raelian Movement (1999) 
 
In 1999, the Minister refused to register the Polish Raelian 
Movement, whose doctrine is contained in Claude Vorilhon’s book: “The 
message given to me by extra-terrestrials. They took me to their planet”255.  
The Supreme Administrative Court confirmed the negative decision 
of Minister. According to the Court, the doctrine of Raelian Movement is 
more similar to a program of a political party or an association than a 
religious movement. Moreover, a group cannot be considered “religious” if 
it declares to have a set of atheistic beliefs in its doctrine. The administrative 
judges stated that the doctrine of the Movement does not correspond to the 
common patterns of religion, because the doctrine of the organization does 
not include any references to the sacrum, which should be required in the 
case of a religious doctrine256.  
 
 
4.2 - The Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster (2013) 
 
In 2013, the Minister refused to register the Church of the Flying 
Spaghetti Monster, after having requested the opinion of various specialists 
in religious studies about the religious features of this group. Those scholars 
emphasized that the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster can be 
considered as a joke religion and its doctrine “definitely shows the signs of 
a parody of already-existing doctrines”257. In the light of this opinion, the 
Minister refused to register it and the adherents decided to take the case to 
court.  
The Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw, although 
admitting that the Minister committed procedural mistakes (by utilizing an 
out-of-date procedure), confirmed the decision. According to this Warsaw 
administrative Court, the religious character of a community is determined 
by its adopted reference to sacrum and its goals concentrating on the 
spiritual needs of adherents258. 
 
 
5 - What is the idea of sacrum in Polish law? 
 
                                                          
255 C. VORILHON (RAËL), The message given to me by extra-terrestrials. They took me to 
their planet, AOM Corporation, Tokyo, 1986. 
256 Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 22 January 1999. 
257 See P. STANISZ, The Status of Religious Organizations, cit., p. 7. 
258 Judgement of Voivodeship Administrative Court in Warsaw of 8 April 2014.  
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Both the Courts related the “religious character” of a group to the idea of 
“sacrum”; and Warsaw Court emphasized the spiritual needs of adherents. 
In this view, the meaning of religion refers to a doctrine with a sacred idea 
of the world. It has a legal significance when necessary to determine the 
legal effect of the term “religion” connected to the public powers, as an 
atheistic or an agnostic belief is not conceived as a religion. In the Polish 
legal system the ideas of “religion” and of “sacrum” are characterized by 
the Abrahamic religious tradition. This consideration is not only due to the 
fact that in the Constitutional Preamble God is stated as a source of values, 
but also to some legal dispositions rooted in the Judeo-Christian view of 
religion and cult. 
Art. 53 of the Constitution regarding positive freedom of religion, 
states  
 
“the freedom to profess or to accept a religion by personal choice as 
well as to manifest such religion, either individually or collectively, 
publicly or privately, by worshipping, praying, participating in 
ceremonies, performing of rites or teaching”259, as well as the 
“possession of sanctuaries and other places of worship for the 
satisfaction of the needs of believers as well as the right of individuals, 
wherever they may be, to benefit from religious services”260. 
 
In the Act of 1989 the list of religious rights is more detailed because 
we can find also, for example, the right to enter the priesthood or to become 
a nun or a monk, the right to remain silent in matters pertaining to one’s 
religion or convictions, or the right to be buried in accordance with one’s 
religion principles or convictions regarding religion; and especially art. 19, 
sect. 2 of the Act contains a list of a religion’s prerogatives, such as defining 
religious doctrine, dogmas and principles of faith and liturgy, organising 
public worship, rituals and religious gatherings, ruling its own affairs by 
applying its own law, exercising spiritual authority and managing its own 
affairs in a free manner, as well as appointing, educating and employing the 
clergy261.  
This list of provisions pertaining to the extent of religious freedom is 
uncommonly wide. Historically, it depends on the experience of the 
communist period when these rights were not respected, but from a legal 
perspective, it is due to the meaning of religion in Poland and to the ways 
into which religion can be manifested.  
                                                          
259 For the English translation used see supra note 17. 
260 Ibidem. 
261 See P. STANISZ, Religious jurisdiction in Poland, in R. Potz, W. Wieshaider (Ed.), 
Religious Adjudication and the State. Proceedings of the XXVI th Annual Conference (Vienna, 13-
16 November 2014), Editorial Comares, S.L., Granada, 2015, p. 171. 
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As in this list of religious rights and prerogatives within these legal 
provisions there are a lot of elements related to the Abrahamic tradition, 
seems to be very difficult to separate Polish culture from the Catholic or 
Christian tradition.  
 
 
6 - Conclusion  
 
In the Polish legal system, there are two notions of religion: 
(a) a legal notion of religion, concerning refugee status in the Polish 
territory, which also includes atheistic beliefs, contained in a statute 
approved by the Parliament, but not appropriate for the entire legal system;  
(b) a Constitutional idea of religion which cannot be extended to 
atheistic organizations and which fits into the entire legal system except for 
the aim of the Act that offers protection to foreigners in Poland. Indeed, the 
Constitutional provision regarding the equal rights of religious 
organizations does not pertain to communities that do not have a religious 
character. In this view, the concept of religion is related to the ideas of 
sacrum and of spirituality (maybe a traditional sense of sacrum and of 
spirituality), and it invokes the God or a god not of this world.-- 
Therefore, in Poland the meaning of religion is questionable and, 
paradoxically. The statute's provision about religion is more “guarantist” in 
protecting civil rights and civil liberties than the Constitutional disposals 
on it. 
In my opinion, this causes an unequal treatment in religious issues 
between people within the same nation. Indeed, in Poland a citizen cannot 
be considered as “religious”, even if he has the same atheistic belief used to 
confirm the refugee status of a foreigner for religious persecution. This case 
is clearly against art. 32 of the Polish Constitution:  
 
“1. All persons shall be equal before the law. All persons shall have the 
right to equal treatment by public authorities. 
2. No one shall be discriminated against in political, social or economic 
life for any reason whatsoever”262.  
 
There is no doubt that this controversial character of the “meaning” 
of religion in Poland can be literally considered as discriminatory in the 
light of the principle of religious freedom.  
 
                                                          
262 I am using the English translation adopted by the Polish Sejm’s official website: 
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm 
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ABSTRACT: This article examines the meaning of religion in the Polish legal 
system. In Poland there are two concepts of religion: a notion of religion contained 
in a statute which also includes atheist beliefs, not suitable for the entire legal 
system; and a Constitutional idea of religion which is related to an Abrahamic 
concept of God. So, in Poland the meaning of religion is controversial, and this 
controversial meaning of religion causes discrimination in religious issues within 
the same nation.  
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the Constitutional court - 3. What are the boundaries of religion? - 4. Conclusions. 
 
 
1 - Introduction 
 
Scholars in many different fields have often asked what features a social 
phenomenon should have so it can be considered to be a religion, but in the 
juridical field it has been stated that looking to define a religious confession 
is not a worthwhile venture, and even less so trying to define a religion. It 
is as if the attempt to outline a concept of religion is an unwanted meddling 
in a sphere of life that cannot be reduced to legal categorization, almost as 
if the State claims the right to "prefigure a stereotype of religion"263. 
Virtually all legal systems deal with religions in various ways, but 
only with difficulty can we find any criteria according to which a social 
phenomenon can be qualified as religious. 
Even those who deal with international law point out the lack of a 
definition of religion and they emphasize that, even though there are a large 
number of acts that protect freedom of religion, none of them explain what 
is actually meant by the word "religion"264. 
This issue has been under examination for many years and in many 
countries. For example, American jurisprudence and its scholars - with a 
law system characterized by the separation of Church and State - in its early 
period considered as religions exclusively those which were monotheistic, 
                                                          
263 S. DOMIANELLO, Giurisprudenza costituzionale e fattore religioso. Le pronunzie della 
Corte Costituzionale in materia ecclesiastica (1987-1998), Giuffrè, Milano, 1999, p. 65. M. 
TEDESCHI, Le minoranze religiose tra autonomia e immobilismo del legislatore, in R. Coppola, 
C. Ventrella (eds.), Laicità e dimensione pubblica del fattore religioso. Stato attuale e prospettive, 
Cacucci, Bari, 2012, p. 75, wrote that “the State must not classify a group as a religious one, 
because the group autoqualifies itself […] Religions are social groups with religious 
purposes”. 
264 See T.J. GUNN, The Complexity of Religion and the Definition of “Religion” in 
International Law, in 16 Harvard Human Rights Journal (2003), pp. 189-215. 
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and only later were atheistic, moral and philosophical beliefs included in 
the definition of religion. This interpretation was confirmed by the Supreme 
Court in the 1960s265. 
There is no real definition of what religion is from the point of view 
of the law, and this is the case also in Italy. This lack of definition could be 
justified by the non-religious essence of the contemporary legal system 
which must take a step back when it comes to giving a definition to words 
that are linked to the religious sphere. 
A direct look at the Italian experience would seem to show that the 
State's presumption to identify a concept of religion is incompatible with 
secularism. In fact, the secular state by definition should not be able to 
define religion and the religious. However, the very definition that the 
Constitutional Court has given to Italian secularism makes it a necessity for 
the State itself to know whether a social reality can be defined as a religion, 
and whether a certain fact or behaviour can be qualified as religious. The 
well-known judgment n° 203 of 12 April 1989266, which for the first time 
stated the "supreme principle of secularism of the State", defined it not as 
"the State's indifference to religions, but the guarantee of the State for the 
safeguarding of freedom of religion, under confessional and cultural 
pluralism"267. To be not indifferent to something you must know what that 
something is and, "under the confessional and cultural pluralism" in Italy, 
recognizing religion is not easy. 
Even the guarantee of equal freedom for all religious confessions 
which Article 8 of the Italian Constitution specifies, requires a compass to 
guide jurisprudence in the difficult task of understanding if a group is a 
                                                          
265 See L.J. STRANG, The Meaning of “Religion” in the First Amendment, in 40 Duquesne 
Law Review (2001-2002), pp. 181-240. See, also, G.C. FREEMAN, III, The Misguided Search 
for the Constitutional Definition of “Religion”, in 71 Georgia Law Review (1983), p. 1553, nt. 157; 
in Freeman vision, there is a list of eight characteristic that all religions possess, though 
each religion may not have all characteristics: “1. A belief in a Supreme Being; 2. A belief 
in a transcendental reality; 3. A moral code; 4. A worldview that provides an account of 
man’s role in the universe and around which an individual organizes his life; 5. Sacred 
rituals and holy days; 6. Worship and prayer; 7. A sacred text or scriptures; 8. Membership 
in a social organization that promotes a religious belief system”. 
266 This sentence, like the others cited in this paper, is published in the Italian 
Constitutional Court official website (www.cortecostituzionale.it). 
267 We have a very wide bibliography on the principle of “laicità”. For an approach that 
moves from jurisprudence, see S. SICARDI, Il principio di laicità nella giurisprudenza della 
Corte Costituzionale (e rispetto alle posizioni dei giudici comuni), in Atti della tavola rotonda su 
“Rigore costituzionale ed etica repubblicana”, Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” 
(26 maggio 2006), (http://archivio.rivistaaic.it/materiali/convegni/200611foggia/relazione%20Si 
cardi.pdf). For a theoretical approach, see. P. STEFANI, Il problema giuridico della laicità nella 
società multiculturale, Aracne, Roma, 2013. 
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religion or not268, though unfortunately this compass is not to be found 
within the Constitution. 
 
 
2 - The meaning of religion in the jurisprudence of the first 
Constitutional court 
 
The Constitution, indeed, uses many words related to religion without 
giving them any actual definition. We find several references to religion, for 
instance in the article of law that affirms the equality of all citizens without 
regard to their “religion” (Article 3); elsewhere the Constitution uses words 
like "religious faith", "cult", "rites" (Article 19), or it protects the "purpose of 
religion or of worship" of bodies and organizations (Article 20). However, 
when the Constitution of the Republic wants to legislate on organised 
religion it identifies this as the Catholic Church (Article 7) and “religious 
confessions” (Article 8). This short list of the references to religion that we 
can find in the Constitution shows that the writers of the Constitution 
preferred to get the definition of religion, religious, cult and rites etc. from 
the social context of their time, rather than trying to identify the features of 
religion. At that time the Italian social context was rather clear and 
reassuring in that in Italy, in the mid-1950s, religion was essentially the 
Catholic Church while other religions which were historically present in the 
country, especially Judaism and Evangelicalism, were considered in a 
subordinate position to that of the Catholic Church. They were defined, by 
Law n° 1159 of 24 June 1929, as "admitted cults", terminology that was the 
fruit of the ideology, which permeated Italy at that time. 
This was still the “definition” of religion in 1956, the year that the 
Italian Constitutional Court issued its first ruling. In that same year, Cesare 
Magni devoted a large part of his book Avviamento allo studio analitico del 
diritto ecclesiastico to the legal definition of “Religion” and “Religious”. 
Magni asserted that religion, in its broader sense, can be defined as a “belief 
in the existence of transcendent powers, personal or impersonal, acting in 
the world”269.  
Without doubt, the Author - and it couldn’t have been in any other 
way - obtained his definition of religion from the cultural and social context 
of the age in which he lived. His reference to “impersonal powers” was 
necessary in order to encompass the Far Eastern traditions which Magni 
identified in Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism and Chinese universalism, 
                                                          
268 See P. CONSORTI, Diritto e religione, 2ª ed., Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2014, p. 90. 
269 C. MAGNI, Avviamento allo studio analitico del diritto ecclesiastico, Milano, Giuffrè, 
1956, p. 77. 
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while those religions which believe in a personal God, “who created the 
world from nothing thanks to his only and free will, and who is over all 
things”270 are the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, Islam and 
Zoroastrianism. Evidently, he had in his mind the great religions of the 
world. Two years later, Pietro Gismondi, in his paper on the religious 
interests within the Constitution, identified in religion the "essential and 
primordial expression of human spirituality"271. He believed that religions 
are hallmarks of the nation and that they “reflect the history of the people 
among which they were born and the peculiarities of their civilizations”. He 
also insists on the legal character of religions, that they can be religions only 
if they have rules and an organization272. Magni looked for a definition of 
religion within their theology while Gismondi focused on their institutional 
aspects. 
If this is the idea of religion that we can find in legal scholarship, 
what is the earliest definition of religion that we can find within the 
jurisprudence of the Italian Constitutional Court? In its first years of 
activity, the Constitutional Court did not see any need to identify a 
definition of religion. In fact, until the end of the Nineteen-Seventies, the 
Court was principally involved in justifying the privileges of the Catholic 
Church over other religions. Such privileges were necessary to protect the 
“religious feelings” of the majority of the Italian people273.  
In Judgment n° 125 of 28 November 1957, the Court dealt with the 
question of the constitutionality of the crime of contempt against symbols 
or persons of the Catholic Church, which was more severely punished than 
contempt against symbols or persons of other religions. In the opinion of 
the Court, the special consideration reserved to the Catholic Church was 
justified by “the importance of the ancient uninterrupted tradition the 
Catholic Church has always had in the Italian population, almost all Italians 
being Catholic”. Also in the Judgment n° 79 of 17 December 1958, the 
Constitutional Court deemed the crime of contempt lawful because it is a 
crime against the “religion of the State”, even if the State was formally non 
confessional. In the judges’ opinion, with this formulation, the legislator 
didn't want to give "importance to a formal qualification of the Catholic 
religion, but to the circumstance that almost the entire Italian population 
                                                          
270 C. MAGNI, Avviamento allo studio, cit., p. 87. 
271 P. GISMONDI, L’interesse religioso nella Costituzione, in Giurisprudenza Costituzionale, 
1958, p. 1222. 
272 P. GISMONDI, L’interesse religioso., cit., pp. 1222 e 1230. 
273 See A. ALBISETTI, Il diritto ecclesiastico nella giurisprudenza della Corte Costituzionale, 
III ed., Giuffrè, Milano, 2000, pp. 24-26. 
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professes Catholicism". In the Court's opinion, "there can be no distance 
between social reality and legal principles"274. 
Judgment N°58 of 6 July 1960, ruled that the wording of the oath 
established by Article 404 of the code of criminal proceedings, then in effect, 
was constitutional. That wording contained an explicit reference to a 
commitment to truth before God, but the judges wrote that “it corresponds 
to the conscience of the Italian people, who are believers; so, allowing that 
the swearer believes in God, it is consistent with any religion, also for the 
non-Catholics”. Actually, the Court didn't examine the question as related 
to Article 19 (protection of religious freedom), but with respect to Article 21 
(freedom of thought), since it expressly asserted that, according to the 
Constitution, religious freedom is only a positive freedom, a freedom to 
believe: "atheism begins where religious life ends". The Court, even if it 
doesn't say so, in this judgment shows itself to have a precise idea of what 
religion is: it is a religious idea that believes in the existence of God. It is 
clear that the model of religion in the mind of the Court is the Catholic one 
to which almost the entire Italian population belongs, (as we can read in the 
grounds for the judgment). In fact, the Court states that, so conceived, the 
wording of oath would satisfy all religions, including the non-Catholics, but 
this statement is not correct in that some religions prohibit their adherents 
from taking any type of oath. In fact it was rescinded after only three years. 
Judgment n° 85 of 25 May 1963 originates from the refusal of a 
Pentecostal Christian to take an oath, for religious reasons. A citizen, 
Christian but not Catholic, refutes the theory that the oath would be 
consistent with his religious faith. At this point, the Court has to change the 
level of argumentation and it argues that in reality the oath is not an act of 
worship, but it expresses "an appeal to general religious values"; so 
precluding the hypothesis that the State, imposing the oath, interferes in 
religious affairs. 
The Court, with these judgments, gave a definition of religion and 
worship, supporting a Catholic interpretation of them, perhaps 
unwittingly, perhaps not, but anyway echoing the definition given by 
Gismondi, which is that religion identifies itself with nation. 
In judgment n° 39 of 13 May 1965, that once again concerns the 
constitutionality of the criminal laws protecting religions, the Court justifies 
the fact that contempt against the Catholic Church receives a heavier 
sentence than that against other religions. It considers that the law “can treat 
in a different way the various religions on the basis of their different 
                                                          
274 M. VENTURA, La libertà di religione o di credo: il percorso costituzionale, in AA.VV., Per 
i sessanta anni della Corte costituzionale, Giuffrè, Milano, 2017, p. 26. 
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importance in the public sphere". From this perspective, the Catholic 
confession is "practised by the majority of the Italian people, and for that a 
different criminal protection is constitutional, because it looks more 
carefully at the "religious feelings of the Italian people". 
We may say that, according to Constitutional Court jurisprudence of 
that time, religion was synonymous with Catholicism, which permeated the 
culture and was socially perceived as the religion of Italian people. 
Similarly, we can say without exaggeration that the Constitutional Court, 
in its first fifteen years of activity, supported the markedly Catholic 
sentiments of the society of time275, favouring the protection of collective 
religious freedom (especially that of the Catholic church) rather that 
individual freedom. In Constitutional Court jurisprudence, religion 
appears as an institutional reality rather than a response to people’s 
spiritual needs. 
In the mid-Seventies a small change in jurisprudence came about 
with some judgments in criminal matters expressing the need for the 
legislator not to be limited to protecting the religious feelings of Catholics, 
but also to be concerned with the protection of the religiosity of others.  
In judgment n° 117 of 2 October 1979, the Court changed its opinion 
regarding the oath and it noted that, while in 1960 it had denied “the 
prevailing religious essence” of the oath, in hindsight “it has a clear 
religious meaning”. The wording of the oath, that appeals to our 
responsibility towards God,  
 
“in everyday language evokes a commitment to tell the truth in front 
of a supernatural and supreme Being, who is transcendent, omnipotent 
and omniscient [...] in front of a God who can read inside people’s 
hearts and who judges their behaviour”.  
 
It is interesting to note that Italian Constitutional jurisprudence doesn't give 
a definition of religion, but it ventures onto the more treacherous ground of 
defining God. It defines God, in accordance with the Catholic vision, as a 
Supreme Being, omnipotent, omniscient and the judge of humankind. 
Notwithstanding this, the sentence declares that the part of oath's wording 
that refers to divinity is unconstitutional and it expressly admits that 
atheism is an expression of religious freedom, protected by Article 19 of the 
Italian Constitution. 
In the late 1980s, even the crime of blasphemy is interpreted in a new 
way. The court is conscious of the difficulty of continuing to justify the 
                                                          
275 See G. DALLA TORRE, Giurisprudenza costituzionale e dottrina ecclesiasticistica. Saggio 
di analisi, in R. Botta (ed.), Diritto ecclesiastico e Corte costituzionale, Edizioni Scientifiche 
Italiane, Napoli, 2006, p. 97. 
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punishability of this behaviour given the fact that it would offend "the 
religion of almost all Italians", or because it would protect "the religious 
feelings of the majority of Italian population". After judgment n° 925 of 28 
July 1988, blasphemy remains punishable but it becomes "immoral 
behaviour", a "bad habit for many people"; the Court underlines the need 
for the legislature to intervene "to tackle inequalities in the treatment of 
different religions". 
The Court continues to use concepts such as “religion”, “religious 
act”, “conscience”, “religious feelings” taking their meanings for granted or 
rather, adapting their definitions to those given by the prevailing culture. 
 
 
3 - What are the boundaries of religion? 
 
Of note was a change of perspective in Constitutional jurisprudence 
towards the end of the last century. A few years before this, in 1984, with 
the reform of the Concordat between the Catholic Church and the State, the 
principle of the Catholic religion as the sole religion of the Italian State, was 
considered no longer in force, but the meaning of religion was still an open 
question. 
In 1986, Francesco Finocchiaro published the first edition of his 
textbook, studied in the following decades by generations of professors and 
students, in which he felt the need to give a definition of religion, and he 
formulated it as follows: religion  
 
“has its own original complete conception of the world, which 
empowers not only the relationship between man and God, but those 
existing between man and man, giving rules governing not only the 
social life of an entire group, not only the relationships between the 
group and the other communities, but also the behaviour of the 
individual belonging to the group, when he acts within other social 
communities such as, for example, the civil community”276.  
 
The most authoritative Italian scholarship of the mid-1980s regarded 
religion as a theistic system, which has an original interpretation of human 
events, and that has a system of moral and legal regulation of relationships 
between people, between people and God, and between the religion and 
other communities, especially the State.  
Some years later, the Court had to decide on the constitutionality of 
some tax laws that facilitated the religious activities of organizations and 
                                                          
276 F. FINOCCHIARO, Diritto ecclesiastico, 10ª ed., Zanichelli, Bologna, 2009 (but we can 
find the same definition in the first edition of the book). 
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associations, and it questioned the meaning of the phrase “religious 
association”. In judgment n° 467 of 19 November 1992, the Court 
underlined that in general the law does not give a definition of the various 
aims of organizations, whether political, cultural, sports or even trade 
unions, however, this “does not mean that we cannot, and we must not 
deduce the meaning of the phrase ‘religious association’ from all of the 
laws”. Continuing its argument, the Court asserted that in order to define 
an association as "religious" it is not sufficient that it qualifies itself as such, 
but it is necessary that its real nature is evaluated in the light of "criteria that 
can be deduced from the whole legal system". Associations “shall 
demonstrate their religious essence and their religious character [...] 
according to criteria that in the law of the state qualify the aims of religion 
and cult worship”. 
The Court, with this judgment, distanced itself from its previous 
attitude of accepting the definitions of religion and religious as what was 
commonly believed. It asserted the necessity of identifying a definition of 
religious within national law, and this definition is to be deduced from laws 
regarding religious entities, that is a religious association is that which has 
a purpose of religion or worship. 
However, we find no explanation of what this religious purpose may 
be; we find only the reference to the discipline of ecclesiastical 
organizations, which, from our point of view, is disappointing. Indeed, the 
legislature defines the content of religious activities for practical reasons, 
essentially related to the fact that certain activities carried out by religious 
entities receive a favourable tax treatment. Thus in Law n° 222 of 20 May 
1985 which governs Catholic organizations, charitable activities, assistance 
and education are not defined as religious activities, while the agreement 
with the Valdese Board of Methodists etc. considers them as religious. If we 
applied to the Islamic religion the definition of "religious activities" of Law 
n° 222 of 1985, we would have to exclude from them the Zakat (ritual 
charity) and the Hajj (pilgrimage), which are not only religious acts but also 
are mandatory for Muslim believers. It is therefore impossible to derive a 
definition of what is "religious", valid for all, from an examination of 
legislation in the field of religious bodies and entities.  
A broader attempt to define what religion is, was made by the 
Constitutional Court in judgment n° 195 of 27 April 1993, which considered 
the constitutionality of a regional law concerning the construction of places 
of worship, and focused on the definition of “religious confession”. The 
Court, after having excluded the possibility of resorting to the criterion of 
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self-qualification, tried to draw up "a sort of identikit"277 of the religious 
confession. It stated that the existence of a confession must be established 
in the light of criteria such as previous public recognition, a statute that 
clearly expresses its characteristics and, finally, general respect. However, 
this is like a dog biting its tail, because the problem is that, in a multicultural 
society, we often do not have a general respect for what a religion is. This is 
anyway only a partial attempt, because, as we have already mentioned, the 
definition concerns religious confessions rather than religion. In fact, 
religious confession is only a species of the genus religion. 
In the same period, the Court perceived the necessity of rethinking 
the law that punishes blasphemy and it explained that in Paragraph I of 
Article 724 of the Italian penal code that religion is the object of protection. 
As we have said, in judgment n° 925 of 1988, the Court declared the 
legitimacy of the crime of blasphemy "secularizing" it into rude behaviour, 
but in judgment n° 440 of 18 October 1995, the Court underlined the 
differences existing between religion and "good manners", and blasphemy 
was brought back to its real nature, it could not be considered only as 
immoral behaviour or as a rude act. The Court wrote that “religion and its 
believers are always different from good manners and from polite people”; 
then, examining the text of Article 724, para. I, it affirms “blasphemy against 
a deity [...] can be punished independently of the fact that the deity is from 
one religion or from another”. 
The issue of defining what religion is and what deity means still 
remained unresolved. The same Court underlined this problem in the 
judgment n° 346 of 16 July 2002, where it wrote that there is “there is a lack, 
in the law, of clear legal criteria that are useful to define religious 
confessions”. 
A favourable occasion for the Court to express itself on this topic 
came with judgment n° 52 of 16 March 2016. The case was about the Italian 
government’s refusal to begin negotiations for the drawing up of an 
agreement with an atheist organization, the UAAR (Union of atheists, 
agnostics and rationalists). The government had refused to start 
negotiations, by asserting that atheism is certainly protected by Article 19 
of the Constitution, but atheism does not allow organizations that we can 
define as a “religious confession”, which, according to the Italian 
government, is “an act of faith devoted to the divine and lived in common 
among many people who make it manifest to society through a particular 
institutional structure” (note 5 December 2003 of the Presidency of the 
                                                          
277 P. MONETA, Effetti della giurisprudenza della Corte costituzionale sul piano legislativo e 
interpretativo, in R. Botta (ed), Diritto ecclesiastico e Corte costituzionale, cit., p. 264. 
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Council of Ministers, quoted in Council of State, Sect. IV, 4 December 2011, 
n° 6083278; which does not enter into the merit of the definition of religious 
confession, but merely asserts that such an assessment cannot be regarded 
as unquestionable even if it involves "undoubted practical difficulties”, and 
affirms cannot even be "characterized by wide discretion”). 
The Court, in judgment n° 52 of 2016, does not deeply go into 
considering if an organization of atheists can be defined as a religious 
confession. It merely underlines that, in the absence of a definition of 
confession, the same Court had pointed out criteria that "in legal experience 
are used to distinguish religious confessions from other social 
organizations". It observes that the fact that the Government denying the 
character of confession to the UAAR association has had no other effect than 
to deny the opening of negotiations for an agreement with the state. Since 
in the Court's opinion such negotiations are remitted to the broad political 
discretion of the Government, the Court does not go into the merits of the 
matter. The ruling of the Court states that the government has broad 
freedom in deciding whether and with what religious confession to begin 
negotiations for the drawing up of an agreement, but it does not tell us if, 
and for what reasons, an association of atheists can be considered as a 
religious confession. It really was a missed opportunity. The United 
Sections of the Court of Cassation, in judgment n° 16305 of 28 June 2013279, 
- that is at the origin of the appeal decided by the Constitutional Court with 
the judgment n° 52 of 2016 - affirmed that  
 
“if legal consequences derive from the conventional notion of religion, 
it is inevitable and necessary for those who are delegated with the 
responsibility of defining it, must do so, otherwise the recognition of 
rights and possibilities related to this definition remains entrusted to 
their arbitrariness”.  
 
The Court of Cassation emphasizes that there should be no further 
procrastination in finding a definition of religion, because legal 
consequences are linked to that definition, above all the opportunity of 
asking the government to open negotiations to draw up an agreement as 
according to Article 8 of the Constitution280. The Constitutional Court 
decided, however, not to take note of the urgency, in a judgment that marks 
                                                          
278 The Sentence in OLIR- Osservatorio delle libertà ed istituzioni religiose 
(https://www.olir.it/ricerca/getdocumentopdf.php?lang=ita&Form_object_id=5713). 
279 In OLIR (https://www.olir.it/documenti/?documento=6134). 
280 See A. LICASTRO, La Corte costituzionale torna protagonista dei processi di transizione 
della politica ecclesiastica italiana?, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, Rivista telematica 
(www.statoechiese.it), n. 26 del 2016, p. 27. 
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“one of the most timid moments - if not of true regression - of Constitutional 
jurisprudence in ecclesiastical matters”281. 
 
 
4 - Conclusions 
 
To find an answer to the question on what religion is, we have to turn back 
to scholarship. Silvio Ferrari tried to elaborate a definition, making a 
distinction between "religion" and "belief"; the first offers to believers a 
transcendent reality, answering the fundamental questions of human 
existence, it has a moral code and engages the faithful, especially through 
acts of worship. Belief, which can be atheist, agnostic, philosophical, 
pacifist, animalist, vegan, and so much more, offers an interpretation of 
natural reality, but it does not invite you to believe in an "Ultimate Reality, 
an Absolute, or a Vital Force"282. If it is true that it is almost impossible to 
identify a paradigm of religion, because there are realities that escape 
definition, we do however have the tools to elaborate a definition, starting 
from the religions already existing in our society283. 
The first observation to be made is that, looking at reality, religion 
does not always correspond to the model of religious confession, and the 
difference between them is played out on the level of organization of its 
rules and regulations. A religious confession must be organized and it must 
have a juridical organization, while religion pervades the culture and 
therefore it forges the identity of the person. 
Italian Constitutional jurisprudence is therefore called to make a 
cultural effort - as it has done in the past, for example, when it stated the 
supreme principle of “laicità” (secularism) - to try to give a meaning to the 
word “religion”. It is an effort necessary in a society characterized more and 
more by the presence of different cultures. It is a necessity if we want to 
create a pacific coexistence. Religion and culture are in fact two closely 
related phenomena; we can say that there is a "interpenetration between 
religion and culture"284. In culturally homogenous societies, such as was 
                                                          
281 V. PACILLO, La politica ecclesiastica tra discrezionalità dell’Esecutivo, principio di 
bilateralità e laicità/neutralità dello Stato: brevi note a margine della sentenza della Corte 
Costituzionale n. 52 del 10 marzo 2016, in Lo Stato. Rivista semestrale di Scienza costituzionale e 
Teoria del diritto, IV (2016), n. 6, p. 249. 
282 S. FERRARI, La nozione giuridica di confessione religiosa (come sopravvivere senza 
conoscerla), in V. Parlato, G.B. Varnier (eds.). Principio pattizio e realtà religiose minoritarie, 
Giappichelli, Torino, 1995, p. 35. 
283 S. FERRARI, La nozione giuridica di confessione religiosa, cit., pp. 31-32. 
284 M. RICCA, Laicità interculturale. Cos’è?, in G. Macrì, M. Parisi, V. Tozzi (eds.), Diritto 
e religione. L’evoluzione di un settore della scienza giuridica attraverso il confronto fra quattro libri, 
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found in the Italy of the last century, there was no question of 
understanding what a religion was. Nowadays the categories mix and 
“cultural difference frequently assumes the same features as religious 
identity. In so doing, it claims nothing but its own space within the public 
space, that is, along the same paths that all subjects of law tread every 
day”285. Multicultural society requires jurists to better understand what the 
boundaries of religion are, because without understanding this, it is 
impossible to govern and prevent conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
Plectica, Salerno, 2012, p. 61. 
285 M. RICCA, A modest proposal: An Overgrown Constitutional Path to Cultural/Religious 
Pluralism in Italy, in CALUMET - intercultural law and humanities review, 3 (2/2016), p. 10 
(http://www.windogem.it/calumet/index.asp?lang=eng). 
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1 - Introduction 
 
The present paper analyzes the problem of the definition of religion in 
English case law. Giving a legal definition of religion and identifying its 
parameters is challenging. It can therefore be considered an “undertaking 
bound for failure”286: such a topic is more widely developed in other fields 
of study287, but the sociological notion does not exactly lend itself to 
defining “what courts ought to protect”288.  
At the same time such a legal definition of religion, as clear as 
possible, plays a key role. This is due to the increasing weight recognized 
in modern legal systems to the collective dimension of religious freedom. 
Such a notion (and the related “binomial confessions-sects”)289 is not a mere 
academic question. It has a substantial impact on the state recognition of a 
“religious” status to groups and allows them to enjoy a specific juridical 
regime290. For this reason States, if they wish to maintain a strict attitude of 
deferential abstention (“hands-off” approach), are obliged to provide a 
definition of religion. However, there is a high risk of offering over- or 
under-inclusive solutions291. Moreover, even though the possibility of a self-
                                                          
286 See C. MILLER, “Spiritual but not Religious”: Rethinking the Legal Definition of Religion , 
in Virginia Law Review, vol. 102, 2016, p. 841. 
287 See R. N. BELLAH, Religious Evolution, in American Sociological Review, vol. 29, 1964, 
pp. 358-374.  
288 See N. TEBBE, Nonbelievers, in Va. L. Rev., vol. 97, 2011, p. 1135. 
289 See G. CAROBENE, Problems on the legal status of the Church of Scientology , in Stato, 
Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), 21/2014, p. 1. 
290 See A. LICASTRO, Il diritto statale delle religioni nei paesi dell’Unione Europea, Milano, 
Giuffrè, Second Edition, 2017, p. 64 ff. 
291 See S. FERRARI, I.C. IBAN, Diritto e religione in Europa occidentale, Bologna, il 
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qualification seems to be the best option, it is not exempt from the risk of 
encouraging frauds. This is because “sham religions” might exploit this 
opportunity to enjoy the benefits recognized to religious groups. 
For all these reasons, State approach should be founded as far as 
possible on neutral standards in order not to intrude into ambits that should 
be strictly regulated by religious groups. 
 
 
2 - The English religious landscape and its connected system of legal 
protection 
 
Evolution in the religious landscape in England is in progress; the last one 
has been described by some Authors as “three-dimensional” (Christian, 
secular and religiously plural)”292. In any case, some trends are palpable: a 
gradual and continuous decrease in affiliation to traditional churches; an 
increase of atheism; a rise of faiths connected with immigration (Islam). A 
high number of minority religious groups also belong to minority ethnic 
communities, giving rise to intricate connections between race, religion and 
culture. Minorities show a greater loyalty to their culture and their religion, 
while majority churches experience the attitude of “believing without 
belonging” in the faithful293.  
In the search for a balance between the interest of minority groups to 
safeguard some key aspects of their culture and their religion and state 
concern for social cohesion, the English approach is very distant from the 
policies of assimilation (such as the French one) and it has traditionally 
opted for a more pluralistic and permissive model. However, such a policy 
raises concerns in those who are worried about the risks of religious 
fundamentalism, community segregation, and the vulnerability and 
powerlessness of “minorities within minorities”294. 
The present day legal framework mirrors these basic changes: even 
though the Church of England is still the established state religion and as 
such enjoys a more favourable status than other denominations and 
maintains its entanglement with the public sphere, there has been, from the 
18th century onwards, a gradual process of improvement of the legal 
                                                          
Mulino, 1997, p. 68. 
292 See M. NYE, P. WELLER, Controversies as a Lens on Change, in Religion and Change in 
Modern Britain, L. Woodhead, R. Catto (eds.), Abingdon, Routledge, 2012, pp. 34-54. 
293 See G. DAVIE, Believing without Belonging, Oxford-Cambridge (Mass.), Blackwell, 
1994. 
294 See M. MALIK, Minorities Legal Orders in the UK. Minorities, Pluralism and the Law , 
London, The British Academy, 2012. 
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treatment of other religious groups “from persecution to tolerance and 
latterly to accommodation”295. The recent legal acts encourage the 
recognition of an appropriate quantum of religious liberty to all religious 
groups (even though minority groups still complain they do not play on a 
level field of complete equality). Nowadays the protection of religious 
freedom seems increasingly intertwined with the safeguarding of equality 
and human rights296: minority religions view recent legal statutes as an 
opportunity of further amelioration of their legal treatment; on the contrary, 
some voices of Christian opinion feels “marginalised” and “penalized” by 
such new legal narrative implementing “equality and diversity”297.  
Finally, the peculiarity of a commom law system, where case law has 
a predominant role, as it goes to integrate and change the rules introduced 
by the legislator, should not be overlooked. 
 
 
3 - The meaning of religion under Charity Law: the process of evolution 
from the Segerdal to the Hodkin case 
 
There has never been a common legal definition of religion in English law, 
because of the number of world religions, social changes, and the various 
legal contexts. In England, there is no formal system of recognition or 
registration of groups as “religion”. However, religious groups can obtain 
certain advantages, such as tax benefits, registering as religious charities. 
The Charity Commission recognizes the “advancement of religion” as a 
charitable purpose. However, in order to obtain such a status, religious 
charities are required to demonstrate that they carry out their activities for 
the public benefit. Approved forms of religion traditionally enjoyed the 
support offered by charity law, but from the nineteenth century onwards 
English courts have had to cope with religious pluralism and they have 
recognized that the idea of “religion” can incorporate non-Anglican forms 
                                                          
295 See M. HILL, Reasonable Accommodation: Faith and Judgement, EUI Working Papers, 
2016, p. 1; M Hill, R. Sandberg, N. Doe (eds) Religion and Law in the United Kingdom, 
Netherlands, Wolters Kluwer, Second edition, 2014, pp. 26-27.  
296 The 1998 Human Rights Act seems to incorporate the guarantees offered by the 
ECHR into English law. The Equality Act 2010 prohibits unlawful harassment, 
victimization and direct and indirect discrimination at work founded on religion or belief; 
it is the legal tool by which Great Britain fulfills its obligations under EU Directive 2000/78. 
See P. EDGE, L. VICKERS, Review of Equality and Human Rights Law Relating to Religion and 
Belief, Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2015, p. 28. 
297 See A. DONALD, K. BENNETT, P. LEACH, Religion or Belief, Equality and Human 
Rights in England and Wales, Manchester, Equality an Human Rights Commission, 2012, p. 
112 ff. 
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of Christianity298, non-Christian religions such as Judaism299, less 
widespread religious groups (Hindu, Sikh, Bahai, Zoroastrian and Jain 
groups)300, and also some Buddhist groups (notwithstanding the traditional 
Judeo-Christian centric concept of deity adopted by the English judiciary), 
rejecting atheism from the ambit of the accepted religious realities301. 
Most recent case law concerns new religious groups, such as the 
Church of Scientology, and their attempts to have their buildings registered 
as places of worship under the Places of Worship Registration Act 1855, just 
to enjoy the more favourable conditions offered by the State to religious 
premises302. 
According to the Segerdal case (which arose from an attempt by the 
Church of Scientology to have a chapel registered as a place of worship 
under the Places of Worship Registration Act 1855), Scientology is more a 
philosophy of the existence of man and of the concept of life, rather than a 
religion; it does not involve “religious worship” as such, since it is not 
connected with “reverence or veneration of God or of a Supreme Being”303. 
Such a theistic definition of religion has been repeatedly underlined 
in subsequent cases304 and also when the Charity Commission decided to 
reject the application of Scientology to obtain the status of a charity305.  
                                                          
298 See Thornton v Howe (1862) 21 Beav 14 (UK). 
299 See Re Michel’s Trust (1860) 28 Beav 39 (UK). 
300 See P.W. EDGE, Religion and Law: An Introduction, London, Ashgate, 2006, p. 107. 
301 See Re South Place Ethical Society ([1980] All ER 918 (UK). According to Judge Dillon, 
in the decision Re South Place Ethical Society, religion “is concerned with man's relations 
with God, and ethics are concerned with man's relations with man. The two are not the 
same, and are not made the same by sincere inquiry into the question: what is God?; 
besides, religion is about faith in a god and worship of that god”. 
302 Worship meetings of over 20 people are allowed only in buildings (other than private 
residences) registered as places of worship (Places of Religious Worship 1812s.2 (UK)); 
registration is required to hold religious marriage ceremonies; buildings registered as 
places of worship are exempt from the planning controls concerning buildings of special 
value for conservation purposes (Ecclesiastical Exemption (Listed Buildings and 
Conservation Areas) Order 1994 art. 4). 
303 See R v Registrar General, Segerdal and another, in All England Law Reports, [1970] 3 All 
ER. 
304 In 1974 the Immigration Appeal Tribunal stated that Scientology cannot enjoy the 
privileges accorded in the immigration law to the ministers of religion.  
305 In 1999 it stated that “it is accepted that Scientology believes in a supreme being”, 
but “the core practices of Scientology, being auditing and training, do not constitute 
worship as they do not display the essential characteristic of reverence or veneration for a 
supreme being”. Scientology’s application was also rejected because the Commission 
underlined that its benefit would have been enjoyed only by elected members and not by 
the public as a whole. According to previous case law, in fact, “[...] a benefit will not be 
recognised for the public as a whole if it relies upon metaphysical causation, for instance 
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A recent ruling, nevertheless, addresses the question whether a 
building of the Church of Scientology can be registered as a “place of 
meeting for religious worship”, so that a civilly valid marriage ceremony 
can be solemnized there306.  
Such a decision reverses the traditional British approach to the 
concept of religion. Lord Toulson, who wrote the leading judgement, 
provided a detailed description of the idea of religion307: from this 
definition, religion might be described as a system of beliefs transcending 
sensory perception or scientific data, that is respected by a group of 
believers (so the associational nature of religion is emphasized), which aims 
at explaining mankind’s position in the universe and its relationship to the 
infinite, and to teach its followers how they should live their lives in 
accordance with the spiritual principles linked to the belief system. Within 
this concept of religion, which develops the functional role of the belief 
system in the adherent’s life and his “ultimate concern”308, Scientology can 
clearly be considered a religion, its spiritual leaders can hold religious 
services and its premises can be registered as places of worship.  
Following this ruling, religion cannot be limited to faiths 
worshipping a supreme God because doing so would also mean excluding 
Buddhism, Jainism, Taoism, Theosophy and part of Hinduism from the 
religious sphere; this assumption would even cause an undue interference 
with intricate theological issues.  
                                                          
prayers by cloistered nuns to benefit the world as a whole” (Gilmour v Coates [1949] AC 426 
(UK). However, a public advantage can be recognised also to a small religious group, as 
the Commission traditionally starts from the assumption that advancing any religion is 
advantageous, and then assesses the public importance of such a benefit. See A. VAN ECK 
DUYMAER VAN TWIST, Religion in England, in Mit welchem Recht? Europäisches 
Religionsrecht im Umgang mit neuen religiösen Bewegungen, a cura di K. Funkschmidt., Berlin, 
Evangelische Zentralstelle für Weltanschauungsfragen, 2014, pp. 74-90.  
306 See R (on the application of Hodkin and another) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and 
Marriages [2013] UKSC 77, 11 December 2013.  
307 “I would describe religion in summary as a spiritual or non-secular belief system, 
held by a group of adherents, which claims to explain mankind’s place in the universe and 
relationship with the infinite, and to teach its adherents how they are to live their lives in 
conformity with the spiritual understanding associated with the belief system. By spiritual 
or non-secular I mean a belief system which goes beyond that which can be perceived by 
the senses or ascertained by the application of science. I prefer not to use the word 
“supernatural” to express this element, because it is a loaded word which can carry a 
variety of connotations. Such a belief system may or may not involve belief in a supreme 
being, but it does involve a belief that there is more to be understood about mankind’s 
nature and relationship to the universe than can be gained from the senses or from science. 
I emphasise that this is intended to be a description and not a definitive formula”.   
308 See Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, in Harv. L. Rev., vol. 91, 1978, 
pp. 1066-67. 
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Such a decision offers therefore a solution for the particular case of 
those religions (such as Buddhism), which previous case law preferred to 
qualify as “exceptional cases" rather than expanding the meaning of 
religion to include non-theist beliefs309. 
By its very words, it seems that the English court has been deeply 
influenced by an examination of some foreign Court decisions in order to 
face the problem posed by the Church of Scientology: such decisions 
develop an “analogic” approach, whereby the belief system in question is 
compared to other belief systems already accepted as “religions”. Some of 
the standards adopted in such rulings, in order to identify a “religion”, as 
the involvement of the transcendent factor of belief systems and the 
observance of particular standards or codes of conduct by adherents, have 
been applied to this English ruling310.  
                                                          
309 In fact, Lord Toulson added that “The evidence in the present case shows that, among 
others, Jains, Theosophists and Buddhists have registered places of worship in England. 
Lord Denning in Segerdal [1970] 2 QB 697, 707, acknowledged that Buddhist temples were 
"properly described as places of meeting for religious worship" but he referred to them as 
"exceptional cases" without offering any further explanation. The need to make an 
exception for Buddhism (which has also been applied to Jainism and Theosophy), and the 
absence of a satisfactory explanation for it, are powerful indications that there is something 
unsound in the supposed general rule”. See K. BROMLEY, The Definition of Religion in 
Charity Law in the Age of Human Rights, in The International Journal of Not-For-Profit Law, vol. 
3.1, 2000, p. 41. 
310 See Court of Appeals of the United States, 3rd Circuit, Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197 
(1979); High Court of Australia, in the Church of the New Faith v. Comm'r of Pay-Roll tax 
(Victoria) (1983) 154 CLR. In the first decision, Judge Adams of the Third Circuit has 
suggested a test for religion consisting of three parameters. He has identified the task of 
religion as providing a comprehensive belief system: as opposed to an isolated teaching, it 
supplies an all-embracing set of beliefs that "addresses fundamental and ultimate questions 
having to do with deep and imponderable matters”. Such basic questions include: "the 
meaning of life and death, man's role in the Universe, [and] the proper moral code of right 
and wrong ". Uniting these two ideas, religion can be defined as a comprehensive belief 
system that focuses on the fundamental questions of human existence, such as the meaning 
of life and death, man's role in the universe, and the nature of good and evil; the 
requirement of a comprehensive belief system addressing fundamental questions is 
stressed, as it provides an acceptable starting point to define the concept of religion.  
Finally, a religion can often be recognized by the presence of "any formal, external, or 
surface signs that may be analogized to accepted religions” (formal services, ceremonial 
functions, the existence of clergy, structure and organization, efforts at propagation, 
observation of holidays and other similar manifestations associated with the traditional 
religions). Cfr. B. CLEMENTS, Defining Religion in the First Amendment: A Functional 
Approach, in Cornell Law Review, vol. 74, 1989, pp. 532-558. 
In the second decision, the Court had to decide “whether the beliefs, practices and 
observances which were established by the affidavits and oral evidence as the set of beliefs, 
practices and observances accepted by Scientologists, are properly to be described as a 
religion”. It stated that: “We would therefore hold that, for the purposes of the law, the 
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There is a further significant point. Once Scientology had been 
included within the meaning of a religion, if its chapel could not have been 
registered under the Places of Worship Registration Act because its services 
do not involve the kind of veneration which the Court of Appeal in Segerdal 
considered essential, the result would have been to prevent Scientologists 
from being married anywhere in a form which involved use of their own 
marriage service.  
They could have held a service in their chapel, but it would not have 
been a legal marriage, and they could have had a civilly valid marriage on 
other “approved premises” under section 26(1)(bb) of the Marriage Act, but 
not in the form of a religious service, because of the prohibition in section 
46B(4) of the Marriage Act 1994311. They would therefore have been under 
a double exclusion and discrimination, not only compared to atheists and 
agnostics, but also to most religious groups. The result would have been 
illogical, discriminatory and unjust. When Parliament prohibited the use of 
any “religious service” on approved premises in section 46B(4), it did so on 
the assumption that any religious service of marriage could lawfully be held 
at a meeting place for religious services by registration under Places of 
Worship Registration Act. 
 
 
4 - The meaning of “belief” under Equality and Human Rights Law 
 
Under Charity Law, on the basis of which the recognition of the status of 
religion involves the enjoyment of some financial benefits, a more reluctant 
approach has been adopted towards nontraditional belief systems by the 
judiciary; however, under Equality and Human Rights Law, UK courts 
have found that most beliefs deserve protection and are not prone to 
questioning the legitimacy or worth of a person’s most authentic beliefs 
unless they conflict with human dignity.  
                                                          
criteria of religion are twofold: first, belief in a supernatural Being, Thing or Principle; and 
second, the acceptance of canons of conduct in order to give effect to that belief, though 
canons of conduct which offend against the ordinary laws are outside the area of any 
immunity, privilege or right conferred on the grounds of religion”. So, the Court held that 
Scientology can be granted the status of religion.  
311 Section 26(1)(bb), as inserted by section 1(1) of the Marriage Act 1994, permits 
marriages to be solemnized on the authority of a superintendent registrar on “approved 
premises”. Under that provision, marriages can now take place in hotels or elsewhere.  
The form of marriage on approved premises is governed by section 46B, as inserted by 
section 1(2) of the 1994 Act, and sub-section (4) provides: “No religious services shall be 
used at a marriage on approved premises in pursuance of section 26(1)(bb) of this Act”. 
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Such an approach is broader and more coherent with the most recent 
legislative trends (aimed at managing a multicultural social context), on the 
grounds of which the definition of religion was re-assessed in the light of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, the Strasbourg jurisprudence312 
and the EU Directives313. According to this trend, both “philosophical” and 
“religious” beliefs deserve a wider protection, which cannot be limited to 
established religions314: so the category of belief includes all claims of 
conscience, even the deeply held secular ones.  
Under Human Rights and Equality Law, The UK courts tend to 
implement the principles derived from the Strasbourg Court cases to 
determine whether a religious or a philosophical belief merits protection 
under equality legislation or Article 9 ECHR, thus weakening the boundary 
between religion and conscience. 
                                                          
312 See Arrowsmith v United Kingdom (1978) 3 EHRR 218; H v UK (1992) 16 EHRR CD 44; 
Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 293; Chappell v United Kingdom (1987) 
53 DR 241. In the last case the ECtHR recognised Druidism as a religion under Article 9. 
The Charity Commission has also identified Druidism as a religion (Application 
forRegistration of the Druid Network, 21 September 2010). Otherwise, the Commissioners did 
not recognise the Pagan Federation (Application for the Registration of the Pagan Federation, 
2012) or the Gnostic Centre as charities for the promotion of religion (Application for the 
Registration of the Gnostic Centre, 16 December 2009). 
313 Section 3 (2) (a) of the Charities Act 2011 states that "Religion" includes a religion 
which involves belief in more than one god and a religion that does not involve belief in a 
God. Under the Equality Act 2010, religion means “any religion” and belief means “any 
religious or philosophical belief”; atheism is also included. The Explanatory Notes (para. 
52) accompanying the Equality Act 2010 follow Strasbourg jurisprudence in explaining that 
a “philosophical belief” must “be genuinely held; be a belief and not an opinion or 
viewpoint based on the present state of information available; be a belief as to a weighty 
and substantial aspect of human life and behaviour; attain a certain level of cogency, 
seriousness, cohesion and importance; and be worthy of respect in a democratic society, 
compatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental rights of others”. 
314 See Farrell v South Yorkshire Police Authority [2011] EqLR 934 (ET), where the 
Employment Tribunal held that the claimant’s belief in a New World Order - “a secret 
satanic ideology to enslave the masses and claim control of the world’s resources” - was 
not a belief deserving protection. It was “wildly improbable” and did not reach the 
required standards of cogency or coherence. See Hashman v Milton Park Dorset Limited 
[2011] EqLR 426 (ET), where the Employment Tribunal held that belief in the sanctity of 
life and anti-fox-hunting are qualified for protection. On the contrary, the House of Lords 
has held that pro-hunting views are not under the protection offered by Article 9 ECHR (R 
(Countryside Alliance) v Attorney General [2008] 1 AC 719). See also Alexander v Farmtastic 
Valley Ltd and Others [2012] EOR 222, in which case the Employment Tribunal held that 
beliefs about the treatment of animals that embodied vegetarianism and aspects of 
Buddhism were protected beliefs; Streatfield v London Philarmonic Orchestra Limited [2012] 
EqLR 901, where the Employment Tribunal granted humanist beliefs protection under the 
Equality Act 2010. 
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According to these decisions, a belief must be genuinely held; it must 
be a belief and not an opinion or viewpoint based on other information315; 
it must reach a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and 
importance316; it must be considered worthy of respect in a democratic 
society; it has to be coherent with human dignity and it must not be 
incompatible with the fundamental human rights317. A philosophical belief 
should have a similar position or cogency as a religious belief is equipped 
with, but it does not need to be shared by others318 A “one-off belief”, that 
is to say, a belief that does not fully rule a person's existence, may 
nevertheless admitted to the protection reserved to religious beliefs319.  
 
 
5 - The recent case of the Temple of the Jedi Order 
 
Following its traditional strict approach, in 2016 the Charity Commission 
rejected an application to be granted the status of religion from a group self-
qualified as the Temple of the Jedi Order (TOTJO). TOTJO is an entirely 
web-based organization and the Jedi are almost exclusively an online 
community. The information provided on the TOTJO’s website and 
produced in support of the application, which includes the content of the 
sermons and transcripts of the Live Services which are founded upon the 
Jedi Doctrine and recite the Creed (adopted from the Prayer of St. Francis 
of Assisi) were taken into consideration.  
In its ruling, the Commission stated that although the group makes 
“sermons”, transcripts of “live services” and a “creed” available on its 
website, and has its own calendar of special days and other forms of 
                                                          
315 For example, the thesis, founded on current research concerning the effects on 
children, that single-sex couples should not be allowed to adopt, was considered as an 
opinion rather than a belief in McClintock v Department of Constitutional Affairs [2008] IRLR 
29. 
316 In some cases a belief was dismissed on these grounds and the House of Lords has 
questioned the appropriateness of this enquiry by courts (R (Williamson) v Secretary of State 
for Education and Employment [2005] 2 AC 246). According to the Arrowsmith case, the House 
of Lords accepted that pacifism was a protected belief in this case. 
317 Thus, a religious belief, which involves exposing others to torture or inhuman 
punishment, would not obtain protection (R (Williamson).  
318 See Grainger Plc v Nicholson [2010] ICR 360: in this case, the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal held that a belief in man-made climate change, and the connected moral 
imperatives, could be considered, if genuinely held, as a philosophical belief for the 
purposes of the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations (SI/2003/1660).  
319 See Grainger, where pacificism and vegetarianism are one-off beliefs in this sense, but 
both have been qualified as protected beliefs. 
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“religious” practice, its activities did not have the required elements of 
“worship” to be considered as religious320. 
Besides, the Charity Commission held that Jediism "lacked the 
necessary spiritual or non-secular element" to be qualified as a religion. 
The absence of a belief system was emphasized: the Commission 
stated there was not sufficient evidence that "moral improvement" was 
central to the beliefs and practices of Jediism and it did not have the 
"cogency, cohesion, or seriousness" to be classified as a belief system. 
Finally, the Commission held that a religion must also have a 
positive beneficial effect on society in general and feared that, otherwise, 
Jediism might, in part, have an "inward focus" on its members. 
 
 
6 - Conclusions 
 
The lack of a clear definition of religion leaves a lot of discretionary power 
in the hands of judges. The government trend is aimed at allowing the 
courts and tribunals the task of facing the definitional issues as they turn 
up. In fact, “given the wide variety of different faiths and beliefs in this 
country”, it was not considered appropriate for the government to assess 
the legitimacy of particular religions or beliefs 321. 
Courts feel uncomfortable about giving a legal definition of religion. 
Even so, the judiciary is encharged to determine the range of the concept on 
a case-by-case basis, according to the context in which the question arises. 
Case law witnesses the long process of evolution concerning the 
meaning of religion in the English legal system. In the past, it was connected 
to a set of shared values and to its national Christian identity. 
Multiculturalism, globalization and secularism have led to a weakening of 
such a traditional approach, in view of the new needs of coping with 
religious diversity and plurality. Such needs are the tip of the “iceberg” of 
the difficult balance between state secularism and the social demands of 
religious accommodation. At the same time, the English legal system has 
accepted the idea that religions are not static and cristalyzed sets of value. 
                                                          
320 “Although these publications borrow from the prayers and texts of world religions, 
in the context of TOTJO the Commission is not satisfied that the 'Live Services' on the 
website, the published sermons and the promotion of meditation evidence a relationship 
between the adherents of the religion and the gods, principles or things which is expressed 
by worship, reverence and adoration, veneration intercession or by some other religious 
rite or service […]. In particular, it is significant that Jediism may be adopted as a lifestyle 
choice as opposed to a religion”. 
321 See Government consultation on implementing EU Directive 2000/78 (para 13.5). 
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Moreover, it recognizes their more flexible and dynamic dimension, which 
is the effect of the social and cultural context they interact with.  
The primary advantage of the most recent “functional” and, at the 
same time, “analogic” approach is that it offers more objective and tangible 
elements for courts to focus on while assessing whether a belief or practice 
is religious. This approach attempts to articulate more open definitional 
guidelines and to provide a concrete methodological structure to judicial 
analysis, in order to determine which belief systems can be qualified as 
religions. In this way, it tries to minimize penalization of non-traditional 
religions and to resolve the contradictions of the previous definition. Some 
borderline cases concerning newer forms of “faiths”, on the other hand, are 
qualified as undeserving of legal protection. 
A broad perspective notwithstanding emerges, aimed at including, 
rather than excluding, belief systems, in order to provide protection to a 
wide array of belief systems. This approach seems to leave a margin of 
flexibility322, giving the courts the possibility of distinguishing sham claims. 
It should mitigate future excessive judicial fluctuations, depending on the 
predilections of single courts323. In any case, such a qualification is not 
sufficient to admit that a “religious” behaviour deserves an accommodation 
if there is a violation of criminal law324.  
Under Charity Law, specifically, the legal notion of religion is prone 
to favor organized religion over individualized personal approaches. Even 
so, religion might occur also outside an institutional framework. Thus, it 
risks excluding religious beliefs that are not held by a group. The Courts 
have now overturned theism as a defining feature of religion and today 
incorporate even nontheistic belief systems. The judiciary should take a step 
further, to recognize that the presence of an organized group is not a 
prerequisite for legal protection. At the same time, the emphasis given to 
the metaphysical dimension of religion seems to reject belief systems 
grounded in the physical world (e.g. secular humanism, atheism), which do 
                                                          
322 It also takes into consideration, even though with some caution, the self-perspective 
of the same groups: “A fifth and perhaps more controversial, indicium (see Malnak v Yogi) 
is that the adherents themselves see the collection of ideas and/or practices as constituting 
a religion” (p. 174). 
323 It is in fact similar to the one developed by Judge Adams in Malnak v. Yogi, which is 
strictly constructed by comparing religious and nonreligious belief systems. 
324 See R v Taylor [2001] EWCA Crim 2263 (23 October 2001) (UK), and R v Andrews 
[2004] EWCA Crim 947 (5 March 2004) (UK), cases concerning the religious use of drugs 
by Rastafarians. The courts stated that, even though Rastafarianism is a religion, and that 
the drugs were aimed at religious purposes, the legal prohibition is consistent with Article 
9(2) ECHR. Cfr. R. Sandberg (ed.), Religion and Legal Pluralism, Burlington (VT), Ashgate, 
2015. 
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not include any transcendent factor, as religions. However, in this regard, a 
deeper analysis of new forms of spirituality and the option to offer them 
legal protection seems to impose itself as a future task for the judiciary. 
Moreover, such a trend would be in harmony with the new social 
need to satisfy the expectations of religious pluralism in a religiously 
neutral framework. It would avoid the risk, on one hand, of creating an 
excessively open system, which would make religious beliefs and ways of 
life or even “sham religions”all equal. On the other hand, it would prevent 
using anachronistic parameters. It also might try to minimize the risk of a 
pervasive judicial interference into theological matters which courts are not 
equipped to weigh up325.  
Such an overcoming of the ”obsolete patterns of 
inclusion/exclusion”326, drawing “lines between religious and nonreligious 
belief systems”327, will surely have a positive impact on the recognition of 
other groups as religions. It would, in fact, not only cover the claims of those 
who complain of discrimination under the Equality Act 2010, but also 
include the purposes of Charity Law.  
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: The present paper analyzes the problem of the definition of religion 
in English case law. Case law witnesses the long process of evolution concerning 
the meaning of religion in the English legal system. In the past it was connected to 
a set of shared values and to its national Christian identity. Multiculturalism, 
globalization and secularism has led to a weakening of such a traditional 
approach, in view of the new needs of coping with religious diversity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
325 See MBA v. London Borough of Merton, [2013] EWCA Civ 1562. 
326 See G. CAROBENE, Problems on the Legal Status of the Church of Scientology, cit., p. 15. 
327 See C. MILLER, “Spiritual but not Religious”: Rethinking the Legal Definition of Religion , 
cit., p. 853. 
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The meaning of ‘Religion’ in Hellenic case law 
 
 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction - 2. Hellenic case law: “prevailing religion” and “known 
religion” - 3. The meaning of religion in Hellenic case law - 4. Conclusions. 
 
 
1 - Introduction 
 
To correctly explore the meaning attributed to the concepts of religion and 
religious confession in Hellenic jurisprudence, I consider it essential to 
account for some peculiarities of the Greek legal system that constitute 
elements of particular interest in comparative legal studies. On the one 
hand, continuous evolution and stratification of legal sources can be 
observed and, on the other, the singular link existing between the Eastern 
Orthodox Church of Christ and the Hellenic Republic and the consequent, 
significant importance of Orthodoxy in the legal framework of the latter328. 
                                                          
328 Although it is not completely anomalous within Europe, the Greek situation does 
have some unusual characteristics. In terms of the relationship between the State and 
religious confessions, Greece can be placed alongside Denmark, Great Britain and Sweden. 
In relation to one of the possible relationships between the State and the religious 
phenomenon, it has been observed that: “Il modello della separazione […] può pertanto 
ricevere applicazione sia attraverso un principio di indifferenza dello Stato, sia attraverso 
un principio di collaborazione […]. Nella seconda ritroviamo tutte quelle carte 
costituzionali che segnano un superamento del modello dianzi esaminato, ed esprimono 
piuttosto un aspetto più consono alla configurazione e agli orientamenti dello Stato 
sociale…in un quadro di neutralità che si fa tuttavia parziale per quelle confessioni 
storicamente maggioritarie nella rispettiva tradizione nazionale. Non si esclude pertanto 
che vengano previsti regimi preferenziali per alcune confessioni riconosciute […]. Tale 
preferenza assume contorni giuridici più marcati quando certe confessioni coincidono col 
riconoscimento di chiese nazionali”. See G. DE VERGOTTINI, Diritto costituzionale 
comparato, 4a ed., vol. I, Cedam, Padova, 2004, p. 349. T. RIMOLDI, (I rapporti Stato-Chiesa 
nell'Europa dei Quindici, in www.olir.it, January 2005, p. 2) writes: «[...] è possibile ricondurre 
i tipi fondamentali di sistemi di relazioni, almeno basandosi sulla posizione che le Chiese 
hanno nei diversi ordinamenti giuridici, a tre grandi gruppi. Un primo gruppo è 
caratterizzato dal fatto che una o, più raramente più Chiese, hanno assunto il ruolo di 
'Chiesa di Stato" o di "Chiesa stabilita". A questo gruppo appartengono la Danimarca, la 
Finlandia, la Grecia, l'Inghilterra, e la Svezia». See also F. MARGIOTTA BROGLIO, Il 
fenomeno religioso nel sistema giuridico dell’Unione Europea, in F. MARGIOTTA BROGLIO, 
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On this point, it is clear that the Hellenic legal system displays 
heterointegration329, through the subsumption of the fundamental dogmas of 
the Orthodox faith in the regulatory order, and even within the constitution 
introduced, with strong symbolic value, by the Preamble which invokes the 
Holy, Indivisible and Consubstantial Trinity330. 
The jurisprudence that will be examined331 reveals the permeation of 
the religious precept in the legal one, to the extent that, in some cases, it 
does not seem to realize the objective lack of balance that this causes in 
terms of protecting the declinations of the right of religious freedom of 
individuals and of non-orthodox confessional communities living within 
the territory of the State332.  
The reading of the verdicts of the Άρειος Πάγος (Court of Cassation, 
hereinafter ΑΠ) of the Συμβούλιο της Επικρατείας (Council of State, 
hereinafter ΣτΕ) like those of lower jurisdictions, reveals that, alongside a 
                                                          
C. MIRABELLI, F. ONIDA, Religioni e sistemi giuridici. Introduzione al diritto ecclesiastico 
comparato, il Mulino, Bologna, 2004, p. 88 ss.; C.K. PAPASTATHIS, Stato e Chiesa in Grecia, 
in, Stato e Chiese nell’Unione Europea, a cura di G. Robbers, Giuffrè, Milano, 1996, p. 79 ss. 
329 The phenomenon characteristically indicates the integration of the legal system 
through resorting to different systems from the one to be completed, that is, different 
sources from the dominant one, the law. See F. MODUGNO, voce Ordinamento giuridico 
(dottrine), in Enciclopedia del diritto, vol. XXX, Giuffrè, Milano, 1980, p. 725 ss. In relation to 
the Hellenic Republic, there is talk of “incorporazione di norme di diritto confessionale 
nelle leggi statali” A. LICASTRO (Il diritto statale delle religioni nei Paesi dell’Unione Europea. 
Lineamenti di comparazione, Giuffrè, Milano, 2012, p. 25) which appropriately highlights 
how the Statutory Charter of the Church of Greece is also state law (Law no. 590 of 1977). 
330 ΣYNTAΓMA THΣ EΛΛAΔAΣ “Eις τo όνoμα της Aγίας και Oμooυσίoυ και Aδιαιρέτoυ 
Tριάδoς”. The Preamble to the Constitution of Greece “constitutes a matter of different 
institutional significance, because, as it is widely believed, this reference is of a symbolic 
and not a normative nature”. See C. PAPAGEORGIOU, Religion and Law in Greece, Kluwer 
Law International BV, The Netherlands, 2015, p. 30. See also Δ. Θ. ΤΣΑΤΣΌΣ, Συνταγματικό 
δίκαιο, Σάκκουλας Αντ., Αθήνα, 1992, p. 592 ss. The Greek constitution, approved by the 
Fifth Constitutional Assembly and which came into force in 1975 - after the fall of the 
regime of the Colonels in July 1974 - was subjected to review in 1986, in 2001 and in 2008, 
without the maintenance of the Preamble ever being questioned. For the different 
constitutional review operations see Δ.Θ. ΤΣΑΤΣΌΣ, Ε. ΒΕΝΙΖΕΛΟΣ, Ξ. ΚΟΝΤΙΑΔΙΣ (επιμ.), 
Το νέο Σύνταγμα. Πρακτικά Συνεδρίον για το αναθεωρηένο Σύνταγμα του 1975/1986/2001, 
Σάκκουλας Αντ., Αθήνα-Κομοτηνή, 2001; see V. PERIFANAKI ROTOLO, Cenni sulla 
revisione della Costituzione greca del 2001, in Diritto Pubblico Comparato ed Europeo, 2002-2, p. 
469 ss. 
331 Following the more plentiful production of jurisprudence on individual religious 
freedom over the last decade, the jurisprudence on the subject being considered here 
appears rather scarce; in fact, it is legitimate to have the impression of a substantial lack of 
debate on the issue.  
332 Γ. ΣΟΤΗΡΕΛΗ, Η “αναπτυξη τηϛ θρησκευτικής συνειδήσης” στην Προκρουστεια κλίνη 
της “Επικρατουσα Θρησκεία” in Νομικο Βήμα, 43 (1995), p. 986. 
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slightly sluggish requirement to guarantee cultural and religious pluralism 
in the Hellenic social structure, the Greek judge still has a strong 
preoccupation to safeguard and outline the position and role of the Greek-
Orthodox Church in its relations with the Republic and with citizens333, 
aware that Orthodoxy represents the incarnation, not only of the historical 
and cultural identity, but also the ethnic identity, of the Greek people334. 
 
 
2 - Hellenic case law: “prevailing religion” and “known religion” 
 
This situation is undoubtedly the result of a dramatic historical experience, 
emotional connections and structured ideological convictions that shine 
through in the argumentations of the Greek courts. 
In the first place and regardless of the religious issue that emerges, 
Greek jurisprudence does not miss the opportunity to outline the 
consolidated and unquestioned interpretation of the provisions of Art. 3 
par. 1 Σύνταγμα (significantly placed among the fundamental principles of 
the legal system), which attributes the role of “predominant religion” to the 
Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ335.  
                                                          
333 On the other hand, in its approach to the different aspects of the legal discipline of 
the religious phenomenon, the Greek magistracy cannot neglect a precise choice of the 
constituent. As has been observed: “[…] the system of unity between State and Church was 
in essence maintained in the present Constitution - despite the declared intention on the 
part of the government which was then in office, but also of the opposition parties - to 
proceed with a constitutional separation of the two institutions”. C. PAPAGEORGIOU, 
Religion and Law in Greece, cit., p. 44.  
334 On this point, the President of the Episcopal Conference of Greece and Archbishop 
of Athens, Mons. Nikolaos Foskolos, stated, in an interview with the international news 
agency Zenit: «[…] for most Orthodox Greeks, anyone who isn’t Orthodox is not really 
considered Greek. The other Christian confessions and other religions are officially called 
“foreign religions” “ξένα δόγματα”». The text of the interview can be consulted online on 
the website (https://it.zenit.org/articles/la-chiesa-cattolica-in-grecia-tra-luci-e-ombre/). 
335 In the fundamental law in force the provisions on the structure of official relations 
between the State and the Orthodox Church are, for the first time included, not in Art. 1, 
but in Art. 3. The recognition of the Eastern Orthodox Church as prevailing has remained 
unchanged in each of the numerous constitutional texts that have followed on from each 
other since 1821, the year that the Greek War of Independence against the Ottoman Empire 
began. See the Constitutions of Epidaurus (§ a’, 1822), of Astros (§ a’, 1823), of Troizina 
(Art. 1: “Religion of the Territory”, 1827), of the year 1844 (Art. 1-2), the year 1864 (Art. 1-
2), the year 1911 (Art. 1-2), the year 1927 (Art. 1), the year 1952 (Art. 1-2). On this point see 
Κ.Θ. ΖΏΗ, Γ.Ε. ΛΑΣΘΙΩΤΆΚΗΣ, Π.Θ. ΓΙΑΝΝΌΠΟΥΛΟΣ, Η ιστορική εξέλιξη των διατάξεων του 
Συντάγματος (1822-2001), Ινστιτου το Ελληνικη ς Συνταγματικη ς Ιστορι ας και Συνταγματικη ς 
Επιστη μης, Σα κκουλας Αντ. Ν., Αθη να - Κομοτηνη , 2003. 
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The jurisprudential interpretation of this requirement has at most a 
declaratory flavour, based on the quantum criterion of the “religion 
professed by the overwhelming majority of the Greek population”336, but it 
often diverges, specifically tracing this prevalence back to the fact that from 
the early centuries of its appearance until the present day, the Orthodox 
Christian confession has been identified with the history and actual 
existence of Hellenism337.  
This peculiar symbiosis between the secular and the religious 
settings, underlined by the reference of Art. 3 par. 1 of the fundamental Law 
to unity in the dogma and the immutable observance of the “[…] holy 
apostolic and synodal canons, like the holy traditions”338, has consolidated 
the interpretation of jurisprudence according to which the precept 
constitutionalizes the sacred canons (as defined by the seven Ecumenical 
Councils, from 325 to 787 A.D., the local synods and the Fathers of the 
Church), formally integrating them into the list of hierarchically higher-
level state sources339. 
The ΣτΕ, first in 1967 and also following the promulgation of the 
current constitution, actually stated that not only the sacred canons relating 
                                                          
336 See Administrative Court of Appeal of Athens, judgment no. 1700 of 1983.  
The domestic Constitutional Court has also, in the past, made reference to the “religious 
sentiment of the majority of citizens”; for example on the constitutional legitimacy of 
criminal legislation to protect the religious phenomenon of 1930. See judgments no. 125 of 
1957; no. 79 of 1958; no. 39 of 1965; no. 14 of 1973. On this point see O. FUMAGALLI 
CARULLI, “A Cesare ciò che è di Cesare, a Dio ciò che è di Dio”. Laicità dello Stato e libertà delle 
Chiese, Vita e Pensiero, Milano, 2006, pp. 103-104. 
337 Hence, the Chania Administrative Court of Appeal, judgment no. 115 of 2012 which refers 
to the verdicts of ΣτΕ no. 3768 of 2009; no. 2176 of 1998; no. 3356 of 1995; no. 3533 of 1986. See 
also the judgment of the Heraklion Court of First Instance, judgment no. 87 of 1986. It has also been 
authoritatively stated in doctrine that: “The prevailing religion is prevalent because it is inextricably 
connected with the traditions and the majority of Hellenes”.  See C.K. PAPASTATHIS, Greece: 
A Faithful Orthodox Christian State. Τhe Οrthodox Church in the Hellenic Republic, in J. 
MARTÍNEZ-TORRÓN, W. COLE DURHAM JR., Religion and the Secular State. Interim 
National Reports (Issued for the occasion of the XVIIIth International Congress of 
Comparative Law, Washington, D.C., July 2010), The International Center for Law and 
Religion Studies, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah, 2010, p. 344. See also, Π.Δ. 
ΔΑΥΚΤΟΓΛΟΥ, Συνταγματικό δίκαιο. Ατομικά δικαιώματα, Εκδο σεις Σα κκουλα Α.Ε., Αθη να, 
2012, pp. 376-377.  
338 “[…] óπως εκείνες, τους ιερούς αποστολικούς και συνοδικούς κανóνες και τις ιερές 
παραδóσεις”. 
339 ΣτΕ, judgment no. 2176 of 1998; no. 3356 of 1995. Both Hellenic jurisprudence and 
doctrine have dealt extensively with the issue of the “constitutional coverage” offered to 
the sacred canons and the sacred traditions by the provision in question. In fact, the subject 
takes on crucial importance due to the significant legal implications on the internal 
freedom of the Orthodox Church.  
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to dogmatic subjects but also those relating to administrative issues have 
been constitutionalized340, thus establishing the subjection of the ordinary 
legislator who, according to this interpretation, “cannot revise or amend 
basic canonical institutions pertaining to ecclesiastical administration, 
meaning all the canons that have been established in a stable and long-
standing manner within the Church”341. 
In addition to the concept of predominant religion, the jurisprudence 
offers just as clear an interpretation of the concept of “γνωστń θρησκεία”, 
that is, “known religion” of which Art. 13 par. 2 Σύνταγμα guarantees 
protection and freedom of worship within the limits of respect for public 
order and good customs.  
The consolidated jurisprudence of the ΣτΕ denies that the 
requirement of the renown of a confession, or a religious creed, depends on 
a previous formal recognition of the civil authority or the Orthodox 
religious authority342.  
A religious confession can be defined as being known if, on the one 
hand, it professes clear and evident dogmas and truth of faith, which are 
taught publicly and are accessible to anyone interested in them343, and has 
known institutions and aims and, on the other, celebrates its rites in an 
unhidden way344.  
                                                          
340 In actual fact this contrasts with its previous orientation according to which the 
supreme administrative judge had denied that the constitutional coverage of Art. 3 par. 1 
also extended to the sacred canons of a dogmatic nature. The distinction between doctrinal 
sacred canons and administrative sacred canons is also extraneous to the Orthodox Church 
which has never recognised or applied this differentiation within its own corpus canonum. 
On this point see, among others, Κ.Γ. ΠΑΠΑΓΕΩΡΓΊΟΥ, Πορίσματα από την εκκλησιαστική 
νομολογία του Συμβουλίου της Επικρατείας του έτους 1987, in Αρμενόπουλος Επιστημονική 
Επετηρίδα, 17 (1996), ΔΣΘ, Θεσσαλονι κη, p. 35; Σ.Κ. ΟΡΦΑΝΟΥΔΆΚΗΣ, Οι ιεροί κανόνες και 
το Σύνταγμα (Αντισχόλιο ή η «άλλη» ερμηνευτική προσέγγιση), in Αρμενόπουλος, 35 (1981), 
ΔΣΘ, Θεσσαλονι κη, pp. 82-83. 
341 See C. PAPAGEORGIOU, Religion and Law in Greece, cit., p. 47. See also C.K. 
PAPASTHATHIS, Stato e Chiesa in Grecia, cit., p. 83. 
342 ΣτΕ, judgment no. 310 of 1997; no. 493 of 1997. 
343 “Κατα  την ε ννοια των ανωτε ρω συνταγματικω ν διατα ξεων, "γνωστη  θρησκει α" ει ναι 
εκει νη της οποι ας τα δο γματα, η λατρει α και τα διδα γματα αυτη ς εκτι θενται δημοσι ως και 
ασκου νται φανερα , δεν χρησιμοποιει δε προς επικρα τησι ν των με σα ανελευ θερα και δη 
αντι θετα προς το ελευ θερον πνευ μα της ανεξιθρησκει ας, ως ει ναι ο (αθε μιτος) 
προσηλυτισμο ς”. Thus ΣτΕ, judgment no. 1842 of 1992. 
344 “[…] δεν είναι γνωστή εκείνη, της οποίας η λατρεία είναι κατά μέρος έστω μυστική 
και η διδασκαλία κατά μέρος έστω απόκρυφη”. See Court of Heraklion, judgment no. 87 of 
1986. See also: ΣτΕ judgment no. 494 of 1997; no. 4600 of 2005; no. 1920 of 2014; Athens 
Court of Appeal judgment no. 5018 of 2011; Court of Athens, judgment no. 17115 of 1988. 
It is interesting to observe how this definition from jurisdiction was fully quoted by Law 
4301/2014 entitled “Organization of the Legal Form of Religious Communities and their 
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3 - The meaning of religion in Hellenic case law 
 
In the jurisprudence-based reconstruction of the pre-requisite of notoriety 
it is actually irrelevant that the dogmas of the religious confession express 
a position considered heretic by the prevalent religion in Greece345, just as 
it is not significant that the rites are officiated in private places not equipped 
for worship or not open to the public or rather in other public spaces346. 
Likewise, the ΣτΕ specified that, for constitutional purposes, it is not 
significant that the religious movement does not contemplate the 
appointment of religious ministers or that it does not recognize the 
ministry, according to the meaning officially attributed to the term in the 
Orthodox Church. The provision of the qualification of religious leader, 
officiant or religious minister is to be established based on the statutory 
autonomy of the religious confession itself347.  
                                                          
organizations in Greece” which in Art. 1 refers to the “known religion” as to a “religion that 
has no hidden beliefs but clear dogmas and its worship is free and accessible to everyone”. 
345 A religious confession “ανεξα ρτητα απο  τον χαρακτηρισμο  τους ως αιρε σεως ε ναντι 
της Ανατολικη ς Ορθο δοξης Εκκλησι ας, αποτελου ν γνωστη  θρησκει α κατα  την ε ννοια του 
α ρθρου 13 παρ. 2 του ισχυ οντος Συντα γματος” Thus, the Court of first instance of 
Thessaloniki, judgment no. 1080 of 1995 which refers to the decision of the ΣτΕ (in plenary 
session) no. 2105 of 1975. 
346 Athens Court of Appeal, judgment no. 5018 of 2011. However, it is to be observed 
that, despite this, the restrictive administrative procedure connected with the granting of 
the permits and licences for opening non-Orthodox buildings for worship is still 
considered constitutionally compatible. In fact, the ΑΠ ruled on this point with its decision 
no. 20 of 2001 stating that the system of permits for opening places of worship actually 
aimed to protect public order and that the provisions of Law no. 1363 of 1938 and its 
implementing decree of 20.5-2.6.1939 are not in contrast with Art. 13 par 1 and Art. 13 par. 
2 Σύνταγμα or with Art. 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in terms of 
controlling the requirements envisaged by the Fundamental Charter. See also ΣτΕ, 
judgment no. 1920 of 2014 and no. 1411 of 2003. However, it is necessary to point out the 
recent legislative openness displayed through the suppression of the need for 
authorisation from the local Orthodox ecclesiastical authority to open non-Orthodox 
buildings for worship (see Art. 27 Law no. 3467 of 2006). 
347 The principles referred to in the text are clear in the decision of the supreme 
administrative judge on the exemption from military service of a ”religious officiant” of a 
known confession: “Τέλος για την απαλλαγή από την στράτευση αρκεί το ότι ο 
ενδιαφερόμενος είναι θρησκευτικός λειτουργός γνωστής θρησκείας (δόγματος ή 
θρησκεύματος), χωρίς να απαιτείται όπως το συγκεκριμένο δόγμα έχει τύχει εγκρίσεως ή 
αναγνωρίσεως με πράξη της Πολιτείας ή της Εκκλησίας, ενώ είναι αδιάφορο αν οι 
θρησκευτικοί λειτουργοί αυτού στερούνται ιερωσύνης υπό την καθιερωμένη στην Ορθόδοξη 
Εκκλησία έννοια του όρου αυτού”. Thus ΣτΕ, judgment no. 494 of 1997. Where present, 
religious ministers of the known confession, are to be subject to the same supervision and 
bound to the same obligations envisaged by Art. 13 par. 3 Σύνταγμα for religious ministers 
of the prevalent religion. 
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The relevant requirements for the celebration of the rite and any issue 
relative thereto shall also be subject to autonomous discipline, according to 
the precepts imposed by the creed professed by the same confession, 
naturally within the limits of the constitutional ban on proselytism, respect 
for public order and good customs348. 
In relation to the limits contemplated by Art. 13 par. 2 Σύνταγμα, the 
Hellenic judges offer an overall interpretation that identifies them in the 
“set of principles and fundamental, cultural, social, economic and moral 
conceptions that prevail in Greece and govern peaceful and tranquil 
coexistence and society”349. 
Both in the literature offered by the ordinary courts and by the ΣτΕ, 
the requirements mentioned above and no others decide which religious 
group enjoys constitutional guarantees to be set forth as the “known 
confession” and which one, on the contrary, remains excluded because of 
the secrecy of the dogmas and teachings and because of the hidden setting 
in which the rites are celebrated. Hence a movement that is professed to be 
religious cannot be likened to a known confession, rather to a sect or a secret 
and illegal society350. 
In fact, from this perspective, it is interesting to note that, although 
the jurisdictional bodies seek to maintain a neutral position towards all 
known religions in order to prevent discriminatory treatments to their 
detriment, the attitude of Hellenic judges can be harder when a religious 
movement makes an attempt to join the constitutionally protected category. 
                                                          
348 ΣτΕ (in plenary session), judgment no. 919 of 1970 and judgments no. 494 of 1997; no. 
4600 of 2005; no. 1920 of 2014. 
349 “[…] η δημοσι α τα ξη και τα, εις την γενικη  ε ννοια αυτη ς περιλαμβανο μενα χρηστα  
η θη, υπο  την ε ννοια του συνο λου των θεμελιωδω ν, πολιτειακω ν, κοινωνικω ν, οικονομικω ν 
και ηθικω ν αρχω ν και αντιλη ψεων που κυριαρχου ν στην Ελλα δα, ρυθμι ζουν την ειρηνικη  και 
η ρεμη συνυ παρξη και συμβι ωση”. Court of Athens, judgment no. 17115 of 1988. 
350 ΣτΕ, judgment no. 1842 of 1992; Court of Heraklion, judgment no. 87 of 1986. The 
Council of State, in its decisions, has ruled as “known religions” Methodists (judgment no. 
2274 of 1972), Seventh Day Adventists (judgment no. 2004 of 1991; no. 1952 of 1992), 
Mormons and Evangelical Churches (judgment no. 2058 of 1957 in Plenary Session; no. 
2275 of 1962), Jehovah’s Witnesses (judgment no. 2105 of 1975; no. 2106 of 19759), the 
Apostolic Church of God (judgment no. 1842 of 1992), the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter 
Day Saints (judgment no. 549 of 1991), the Church of Christian Brothers (judgment no. 749 
of 1971), the Apostolic Church of Pentecost (judgment no. 2155 of 1966; no. 2226 of 1969), 
and Old Calendarists (judgment no. 1444 of 1991 in Plenary Session).  
Jewish and Muslim religions are the only groups considered, by law, to be a ‘‘legal 
person of public law’’ (“Νομικό Πρόσωπο Δημοσίου Δυκαίου”). All other known religions, 
including the Roman Catholic Church, are considered ‘‘legal persons of private law”. See 
C. PAPASTATHIS, Greece: A Faithful Orthodox Christian State. Τhe Οrthodox Church in the 
Hellenic Republic, cit., pp. 371-372, and extensively Κ.Γ. ΠΑΠΑΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΥ, Έκκλεσιαστικό 
Δικαίου. Θεωρία και Νομολογία, Εκδόσεις Μπαρμπουνάκη, Θεσσαλουίκη, 2013, p. 166 ss. 
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On this point, a verdict of the Court of Heraklion is particularly significant, 
rejecting the application made by the “Christian Church of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses of Crete” to be included in the list of known religions. According 
to the Cretan judge, the “Christian” denomination for the confession in 
question is false and misleading and represents an act of proselytism of 
millenarianism which cannot be considered a known religious confession, 
rather a political or social organization whose principles contrast with 
public order and good customs351. 
To conclude its logical and argumentative stance, the Court of 
Heraklion proposes a definition of the ontological concept of religion with 
all evidence based on the model of monotheist confessions of the Old 
Testament. 
 
“[…] Religion, as we know, is the system of teaching by revelation of 
the existence of an almighty and superior entity, who rules the things 
of the world according to his wish and to whom honour, worship and 
adoration are due. Christianity is the religious confession of Christians 
based on the preaching and teaching of its founding God, Jesus Christ, 
as set forth in the New Testament and as interpreted by the Apostles, 
the Fathers and the Synods”352. 
 
Therefore, while the confession of the Jehovah’s witnesses is a known 
confession353, according to the Cretan judge, “Jehovah's Witness Christians” 
abuse the adjective, misleading believers and implementing behaviour that 
amounts to the crime of proselytism354. 
                                                          
351 “Μα ρτυρες του Ιεχωβα : Απο ρριψη αι τησης για αναγνω ριση σωματει ου με την 
επωνυμι α "Χριστιανικη  Εκκλησι α των Μαρτυ ρων του Ιεχωβα  Κρη της" γιατι ο τι τλος του 
ει ναι απατηλο ς και αποτελει προσηλυτιστικη  ενε ργεια του χιλιασμου . Ο χιλιασμο ς δεν 
αποτελει γνωστη  θρησκει α αλλα  πολιτικοκοινωνικη  οργα νωση της οποι ας η δρα ση, 
αποκαλυ πτεται στα χιλιαστικα  ε ντυπα που κυκλοφορου ν και αντι κειται στη δημο σια τα ξη 
και τα χρηστα  η θη. Τα κυ ρια σημει α του δο γματος των χιλιαστω ν, απο  που ξεκινα  και που 
αποβλε πει. Αξιο ποινη η δρα ση των χιλιαστω ν”: Court of Heraklion, judgment no. 87 of 1986. 
352 “Θρησκει α, ως γνωστο ν ει ναι συ στημα διδασκαλι ας εξ αποκαλυ ψεως περι της 
υπα ρξεως παντοδυνα μου και υπερτα του Όντος, που ρυθμι ζει κατα  τη θεληση  Του τα του 
κο σμου και σ' Αυτο  οφει λεται πα σα τιμη , λατρει α και προσκυ νηση. Χριστιανικη  δε Θρησκει α 
η  Χριστιανισμο ς ει ναι η θρησκει α των Χριστιανω ν, που εδρα ζεται στο κη ρυγμα και τη 
διδασκαλι α του ιδρυτου  της και Θεου  Ιησου  Χριστου , ο πως παραδο θηκε στην Καινη  (Νε α) 
Διαθη κη και ερμηνευ θηκε απο  την Ιερα  Παρα δοση δηλ. υπο  των Αποστο λων, των Πατε ρων 
και των Συνο δων”.  
353 This has been indicated various times by the ΣτΕ. Among many, see judgments no. 
2105 of 1975; no. 2106 of 1975; no. 2484 of 1980; no. 1411 of 2003. 
354 The legal situation of “Jehovah's Witness Christians” was later solved (first by the 
Court of first instance of Athens, judgment no. 520 of 1989 and then by the ΣτΕ with 
decision no. 490 of 1999) through their identification with the confession known as 
Jehovah’s Witnesses for the substantial identity of dogma and beliefs. 
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In practice, there is no doubt that the compression of the enjoyment 
of the right of collective religious freedom is already essentially comprised 
in the actual concept of “known religion” since the ascertainment of the 
subsistence and contents of the pre-condition required by Art. 13 par. 2 
Σύνταγμα, does not exclude a margin of discretion355 by the relevant judicial 
authority. 
 
4 - Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, it appears that Hellenic jurisprudence is still marked by a 
trend towards ideological selectivity.  
Although more recent verdicts lean towards the recognition of the 
religious freedom of believers of religions other than the Orthodox one in 
its multiple declinations356, it is impossible not to notice how the verdicts 
examined appear to see the need to protect the ethnic and cultural identity 
of the Greek population and tend to underline how the Greek Orthodox 
                                                          
355 This discretion, under certain aspects, resounds with that recently granted by the 
Italian Constitutional Court to the Government through judgment no. 52 of 2016. On the 
opening of negotiations with the Union of Rationalist Atheists and Agnostics for the 
purpose of stipulating the agreement as per Art. 8, paragraph 3 of the Constitution, the 
judges of the Palazzo della Consulta did in fact state that: «[…] in una situazione normativa 
in cui la stipulazione delle intese è rimessa non solo alla iniziativa delle confessioni 
interessate, ma anche al consenso del governo, quest’ultimo “non è vincolato oggi a norme 
specifiche per quanto riguarda l’obbligo, su richiesta della confessione, di negoziare e di 
stipulare l’intesa” (sentenza n. 346 of 2002). Ciò deve essere in questa sede confermato, 
considerando altresì che lo schema procedurale, unicamente ricavabile dalla prassi fin qui 
seguita nella stipulazione delle intese, non può dare origine a vincoli giustiziabili» (point 
5.2 of the “Considerato in diritto”). The judgment is published in numerous journals 
including Foro italiano, 2016, I, cc. 1940 ss. (with comments by G. AMOROSO and A. 
TRAVI). See also M. MIELE, Confessioni religiose, associazioni ateistiche, intese. A proposito di 
Corte cost., 10.3.2016, n. 52, in La Nuova Giurisprudenza Civile Commentata, 10 (2016), second 
part, p. 1368 ss. 
356 For example, on the subject of mixed marriages (Athens Court of Appeal, judgment 
no. 5018 of 2011); civil service to replace compulsory military service (ΣτΕ, judgment no. 
494 of 1997); child custody to a Jehovah’s Witness parent in case of divorce (Court  of 
Thessaloniki, judgment no. 1080 of 1995); right to confidentiality regarding professed faith 
(ΣτΕ, judgment no. 3356 of 1995); exoneration from the teaching of the Orthodox religion 
in schools (ΣτΕ, judgment no. 3356 of 1995; no. 2281 of 2001; no. 582 of 2011). It is to be 
noted that the exoneration is reserved for students of other religions, since for Orthodox 
Christian students compulsory attendance of this subject, like the recitation of the morning 
prayers and participation in the liturgies envisaged by the school calendar, by constant and 
univocal jurisprudence of the Council of State, are considered unavoidable consequences 
of belonging to a precise religious community. 
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religion represents a sort of ‘drive belt’ of ethnic and religious values and 
the instrument for transplanting ‘Orthodox awareness’ in citizens357. 
The voice of the Hellenic courts, from this point of view, is 
monophonic: “επικρατούσα θρησκεία” does not mean either the official 
religion or the State religion358 but, based on the text of the constitution, it 
is granted special concern and a favourable policy that does not stretch to 
the other religions. In particular, the prevalent religion is given a public 
tribute in all state manifestations, pre-eminence in national feasts and the 
determination of the calendar of the feasts; and its teaching in public schools 
is guaranteed for a sufficient number of hours per week so as to fulfil the 
right of Greek society to perpetuate Orthodox faith, worship and traditions 
to the new generations359.  
In the jurisprudential interpretation, this is essentially due to the fact 
that Orthodoxy continues to be identified with the dimension of national 
identity interwoven into the history of the Greek people and constitutes at 
the same time “the greatness relative to Greek civilization that continues to 
live in symbiosis with the Orthodox tradition”360. 
Because of these such vibrant statements, their strong symbolic and 
evocative value and the constantly underlined need to preserve and 
transmit the values of national awareness based on the Orthodox Christian 
doctrine, the Hellenic courts appear to be inclined towards singular 
religious patriotism. 
                                                          
357 This is the opinion of the constitutionalist Γ. ΣΟΤΗΡΕΛΗ, Η “αναπτυξη τηϛ 
θρησκευτικής συνειδήσης” στην Προκρουστεια κλίνη της “Επικρατουσα Θρησκεία”, cit., p. 
982. 
358 A different interpretation of the jurisprudence based on the consideration that the 
legal meaning of the term “prevalent” is that of the “official religion of the Greek State” is 
provided by C.K. PAPASTATHIS, Stato e Chiesa in Grecia, cit., p. 79. 
359 ΣτΕ, judgment no. 2176 of 1998; no. 3356 of 1995. 
360 “[...] ο ελληνικο ς πολιτισμο ς εξακολουθει να τελει σε οργανικη  σχε σι με την ορθóδοξη 
παρα δοση”: Chania Administrative Court of Appeal, judgment no. 115 of 2012. The 
peculiar link between Hellenism and Orthodoxy is indicated by the concept of “Helleno-
Christianity”, with a rather wide interpretation that also includes the intellectual and 
spiritual heritage that has contributed to shaping modern Greek identity until the present 
day. The bonds of Greek society and Orthodoxy are maintained through a variety of 
institutions (Church, State, Education, Courts) and cultural and religious activities. 
Orthodoxy is not only a religious tradition, but also a whole culture and way of life; as an 
essential component of Greece’s heritage and an all-embracing notion that holds together 
and cements Greek society. See T. STAUNING WILLERT, A new role for religion in Greece. 
Theologians challenging the ethno-religious understanding of Orthodoxy and Greekness, in 
Innovation in the Orthodox Christian Tradition?: The Question of Change in Greek Orthodox 
Thought and Practice, ed. T. Stauning Willert, L. Molokotos-Liederman, Farnham, Ashgate, 
2012, pp. 183-205. 
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It is certainly possible to note the logical and legal consistency of 
reasoning in the jurisprudence examined, revealing the trace of an intensely 
perceived historical memory that still recognises the common thread of the 
ethnic and cultural identity of the Greek people in the survival of a common 
religious confession, a common language and common traditions. 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: In order to correctly explore the meaning that the concepts of religion 
and religious confession have for Hellenic case law, the paper considers it essential 
to account for some peculiarities of the Greek legal system: the unique bond 
between the Eastern Christian Church and the Hellenic Republic and the 
remarkable significance of the Orthodox religious precept in the regulatory 
framework of the latter. 
In the first instance, the paper sets out to show how the role of the 
“predominant religion” attributed to the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ by 
art. 3 par. 1 Σύνταγμα is uniquely interpreted by jurisprudence and goes beyond 
the mere quantum criterion of the “religion professed by the overwhelming 
majority of the Greek population” but specifically leads back to the fact that the 
Orthodox Christian confession has been identified with the history and actual 
existence of Hellenism.  
Furthermore the paper considers the interpretation offered by the Greek 
judge of the concept of “known religion” of which art. 13 par. 1 Σύνταγμα 
guarantees freedom within the limits contemplated by legislation.  
Finally, the paper sets out to show how the decisions of the Hellenic judge 
grasp every opportunity to underline how Orthodoxy is identified with the 
national identity interwoven into the history of the Greek people. 
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The meaning of ‘Religion’ in Maltese legal system 
 
 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction - 2. The meaningfully conditioning of catholic thoughts in 
the school and in the family life - 3. Conclusions about the meaning of religion in Malta. 
 
 
1 - Introduction 
 
The Republic of Malta, is a Southern European island country in the 
Mediterranean Sea, with the smallest national capital in the European 
Union, of which is a member since 2004, and member of Eurozone since 
2008361. In order to decode the meaning of religion in Malta, we must 
consider the fact that the country is an interesting example of the 
paradoxical coexistence of outdated confessionism and the unstoppable 
contemporary tendency to move towards cultural and religious pluralism. 
The centrality assigned to the Catholic Church does not affect the freedom 
of other confessions. 
Malta has always had a tight relationship with religion. On one hand, 
we find the ancient story of Saint Paul shipwrecked in the bay between 
Mistra and Mgiebah, described in the Acts of Apostles in 28,2, where the 
Apostle defines the indigenous as “barbarians showed us extraordinary 
kindness”. This event has been interpreted as a sign of blessing and divine 
predilection for the island362. On the other hand, there is the presence of St. 
John’s Knights of Jerusalem (The Order of Malta). For this reason Malta 
enjoys the privilege of a long Christian legacy and effectively become an 
Archdiocese in 1964363.  
The Maltese religious population is composed more than 90% by 
Christians, generally belonging to the Roman Catholic Church, which is 
                                                          
361 M. HARWOOD, Malta in the European Union, Routledge, London-New York, 2014.  
362 The Saint Paul tale could be used as symbol of opening to outsider and overcoming 
the fear of difference and cultural and religious prejudice, A. GRIMA, Critical 
Mediterranean Voices, in S. GALEA, A. GRIMA, The Teacher, Literature and the Mediterranean, 
Sense Publisher, Rotterdam, Boston, Taipei, 2014, pp. 103-104. 
363 file:///G:/Malta/Malta,%20Religion%20and%20Social%20Profile%20_%20National%20P 
rofiles%20_%20International%20Data%20_%20TheARDA.htm; http://www.catholic-hierarchy. 
org/diocese/dmalt.html#details.  
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also the main faith and the traditional religion of the State364, as found in 
Article 2 of Malta’s Constitution, adopted on 21 September 1964365.  
 
 
2 - The meaningfully conditioning of catholic thoughts in the school and 
in the family life 
 
In Malta, religious freedom and freedom of conscience are incorporated in 
the same framework of legal protection. In fact, Article 40 of the 
Constitution states that “All persons in Malta shall have full freedom of 
conscience and enjoy the free exercise of their respective mode of religious worship.” 
Article 45 recognizes the so-called principal of equality at law. This principle 
means that the government does not make any kind of discrimination - a 
sort of equality in front of the law - yet it does not mean that the government 
cannot make “normative differentiation” with regard to religious issues366.  
In many aspects of life in Malta, there is very strong the influence 
dictated by the presence of a State Church, involving an anachronistic 
action of the Catholic Church’s interference in temporal matters - an aspect 
that in many other Western countries has been marginalized. However, 
more can be said with regard to this aspect. At first glance, a legacy of jus 
commune appears to survive on the island, due to the fact that the same legal 
system makes use of civil law and Canon law at the same time. The 
“hybrid”367 Maltese legal system refers to Canon law, specifically with 
                                                          
364 P.W. BARKER, Religious nationalism in Modern Europe. If God be for us, Routledge, 
London- New York, 2009, p. 150. About the deep religious culture in Malta see J. 
BOISSEVAIN, Ritual escalation in Malta, in AA. VV., Religion, Power and the Protest in Local 
Communities. The Northern Shore of Mediterranean Sea, ed. by E.R. Wolf, Mouton Publishers, 
Berlin, New York, Amsterdam, 1984, pp. 163-184. 
365 Constitution of Malta art. 2: “The religion of Malta is the Roman Catholic Apostolic 
Religion. But there is more. The authorities of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church have 
the duty and the right to teach which principles are right and which are wrong. Religious 
teaching of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Faith shall be provided in all State schools as 
part of compulsory education” (in http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx 
?app=lom&itemid=8566&l=1). For a complete informations about Maltese legal system see 
J. DRAKE, P.G. XUEREB, E. BUTTIGIEB, Malta in Information Sources in Law, edited by 
J.R. Winterton, E.M. Moys, Bouker Saur, London, Melbourne, Munich, New Providence, 
N.J., 1997, pp. 307-320.  
366 A. BETTETINI, Report su Religion and Secular State: Malta, in Religion and the Secular 
State: Interim National Reports - The XVIIIth International Congress of Comparative Law 
(Washington D.C., 25 july-1 August 2010), under the direction of J. Martinez Torrón, W. Cole 
Durham Jr., Published by The International Center for Law and Religion Studies, Brigham 
Young University, Provo-Utah, 2010, pp. 494-504, specially p. 496. 
 367 See K. AQUILINA, Rethinking Maltese Legal Hybridity: A Chimerich Illusion or a 
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regard to marriage (see the marriage act. Art. 21). At times, it might seem 
that there is a limited space for a dualistic vision of the relationship between 
Church and State. 
Pushing towards a more in-depth understanding of the legal 
structure of Maltese society, we must look at the educational system, 
influenced by the dominant Catholic thinking. According to the country’s 
Constitution (Article 2), amended in 1974368, the duty to handle the 
education of young people in Malta, choosing ethics principles that 
contribute to found the legal system in the country, is attributed to the 
Catholic Church. This kind of confessionality has a special social sense, 
because reflects the real composition of the Maltese population: in fact the 
majority of Maltese citizens belong to that religion, but it doesn’t mean it’s 
a system closed to other religious option. 
Currently, according to the Agreement between Malta and the Holy 
See in 1989369, there is the obligation to teach catholic religion, with the same 
status as other teachings, however national law requires, in every school, a 
Religious counselor (ex Art. 3 of the Agreement)370, who is different from 
the religion teacher, and who is also an integral part of school structures. 
This role does not attempt to add religious information, but rather tries to 
facilitate the spiritual and religious aspects to be expressed in the school 
setting371. 
However, new contemporary imprinting on Maltese institutions 
have had a strong influence, therefore in 2011 the Ethics Education Program 
                                                          
Healthy Grafted European Law Mixture?, in Journal of Civil Law Studies, vol. 4, 2011, pp. 261-
283.  
368 Act n. LVIII 1974 n. 4 (in http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app 
=lp&itemid=27324&l=1).  
369 http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/archivio/documents/rc_seg-st_199302  
18_santa-sede-rep-malta-scuole_en.html.  
370 Agreement between the President of Maltese Episcopal Conference and The Minister 
of Education of the Republic of Malta, Art. 3: “L'animazione religiosa e la guida morale 
degli studenti, come parte essenziale della loro educazione religiosa, sarà assicurata da 
“Religious Counselors” nominati dal Vescovo Diocesano nel cui territorio è situata la 
scuola ed aventi lo “status” di “Counselor in the Education Department” o uno “status” 
ad esso equipollente. Essi svolgeranno la loro attività educativo-pastorale secondo le 
direttive della Conferenza Episcopale Maltese; Articolo 4: L'“Education Officer (Religion)” 
sarà un officiale del Governo scelto tra i ministri ordinati della Chiesa Cattolica. Egli dovrà 
avere l'approvazione, non revocata, della Conferenza Episcopale Maltese”. 
371 C. BORG, Catholic Hegemony in Malta: State Schools as sites of Cultural reproduction, in 
Rethinking hegemony, edited by T. Clayton, James Nicholas Publishers, Albert Park, 2006, 
pp. 65-67. 
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was founded in order to develop a more mature individual moral outlook 
and sensibility based on pluralistic values372. 
This initiative appears to be a realistic attempt to oust the Catholic 
Church from its monopoly on public education, denying the power to issue 
the moral rules of an entire country, as established by Constitution art. 2. 
The introduction of ethics in addition to religion offers a chance to build a 
“common ethical ground for an increasingly pluralistic society”373. 
In my opinion, we should highlight the offer set forth by the 
Archbishop of Malta to the possibility that the same Catholic schools host 
the teaching of the Muslim religion374. A debate broke out375 and 
Archbishop Scicluna insisted saying “the Catholic ethos is one of inclusion 
that respects the religious freedom of Catholic parents as well as that of 
parents of other faiths”376. However, pursuant to Article 47 (5) of the 
Education Act the parents of any minor have the right to ask that their 
children to be exempted from religion lessons, although no alternative has 
been offered yet, and the students sit out the lessons alone or receive free 
lessons.  
Another relevant test of the communion between religious and 
secular elements is the incorporation of the Faculty of Theology in the 
University of Malta following the Agreement between The Government 
and the Holy SEE in 1995, included in Article 84 of the Education Act. 
Academic degrees and diplomas conferred by the Faculty of Theology will 
have canonical and civil value.  
The study of Canon Law only exists in this Faculty in the Department 
of Pastoral Theology, Canon Law and Liturgy. There is no faculty similar to 
our Ecclesiastical law, or comparative law studies, in the Faculty of Law. 
                                                          
372 The purpose of the Ethics Program are fist to develop a mature individual moral 
outlook and sensibility based on values that are uncontroversial in principle; second to 
make mature and informed moral judgments based on the values, in a pluralistic society; 
third to respect the integrity of those who think differently; Forth: values of this kind 
correspond with democratic behavior.  
373 Religion as an identity totem, in www.maltatoday.com.mt/comment/editorial/76361/religion  
_as_an_identity_totem#.WSfzyLhkbyY.  
374 J. PISANI, The Archbishop and Muslims (in https://yforc.wordpress.com/2017/03/18/musli 
m-lover/).  
375 K. SANSONE, Debate on whether Islam should be taught at secondary schools heats up 
'Exposure to other faiths helped foster tolerance' (in https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles(view/2 
0170326/local/debate-on-whether-islam-should-be-taught-at-secondary-schools-h). 
376 P. COCKS, Archbishop reassures Church schools 'will always remain Catholic' (in 
http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/news/national/75533/watch_archbishop_reassures_church_school  
s_will_always_remain_catholic#.WS).  
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The monopoly of Catholic Church in the field of family life377 has 
been quite thoroughgoing until the Marriage Act in 1975, which provides 
for the introduction of civil marriage on the anglo-saxon model378. This 
reform produced a discrimination between catholics and non-catholics, 
because only the second type of citizen could contract a civil marriage in a 
religious form, and it would be valid from both, the religious and the civil 
viewpoint. So catholics had to celebrate two marriages until 1993 when the 
Marriage Agreement between Malta and the Vatican provided the 
recognition of the civil effects of canonical marriage379.  
According to this Agreement, Church tribunals took precedence over 
the civil courts, only if the spouses are agree to choise a court, civil or 
ecclesiastical. This norm doesn’t exist in others concordats. This prevents 
civil separation from taking place if annulment proceedings have already 
begun.  
The Marriage Act was amended in 1995, and became definitively 
pluralistic, incorporating both the anglosaxon system both the canonic one. 
Registration of decisions delivered by Ecclesiastical Tribunals are now 
effected by the Court of Appeal, which delivers a decree declaring the 
decision enforceable in Malta, after a procedure similar to Italy (delibazione) 
art. 24 Marriage Act. This was a first step to re-engage a civil jurisdiction 
over marriage380. 
                                                          
377 A. ABELA, Relationship Education for Families in Transition between Different Cultural 
Value Systems. A Maltese perspective, in H. Benson, S. Callan (eds.), What works in relationship 
education: Lessons from academics and service delivers in the United States and Europe , Doha 
International Institute for Family Studies, Doha, 2009, pp. 149-160. 
378 “Civil effects are recognized for marriages celebrated in Malta according to the 
canonical norms of the Catholic Church, from the moment of their celebration”, and “The 
Republic of Malta recognizes for all civil effects the judgements of nullity and the decrees 
of ratification of nullity of marriage given by the ecclesiastical tribunals and which have 
become executive”. Generally see R. FARRUGGIA, International Marriage and Divorce 
Regulation and Recognition in Malta, in Family Law Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Fall 1995), pp. 
627-634; ID., The influence of Roman Catholic Church in Maltese Family Law and Policy, in AA. 
VV., The Place of Religion in Family Law, ed. by J. Mair-E. Orücü, Intersentia, Cambridge, 
2011, pp. 187-206. 
379 A. BETTETINI, L’Accordo 3 febbraio 1993 tra la Santa Sede e la Repubblica di Malta sul 
matrimonio: brevi annotazioni, in Il diritto ecclesiastico, I, 1997, pp. 103-115. See the Chapter 
255 Marriage Act art. 2 (in http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lo 
m&itemid=8749&l=1).  
380 A.S. PULLICINO, The Church-State Agreement on the Recognition of Civil Effects of 
Marriage and Declaration of Nullity Delivered by Ecclesiastical Tribunals , in Forum, A Review of 
the Maltese Ecclesiastical Tribunal, No. 1, Vol. 6, 1995; Art. 24 Marriage Act, Chapter 255 Laws 
of Malta 1975, emended in 1995: “Registration of a decision as is referred to in article 23 
shall be effected by the Court of Appeal. (2) A request for such registration shall be made 
by application filed in the registry of the said court, and which shall be served on the 
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The big change came in 2011 when divorce was introduced by a 
referendum and then with the Law n.218 2012, with the approval of a 
Catholic group (Kattolici)381.  
In 2014 a third Additional Protocol has been added to the Concordat 
of 1993, allowing that an ecclesiastical tribunal will no longer prohibit a civil 
tribunal from declaring the same marriage to be null, for all civil purposes 
even on the same grounds of nullity. It appears a jurisdictional competition 
in place of the previous exclusivity. 
Another strong wound to Church jurisdiction concerning marriage 
was produced in 2014 when the Civil Unions Act Chapter 550 of Laws of 
Malta382 was promulgated, defining equality among different types of 
families that already existed in social life on the island, opening the doors 
to same sex adoption383.  
Despite these new open viewpoints to secularist social 
transformations, Malta remains the stronghold of pro-life beliefs, deeply 
rooted in the local Catholic culture, even more than in Italy or in the other 
Catholic countries in Europe.  
As a matter of fact, Malta is the only country in Europe where 
abortion is prohibited under all circumstances. Abortion is a crime pursuant 
to Articles 241-244, the Criminal Code of Malta, Chapter 9 of the Laws of 
                                                          
Director of the Public Registry and where it is presented by one only of the spouses, on the 
other spouse. (3) The respondents shall have a right to file a reply within twelve working 
days of the service upon them of the application. (4) Together with the application, the 
applicant shall file (I) One of the parties in the marriage is domiciled in, or a citizen of, 
Malta; (II) The Tribunal was competent to judge the case of nullity of the marriage insofar 
as the marriage was a Catholic Marriage; (III) The right of action and defence of the parties 
have been safeguarded in a manner substantially not dissimilar to the principles of the 
Constitution of Malta; (IV) In the case of a marriage celebrated in Malta after the 11th 
August, 1975, there has been delivered or transmitted to the Public Registry the act of 
marriage; (V) There does not exist a contrary judgment binding the parties pronounced by 
a court, and which has become final and definitive, based on the same grounds of nullity” 
(in http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument aspx?app=.lom&itemid=8749&l=1).  
381 “Referendum is Catholics' chance to be protagonists in their own church” (in 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110711065554/http://maltatoday.com.mt/news/referendum-represe 
nts-chance-for-catholics-to-become).  
382 Chapter 550, Civil Unions Act: art. 4.(1) Save as provided in this Act a civil union, 
once registered, shall mutatis mutandis have the corresponding effects and consequences 
in law of civil marriage contracted under the Act (in http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/Down 
loadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid=12172&l=1).  
383 First gay adoption in Malta was given by FAMILY Court in 13 july 2016 (in 
http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2016-07-15/local-news/Malta-s-first-child-adopted-by-a- 
gay-couple-parents-appeal-the-public-to-educate-others-6736161027; http://www.timesofmalta.co 
m/articles/view/20160713/local/court-gives-go-ahead-for-adoption-by-gay-couple-in-first-for-malt 
a.618685).  
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Malta. That said, current politics are now more inclined to legislate assisted 
pregnancies rather than legalize abortion. 
In the evolution of the Maltese awareness as a modern country, 
increasingly distant from the catholic principles and, at the same time, 
inclined to the protection of human rights, we find Bill n. 113 of 2015, 
introducing an ideal change on the vilification of religion by creating a 
balance between two equivalent rights in a multicultural society: freedom 
of speech and freedom of worship384.  
By decriminalizing the vilification of religion, the Maltese 
government eliminates the no longer tolerable difference between the 
Roman Catholic Church and others, while also granting protection, which 
was previously restricted only to the Catholic religion385, to a whole range 
of civil rights and liberties that the Constitution of Malta and the European 
Convention on Human Rights impose. But there is a Legal objection raised 
by the Curia and some jurists about the danger of circumventing the 
Constitution's rule which expressly establishes on “public morality or 
decency” in Articles 38, 40, 41, 42386. 
Due to the reduced number of members of others religions, the 
problem of regularization, by agreements or a general law, has not yet 
developed in Malta. 
With regard to family life the marriages entered into according to the 
rites or usages of a different church, or religion, are recognized as civil 
marriages by art. 17 Marriage Act, if such churches or religions are generally 
accepted, or if the Minister responsible for public justice declares them as 
recognized by law387.  
                                                          
384 T. ZAMMIT CUTAJAR, Freedom of Speech and Defamation, Times of Malta, (February 
11 2016); Religion and Free Speech: It’s Complicated, Index on Censorship (1 March 2013) (in 
https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2013/03/free-expression-and-religion-overview/).  
385 K. AQUILINA, Religion Needs Protection, Times of Malta, July 22 2015, in 
http://www.timesofmalta.com/Articles/view/20150722/opinion/Religion-needs-protection.577592; 
I. MARTIN, Vilification of Religion laws to be more reflective of today's society’  (2nd February 
2016), Times of Malta (in http://www.timesofmalta.com/Articles/view/20160202/local/vilification-
of-religion-to-be decriminalised-to-be-more-reflective-of.601041).  
386 The Curia opposed this solution, arguing that Articles 163 and 164 should not be 
repealed and eventually should be amended only to establish there it should be no 
difference between the sanctions imposed on those vilifying the Roman Catholic religion 
and those vilifying any other religion or non-belief. See CONFERENTIA EPISCOPALIS 
MELITENSIS, Position Paper on the Decriminalization of the Public Vilification of Religion and 
Pornography, 7th August 2015 (in https://www.um.edu.mt/__data/assets/pdf_ file/0008/273095/ 
POSITIONPAPER-AUGUST2015.pdf).  
387 Article 17[2] of the Marriage Act - Chapter 255 of the Laws of Malta (in http://www.ju 
sticeservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid=8749&l=).  
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Based on the terms in Article 8 of the Education Act (Chapter 327 of 
the Laws of Malta), the Minister of Education has the power to issue a 
licence to open a private school with religious orientation (In 1997 was 
established the first Muslim school). Very recently a controversy has arisen 
between The Moviment Patrijotti Maltin and Laiq Ahmed Atif, Ahmadiyya 
Muslim Community President, about the articulated proposal to remove 
Christian education from school and to allow Muslims to receive lessons in 
Arabic. The main argument to contest the proposal was the impossibility to 
understand what they are saying, with the danger of introducing extremist 
ideas contrary to Maltese way of life388. But the extraordinary news is that 
Archbishop Scicluna welcomes the idea of opening Catholic schools to 
Islam, as I said before389. 
In any case, religious minorities enjoy the same freedom as the 
Catholic Church and no recognition procedure is currently required. Many 
rules of the Penitentiary Regulation of 1995, emended in 2016, are directed 
to guarantee religious freedom to all confessions390. 
 
 
3 - Conclusions about the meaning of religion in Malta 
 
Religion in Malta is not only a bond with past memory, tradition, the 
island’s peculiar history, but it is also a guide for the present, through 
personal and community practice and through the shaping of national 
identity391 thanks to the educational system, but it is also a guide for the 
future, even if perhaps in a new pluralistic view. However, the current 
situation in Malta, full of peculiarities, embodies a detachment from the 
concept of secularism adopted in western society392. Basically, Malta 
                                                          
388 P.L. GANADO, Patrijotti hold protest over teaching of Islam in Church schools  (in 
https://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20170402/local/patrijotti-hold-protest-over-teaching-
of-islam-in-church-schools.644249). 
389 See retro p. 129.  
390 Subsidiary Legislation 260.03 Prisons Regulations, 1st October, 1995, art. 40-45, 
Religious and moral assistance (in http://www.justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx 
?app=lom&itemid=9674&l=1).  
391 For a sociologic reconstruction of the idea of identity Z. BAUMANN, Intervista 
sull’identità, a cura di B. Vecchi, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2008; about juridic consequences G. 
PINO, Identità personale, identità religiosa e libertà individuali, in Quaderni di diritto e politica 
ecclesiastica, 1/2008, pp. 119-151. About Maltese religious identity A. ABELA, Shaping a 
National Identity, in International Journal of Sociology, 35/4, 2006, pp. 22-25; D.A. 
GADZDECKA, Rights, Religious Pluralism and the Recognition of difference: off the Scales of 
Justice, Routledge, London-New York, 2015, pp. 59-60. 
392 About the birth of secularism in Europe: H. LÜBBE, La secolarizzazione. Storia e analisi 
di un concetto, Freiburg-München, 1965, ed. it by P. Pioppi, il Mulino, Bologna, 1970, p. 19; 
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signifies a strong civil recognition of religious principles in a modern formal 
constitution, in a period when all the pluralistic countries try to lighten any 
residual religious content from their legal systems, in order to allow for 
coexistence in the absence of contrasts that are ideologically aimed. It 
appears that Malta is an ancient State that derives its authority from God, 
or a paternalistic and ethic State, and not a modern, democratic and 
secularist State, which founds its legitimization not only by the equal 
political participation of all citizens, but also an open and neutral space for 
multicultural dialogue393. Malta would appear as a fundamentalist State, as 
a “subtle theocracy”394, anchored to the medieval theological myths, in 
which religious reason replaces the public reason who only can satisfies all 
citizen needs395. The Maltese political class still feels that it is a categorical 
imperative to align political choices to the religious beliefs of the majority 
of the country’s citizens. However, the weight behind the numeric criterion 
of the majority is still too strong. We live the time in which individuals use 
religion as an identification of the stability of their identity, be it ethnic or 
                                                          
G. PRETEROSSI, Prefazione a E.W. BÖCKENFÖRDE, Diritto e secolarizzazione. Dallo Stato 
moderno all’Europa unita, Laterza, Bari, 2007, pp. VI-VII; W. MÜLLER, La grande 
secolarizzazione e il tramonto della Chiesa dell’Impero, in W. MÜLLER, J. BECKMANN, L. 
COGNET, P.J. CORISH, O. KÖLHLER, H. RAAB, B. SCHNEIDER, B. STASIEWSKY, 
La Chiesa nell’epoca dell’Assolutismo e dell’Illuminismo. Storia della Chiesa, vol. VII, ed. J. Jedin, 
Prefazione L. MEZZADRI, Jaca Book, Milano, 1972, new ed. 2007, pp. 527-590. Alcuni cenni 
al criterio della maggioranza, superato dalle pronunce della Corte Costituzionale italiana 
925/1988 e 440/1995, in D. LOPRIENO, La libertà religiosa, Giuffrè, Milano, 2009, pp. 153-
154. About the italian doctrine of secularism: C. CARDIA, voce Stato laico, in Enciclopedia 
del Diritto, vol. XLIII, Giuffrè, Milano, 1990, p. 874 ss; M. VENTURA, La laicità dell’Unione 
europea. Diritti, mercato, religione, Giappichelli, Torino, 2001, pp. 106-107; O. FUMAGALLI 
CARULLI, A Cesare ciò che è di Cesare, a Dio ciò che è di Dio, Vita e Pensiero, Milano, 2006; A. 
RIGOBELLO, Laicità e secolarizzazione, in AA. VV., Lessico della laicità, a cura di G. Dalla 
Torre, Studium, Roma, 2007, p. 197 ss.; G. DALLA TORRE, Metamorfosi della laicità, in 
AA.VV., Laicità e relativismo nella società post-secolare, a cura di S. Zamagni, A. Guarneri, il 
Mulino, Bologna, 2009, p. 143 ss.; G. FELICIANI, La laicità dello Stato negli insegnamenti di 
Benedetto XVI, in AA.VV., Aequitas sive Deus, Studi in onore di Rinaldo Bertolino, vol. I, 
Giappichelli, Torino, 2011, p. 239 ss.; P. CAVANA, Laicità e libertà religiosa nella 
giurisprudenza della Corte di Strasburgo, in Res publica, vol. 8, 2014, pp. 87-110; A. FUCCILLO, 
Esercizi di laicità interculturale e pluralismo religioso, Giappichelli, Torino, 2014. 
393 J. HABERMAS, Religion in the public sphere, in European Journal of Philosophy, vol. 14, 
2006, pp. 1-25, p. 5 and p. 24. 
394 The expression is in A. SCIBERRAS, Poll: Secular State or Subtle Theocracy? Article 2 
of the Constitution of Malta? (in http://andrew-sciberras.blogspot.it/2009/08/poll-secular-state-or-
subtle-theocracy.html).  
395 J. RAWLS, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in The University of Chicago Law Review, 
n. 3, 1997, p. 766: “In short, it concerns how the political relation is to be understood. Those 
who reject constitutional democracy with its criterion of reciprocity' will of course reject 
the very idea of public reason”. 
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cultural, specifically in the contest of a forced migration due to war, 
poverty, or negation of the fundamental rights in their native countries. The 
construction of the modern State that occurs through the interruption of the 
bond between religion and violence - due to the modern virtue of tolerance 
- is perhaps a concept that should be reassessed as an attitude (tolerance) 
and as a practice (toleration). Today, pluralism is the new reality, which 
replaces tolerance396 and equality at the same time. This term embraces 
these concepts in an afterthought of the political choices that takes into 
account the different visions of the life, tightly connected to a religious 
option or a belief. However, it is quite evident that religion cannot be ousted 
from political discourse, due to its important role in a citizen’s private life, 
sometimes also a greater motivation to participate in civic life ( electoral 
battles on family issues or bioethics), and limiting religion to the inner 
courts could be dangerously short-sighted. Religion is a very human 
experience and contributes to the birth of a personal and collective 
conscience, and as a result the birth of a civil, complete and pacific living. 
We should also note that Maltese society is developing, like many 
others in the Western world, leaving behind a recent fundamentalist age, 
and now trying to update a rather anachronistic legislation, in the pursuit 
of a balance between Catholic traditions and new pluralistic needs. In 
conclusion, divorce and the reform of vilification of religion are, for 
example, the mark of a new modern country ready to now accept the 
secularist influence, in which the meaning of religion is opening, not only, 
to traditional religious thoughts, but also all kind of beliefs, not strictly 
connected to a church. Malta offers protection to these beliefs based on 
human rights. Proof of the balance that has been reached today is evident 
in the lack of important leading cases regarding religious issues, in internal 
Courts as well as in front of the European Court of Human Rights, with the 
exception of the support to Italy in the famous matter of the crucifix - 
deeming the crucifix to be a symbol of European identity and heritage. It is 
quite likely that the reason behind this balance is found in what the Acts of 
Apostles say about the Maltese population, defining these people as having 
a “rare humanity” and “extraordinary kindness”, and this quality is 
wonderfully expressed in the current work of the Archdioceses. I believe 
that thanks to some corrections to the Constitution, the great limit is the art. 
2, the Maltese legal system can reach a perfect fusion of different cultural 
                                                          
396 “Lo Stato moderno non deve conoscere più tolleranza, ma solo libertà”: F. RUFFINI, 
La libertà religiosa. Storia dell’idea (1901), Feltrinelli, Milano, 1967, p. 11; for a modern 
reflection about tolerance: M. WALZER, Sulla tolleranza, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1998; M. 
D’ARIENZO, Actualité de la tolérance, in Revue d’éthique et de théologie morale, Le Supplement, 
n. 227, 2003, p. 103 ss. 
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components. The country could still remain anchored to its origins and 
identity, yet without appearing as a legacy of the ancient Respublica sub Deo 
and the unique experience of jus commune.  
 
 
ABSTRACT:The meaning of religion in Malta is strictly connected to the peculiar 
confessional setting of his legal order. At the base of this setting there is the art. 2 
of the Constitution which confers only to the catholic church the role of country’s 
moral guide. But despite the anachronistic nature of this norm, the republic of 
Malta is opening to the reality of a balanced religious and cultural pluralism.  
 
